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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO

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(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

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Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Short, Arthur T			3644–3650					
Short, Walter C., Maj. Gen	37–169, 1617–1647		276–541, 4411–4445	220–270				2921–3231
Shortt, Creed, Pvt	452–455							
Sisson, George A			3265–3286					
Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN							4–9	
Smith, Ralph C., Maj. Gen					2	69		
Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen						195–197		
Smith, William W., Rear Adm		32–65		528–572			335–375	3354–3378, 3521–3555
Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN				1077–1081				
Smoot, Perry M., Col	1738–1742							
Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr								5009–5027
Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen					2			
Staff, W. F, CH/CM	1186–1190							
Stark, Harold R., Adm	1805–1808			2–194, 320–324, 774–810				2096–2223, 2244–2477, 5153–5175, 5202–5269, 5543–5555
Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR		323–334						
Stilphen, Benjamin L			1539–1575					
Stimson, Henry L			4037–4094 C					5416–5440 [2] 5441–5463 [1]
Stone, John F						203–204		
Street, George							411–413	
Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen						185		

Sweeney, J. J., Rev	1368–1372							
Taylor, Angus M., Jr., Capt., USA	1447–1469		3250–3257					
Taylor, Kenneth, Lt., USA	415–422							
Taylor, William E. G., Comdr	1229–1240	338–354	1071–1094	609–627				
Thielen, Bernard, Col								26–27, 34–36, 38–41, 49–55, 57–61, 64–65, 70–75, 79–80, 92–101, 103–111, 130, 138, 139–154, 165–172, 188
Thomas, James K., Lt., USA	484–486							
Thompson, O. N., Col						99		
Throckmorton, Russell C., Col			1387–1412					
Tillman, Thomas E			2134–2157					
Tindal, Lorry N., Col	390–393		4487–4500					
Tinker, Clarence, Brig. Gen	1706–1718							
Truman, Louis W., Col			1444–1453					
Turner, Richmond K., Rear Adm	1809–1829, 1861–1862	250–272		988–1024				1911–2063
Tyler, Kermit A., Lt. Col	368–376		1095–1105	446–460				
Ullrich, Ralph T., Sgt	486–489							
Underkofler, Oliver H., Lt., USNR							465–470	
Utterback, Charles J	509–517							
Van Deurs, George, Capt., USN		290–292						
Walker, Eugene B., Col			965–972					
Walsh, Roland, Brig. Gen			1381–1387					
Waterhouse, George S	1262–1272							
Waterhouse, Paul B	1373–1381							
Weddington, Leonard D., Col	1213–1219		3012–3027					
Welch, George S., Maj	422–428		2008–2014					
Wellborn, Charles, Jr., Capt., USN		383–390						
Welles, Sumner								458–473, 477–549

[1] Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
[2] Sworn statement presented to committee.

Names of Witnesses in All Proceedings Regarding the Pearl Harbor Attack—Continued

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
	Pages	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Vol.*	*Pages*	*Pages*	*Pages*
Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen	1311–1329		2722–2744					
West, Melbourne H., Lt. Col	496–499		3120–3124					
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col	1830–1842							
White, William R., Brig. Gen			1989–2007					
Wichiser, Rea B			2456–2478					
Wilke, Weslie T	1334–1340							
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm		279–288					389–410	1723–1911
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen						187–189		
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen	247–259		1345–1381					
Wilson, Erle M., Col			910–931					
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col			3663–3665					
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm				1083–1090				
Wong, Ahoon H			3677–3683					
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR						105–106	376–386	
Woodward, Farnsley C., Lt. (jg), USN							541–553	
							597–602	
Woolley, Ralph E			3750–3773					
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr		379–382					442–450	
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col			3357–3586					
York, Yee Kam	1525–1538							
Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN	1683–1705							3233–3259, 3303–3354
Zucca, Emil Lawrence			2580a–2596					

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 147

PART I OF PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY COLONEL CARTER W. CLARKE, PURSUANT TO ORAL INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY

TESTIMONY AND FINDINGS CONCERNING HANDLING OF CERTAIN TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS

Top Secret

MIS/DC/CWC/EWG/dc 74195

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

20 SEPTEMBER 1944

Subject: Investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled.

The report of the investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled is attached hereto as Tab. A. Briefly summarized, the findings disclose the following:

a. That between 1 October 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor the Secretary of State, Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Chief of War Plans Division and the A. C. of S., G–2 each received identical copies of the daily Magic material that had been screened out by Col. Bratton, and each received a copy of all of the Top Secret documents that are exhibits in this investigation.

b. During the same period the Navy Department was furnishing similar material to the President through the President's naval aide.

c. On 28 November 1941 the so-called "Winds Code" was decoded. This code provided for the warning of Japanese embassies and consulates throughout the world in a voice broadcast that relations between Japan and the United States, Japan and Russia or Japan and Great Britain, as the case might be, were to be severed and that when this word was received all code papers were to be destroyed. Arrangements were immediately made both by the Army Signal Corps and, through the Army Signal Corps, with Federal Communications Commission for listening for a message that would implement this code. However, prior to Pearl Harbor neither the F. C. C. nor the Army Signal Corps intercepted an implementing message.

d. Thirteen of the fourteen parts of Tokyo's reply to the American counter proposals were received by the War Department in the evening of 6 December and were delivered to the Department of State late that evening. The fourteenth section, which was the concluding section of the Japanese reply, and a message from Tokyo to the Japanese

ambassadors in Washington instructing that this reply be presented to the Secretary of State at one p. m., Washington time, were received in the War Department before 0900 E. S. T., 7 December 1941. As soon as possible thereafter Gen. Marshall, Gen. Gerow, Gen. Miles, Col. Bratton and Col. Bundy met in Gen. Marshall's office at the War Department and at that time Gen. Marshall decided to send a further warning message to the commanders in the Pacific area. This information was conveyed by Gen. Marshall to Adm. Stark, who concurred therein and asked that the Navy commanders be informed of the Army message. This message was filed in the War Department Message Center at 1200 noon E. S. T., received R. C. A. Honolulu 33 minutes later but not delivered to the Hawaiian Department until 7 hours and 25 minutes after its receipt by R. C. A. Honolulu.

CLAYTON BISSELL,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G–2.

Enclosures:
Tab. A.

MIS/DC/EWG/dc 74195
20 September 1944

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2:

Subject: Investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled.

1. The undersigned was appointed by the A. C. of S., G–2 to conduct an investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled. Under authority of a letter of 9 September 1944 (AGPO–M–B 333.5 (7 Sep 44)) from The Adjutant General, which read as follows:

> It is desired that you designate officers of your Division to conduct an investigation and interrogations, in accordance with the oral instructions issued to you by the Chief of Staff regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled.
>
> The officers designated to conduct this investigation will be authorized to administer oaths for this purpose.

the investigation was conducted on 14, 15 and 16 September, in Room 2C637 of the Pentagon Building. Testimony under oath was taken of Major General Sherman Miles, Acting A. C. of S., G–2 during the year 1941; Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, Chief of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division during the last half of 1941; Colonel Rufus Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division during the latter half of 1941; Colonel John T. Bissell, head of the Counter Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division during the latter part of 1941; Colonel O. K. Sadtler, Chief of the Army Communications Service during the latter part of 1941; and Mr. William F. Friedman, principal cryptanalyst of the Signal Intelligence Service during the latter part of 1941. Documentary evidence in the nature of copies of 38 Top Secret decoded Japanese messages passing between the Toyko Government and various Japanese embassies in many parts of the world in October, November and early December, 1941 were also introduced into evidence.

[2] 2. There were also introduced into evidence memoranda for the Chief of Staff in the nature of Estimates of the Situation which were made by the then Acting A. C. of S., G–2 the latter part of November and early December, 1941, all of them immediately prior to Pearl Harbor day; the findings of fact of the Roberts Report of January 1942; a telegram to the G–2, Hawaiian Department of 5 December 1941, signed Miles; a telegram signed Brink received in the War Department 6 December 1941 at 1629 E. S. T.; a memorandum of 6 December 1941 signed Perry regarding Jap Washington Embassy burning code books the night of 5 December; telegram from Melbourne, Australia from Merlesmith received in the War Department 7 December at 1950 E. S. T.; M. I. D. form containing information received from the Orient dated 3 November 1941 containing information purporting to have come from a Mr. Hirota; report of Headquarters, Third Corps Area, dated 18 December 1941 entitled, "Report of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii"; secret radiogram dated 7 July 1941 to the Commanding Generals, the Caribbean Defense Command, Philippine Department, Hawaiian Department and Fourth Army; radio message dated 27 October 1941 from Manila, signed Brink; radiogram dated 29 October 1941 from Manila signed Evans; copies of 5 radiograms sent from Tokyo to MILID between 12 July and 27 July 1941; and the following messages flowing between Commanding General, Hawaii and the War Department: 27 November 1941 Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaii; 27 November 1941 G–2 War Department to G–2 Hawaii; 27 November 1941 Commanding General, Hawaii to Chief of Staff; 28 November 1941 The Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaii; 29 November 1941 Commanding General, Hawaii to The Adjutant General; 7 December, Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaii et al.

3. All the testimony taken was stenographically reported and transcribed.

4. All the testimony and evidence received have been considered and as a result of this consideration I find the following facts:

a. That between 1 October and the afternoon of 7 December 1941 there were at least 37 coded messages that were flowing between the Tokyo Government and their embassies in various parts of the world which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence Service and were decoded. In addition there was at least one copy of a telephone conversation between the Tokyo Government and the Japanese Embassy in Washington. These intercepted and decoded messages were Top Secret material that was designated as "Magic" in the latter part of 1941. (Ex. #1, Bratton, p. 10. Sadtler, p. 1.)

b. At all times between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the Top Secret material that is involved in this investigation was handled as follows (Bratton p. 24; Miles p. —) :

It was delivered daily by the Signal Intelligence Service by hand of an officer to the office of Colonel Rufus Bratton who was then Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of M. I. D. Col. Bratton then read all of the material, screening out that which had intelligence value. The other material he then burned. The screened material was then arranged by Col. Bratton in separate piles, one for

the Chief of Staff, one for the Secretary of War, one for the A. C. of S., G–2, one for the Chief, War Plans Division and one for the Secretary of State. Col. Bratton then bound each pile in a carboard folder, inserted the folder in the proper leather dispatch case, locked each dispatch case and delivered it to the proper office, collecting at that time the bags containing the previous day's output. These bags were brought by Col. Bratton back to his office, opened and the material therein checked prior to destruction by burning.

c. Between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Chief of War Plans Division and the A. C. of S., G–2 each received identical copies of the daily Magic material that had been screened out by Col. Bratton, and each received a copy of each of the 38 Top Secret documents that are exhibits in this investigation. In addition, for a short time immediately prior to Pearl Harbor and for a short time thereafter, Gen. McNair, Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, also received daily copies of this Top Secret material. (Bratton p. 7, 24, 25; Miles p. —)

d. During this identical period the Navy Department was furnishing similar material to various officers in the Navy Department and to the President through the President's naval aide. (Bratton, p. 4—Miles p. —)

e. From time to time during this period the Chief of Staff questioned Col. Bratton as to his evaluation of certain of the Top Secret reports that are exhibits in this investigation. (Bratton p. 5 and 12)

f. That on 28 November 1941 Top Secret Army message No. 25432 was decoded. The decoding of this message read as follows (Ex. #2):

From Tokyo
To Washington
19 November 1941
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:

HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:

KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

(3) Japan-British relations:

NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.

On 28 November 1941 Col. Bratton made arrangements for listening for Japanese broadcasts that might include this code. These arrangements were made through Col. Sadtler, then in the office of the Chief Signal Officer, who put Col. Bratton in touch with a Mr. G. E. Sterling, then Chief of the National Defense Operations Section of the Federal Communications Commission. The F. C. C. did thereafter monitor Japanese broadcasts for the purpose of determining if

the Japanese sent a message using the "Winds" code. I am unable to find that a Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted by the F. C. C. or the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Bratton p. 10, 11; Miles p. —; Sadtler, p. 2; Friedman, p. 7; Ex. #3)

I find that on 5 December 1941, Col. Sadtler was informed by Adm. Noyes, Naval Communications Officer, that a Japanese message using the "Winds" code had been intercepted the previous night, and that the message, decoded, meant that Japanese-Great Britain relations were to be broken; that on 5 December 1941 Col. Sadtler so informed Gen. Miles, Col. Bratton, Gen. Gerow, Col. Gaily and Gen. Bedell Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff, but that Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton never informed Gen. Marshall personally of the Sadtler information. I do find, however, that Col. Bratton prior to this time had been informed by the Navy that Commander Rochefort of the 14th Naval [5] District knew all that our own Navy Department knew about the "Winds Code" message and that on 5 December he caused the following message to be sent the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (Sadtler p. 2, 3,; Bratton p. 17, 18; Miles p. —: Ex. #4):

> CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THRU COMMANDANT FOURTEEN NAVAL DISRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKIO REFERENCE WEATHER.

I further find that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton were on 5 December 1941, and had been for some time prior thereto, expecting a break in Jap-Great Britain relations. I further find that no officer of the Navy ever advised Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton that any message implementing the Winds Code had been received by the Navy. I find that if in fact such a message was intercepted, it was not intercepted by the Army Signal Corps or F. C. C. (Bratton p. 11, 12, 13, Roundtable; Miles p. —).

g. I find that 13 of the 14 sections of the Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843 were received by the evening of 6 December and one copy of that part of the Japanese reply was delivered by Col. Bratton to the watch officer on duty at the Department of State late in the evening of 6 December, with instructions to see that the document was delivered to the Secretary of State immediately. (Bratton p. 17; Miles p. —, Ex. #5)

h. I find that between 0830 and 0900 E. S. T. 7 December 1941 Col. Bratton was at his office in the War Department and at that time received copies of section 14 of the Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843, and also received copies of Tokyo's instructions to deliver the reply at 1:00 p. m. 7 December 1941. Top Secret Army No. 25850; that Col. Bratton then immediately attempted to contact the Chief of Staff and the Chief, War Plans Division at their offices in the War Department but these officers were not in their offices at that time; that Col. Bratton then telephoned Gen. Marshall's quarters and was informed that Gen. Marshall had gone horseback riding; that Col. Bratton requested Gen. Marshall's orderly to go out and find him at once and to ask Gen. Marshall to call Col. Bratton on the telephone as soon as practicable as Col. Bratton had an important message to

deliver to him; that Col. Bratton then called Gen. Miles, reporting what steps he, Col. Bratton, had taken and recommending that Gen. Miles come to the office at once; that either Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton thereafter called Gen. Gerow, then Chief of War Plans Division; that sometime between 1000 and 1100 E. S. T. Col. Bratton received a telephone call from Gen. Marshall and then informed Gen. Marshall that [6] he, Col. Bratton, had a message of extreme importance which Gen. Marshall should see at once and advised Gen. Marshall that Col. Bratton would bring the message to Gen. Marshall's quarters if Gen. Marshall so desired; that Gen. Marshall instructed Col. Bratton to report to Gen. Marshall in Gen. Marshall's office in the War Department as the General was on his way there; that Col. Bratton reported to Gen. Marshall in Gen. Marshall's office in the War Department at about 1125 E. S. T., which was shortly after Gen. Marshall's arrival; that shortly thereafter Gen. Miles arrived; that the message, Top Secret Army No. 25850, instructing the Japanese ambassadors to present Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843, to the Department of State at 1300 E. S. T. that afternoon was laid before Gen. Marshall and discussed; that the Chief of Staff then had on his desk the lengthy Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843, which he read aloud to those officers present; that the Chief of Staff asked all officers present for an expression of opinion as to the meaning or significance of the message, Top Secret Army No. 25850; that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton both stated that they believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply, namely 1:00 p. m., that this was an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time, that they thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that it might be into any one or more of a number of other areas; that Gen. Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, Washington time, and that the commanders in the areas, indicated should be on the alert; that Gen. Marshall then called Adm. Stark on the telephone and told Adm. Stark over the telephone that he thought the Army should send out a warning substantially as Gen. Miles urged; that after Adm. Stark replied Gen. Marshall put down the telephone and stated that Adm. Stark did not think any further warning necessary since all the forces had been several times alerted; that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton nevertheless continued to urge Gen. Marshall to send the warning; that Gen. Marshall then wrote out in pencil the warning message and there was some discussion at this particular time as to whether or not the Philippines should be included; that Gen. Marshall again got Adm. Stark on the telephone and read to Adm. Stark the message he, Gen. Marshall, had just written; that Adm. Stark apparently concurred and asked that the naval forces be also informed and Gen. Marshall added a request to that effect at the bottom of his penciled [7] warning; that about this time Gen. Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived and Gen. Marshall again asked each officer present, in succession beginning with Gen. Miles, their opinion as to the significance of the Japanese message, Army Top Secret No. 25850; that Gen. Miles said he thought it probably meant an attack on Thailand but that the timing had some significance and that warning messages to our people should be sent; that

Gen. Gerow, Col. Bundy and Col. Bratton concurred; that Gen. Marshall then gave Col. Bratton the message in Gen. Marshall's handwriting and instructed Col. Bratton to take it immediately to the Message Center for transmittal; that as Col. Bratton was about to leave there was some discussion as to whether the penciled message should go to Gen. Gerow's office for typing first but it was decided that as time was an important factor Col. Bratton should take it in its draft form to the Message Center; that as Col. Bratton left the room Gen. Gerow made a statement to the effect that if there was any question of priority involved to give first priority to the Philippines; that Col. Bratton took the message to Col. French, a Signal Corps officer then in charge of the Message Center, explained to Col. French that it was Gen. Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, giving the Philippines first priority; that Col. French then said he would give it his personal attention and that processing of the message would commence immediately; that Col. Bratton then returned to the office of the Chief of Staff and Gen. Marshall then directed Col. Bratton to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees; that Col. Bratton returned to the Message Center, talked the matter over with Col. French, who informed Col. Bratton that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes; that it was then 1150 E. S. T.; that Col. Bratton returned to the Chief of Staff's office and so reported to him. Bratton p. 14, 15, 16, 17 and 23; Miles p. —, Ex. #6, Ex. #7).

i. I find that the log of the warning message sent by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is as follows (*Ex. #8*):

	E. S. T.	*Honolulu time*
Filed War Department Message Center	12:00 noon	6:30 AM
Sent Western Union	12:17 PM	6:47 AM
Received RCA, Honolulu		7:33 AM
Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu		11:45 AM
Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department		2:58 PM

CARTER W. CLARKE,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Deputy Chief, Military Intelligence Service.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN T. BISSELL

[*1*] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 14 September 1944.
Time: 1310–1330.
Present:
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Colonel John T. Bissell.
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Colonel John T. Bissell, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. State your name, rank, organization and station please.

Col. BISSELL. John T. Bissell, Colonel, Field Artillery, Headquarters 89th Division Artillery, Camp Butner, North Carolina.

Col. CLARKE. On what date did you become a member of G–2 Division, War Department General Staff?

Col. BISSELL. I believe it was on the 25th day of May 1940.

Col. CLARKE. What were your duties at that time?

Col. BISSELL. I was assigned to the Counter Intelligence Group of the Military Intelligence Division.

Col. CLARKE. In what position?

Col. BISSELL. I was Executive Officer of that Group.

Col. CLARKE. How long did you remain on those duties?

Col. BISSELL. I remained as Executive Officer until, I think July 1, 1941, when I became the senior member of that Group.

Col. CLARKE. As Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group of M. I. D., what were your principal duties?

Col. BISSELL. The principal duties that I had were the collection, evaluation and dissemination of counter intelligence information.

Col. CLARKE. Would it be correct to state that your principal duties then dealt with what we might call domestic intelligence rather than any foreign intelligence?

Col. BISSELL. That is correct.

[2] Col. CLARKE. Did you focus your attention on any particular enemy or potential enemy?

Col. BISSELL. Yes, on the Germans and Japanese.

Col. CLARKE. By that I mean their agents in this country.

Col. BISSELL. Yes, and in our possessions.

Col. CLARKE. Were Honolulu and the Philippines included?

Col. BISSELL. They were.

Col. CLARKE. What was your chief source of information with regard to the Japanese prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. At that time it was from reports we got from the Philippines and the F. B. I., principally.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have any knowledge of or access to any material which was known as Magic or Ultra during that period prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. Prior to Pearl Harbor I did not.

Col. CLARKE. Did you know of its existence?

Col. BISSELL. I did.

Col. CLARKE. But you had no knowledge of the contents of any of the material produced?

Col. BISSELL. I never read any of it in the raw. I did receive summaries pertaining to Japanese agents in this country.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss the contents of it with either the A. C. of S., G–2 or the Chief of the Intelligence Group?

Col. BISSELL. I don't recall that I ever did.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss the Japanese situation with the Chief of the Far Eastern Branch of the Intelligence Group?

Col. BISSELL. Only on one or two occasions prior to Pearl Harbor.

[3] Col. CLARKE. Did you receive any information from F. B. I. at any time which would indicate that they had knowledge of any of this material or access to it?

Col. BISSELL. No. Of course I did receive reports on the activities of Japanese agents and attaches in the United States, but that was

obtained by following those individuals, not from any translated codes.

Col. CLARKE. Did any of this information come from wire tapping sources, to your knowledge?

Col. BISSELL. I don't believe so.

Col. CLARKE. In what form did you make available to the A. C. of S., G–2 and to the Chief of Staff such information that you did receive?

Col. BISSELL. As I recall it, we prepared in the Group daily a short memorandum if there was anything of any value.

Col. CLARKE. Was that sent to the Chief of Staff or just to the A. C. of S., G–2?

Col. BISSELL. It went to G–2. I am not absolutely certain in my own mind at that time whether I had that system in operation or not, but when I left here I had it going.

Col. CLARKE. Then you had no channels of contact with either the Chief of Staff or the Chief of the War Plans Division except through the person of the A. C. of S., G–2?

Col. BISSELL. That is correct.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever receive from F. B. I. any information which would lead you to believe that there was a possibility of any attack by the Japanese on the U. S. or any of its possessions prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did it ever come to your knowledge that certain Japanese consulates were destroying codes and burning secret documents early in December 1941?

Col. BISSELL. Yes I knew that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know it at the time?

[4] Col. BISSELL. Yes I knew it at the time.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. That was before Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. It was, I believe, the day of Pearl Harbor that the codes were destroyed. They were burned in the Japanese Embassy here in Washington.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of any other places they were burning codes?

Col. BISSELL. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear or know, prior to Pearl Harbor, that the Navy Department sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on December 3, 1941 stating that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents?

Col. BISSELL. I did not know that.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever initiate any warning message to the corps areas or department commanders with respect to sabotage prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. Yes I did.

Col. CLARKE. What did you base that on?

Col. BISSELL. I based that upon a directive that I got from the A. C. of S., G–2.

Col. CLARKE. In other words, you wrote the message at his direction.

Col. BISSELL. I did, and took it to him for correction and editing.

Col. CLARKE. Then you did not initiate it?

Col. BISSELL. I executed it and carried it out. It was initiated by the A. C. of S., G–2.

Col. CLARKE. Did you know of any message which was initiated by the Chief of the Army Air Forces to the same effect?

Col. BISSELL. No I did not.

Col. CLARKE. Will you state briefly what your actions and activities were on December 7.

Col. BISSELL. On that particular date I was at my house in Washington [5] and happened to be listening to the radio in the afternoon. I heard the commentator discuss the attack on Pearl Harbor. I went to the office immediately and was there until sometime that evening.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have any knowledge of any warning message which was sent to the commanders on the morning of December 7?

Col. BISSELL. At that time, no.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever alerted to be watching for a Jap message in code that might be given during a news broadcast?

Col. BISSELL. No. I knew about it after December 7th but not at the time.

TESTIMONY OF RUFUS S. BRATTON

PART I

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 14 September 1944.
Time: 1045–1200.
Present:
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton.
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and station please.

Col. BRATTON. Rufus S. Bratton, O–3726. Headquarters, Commandant, Headquarters 3rd U. S. Army ETO.

Col. CLARKE. When were you first assigned to duty in the G–2 section of the War Department General Staff?

Col. BRATTON. In the fall of 1936.

Col. CLARKE. And you continued in that duty until when?

Col. BRATTON. I continued on duty in one capacity or another in G–2 until the fall of 1943.

Col. CLARKE. From the time you arrived here until Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 what were your duties?

Col. BRATTON. I was at first assistant to the Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch and later succeeded him to that office.

Col. CLARKE. Who was that? Mason?

Col. BRATTON. Col. Homer Slaughter. I later succeeded him to that office as Chief of the Far Eastern Section. At that time my immediate superior was Col. Faye Brabson. He was later succeeded by Col. Charles Mason; he in turn by Col. Hayes Kroner. Upon

the latter's designation as Chief of M. I. S. I became Chief of the Intelligence Branch. I think that is accurate.

Col. CLARKE. Was one of your duties both as the Assistant and as Chief of the Far Eastern Section, the handling of this so-called Magic or Ultra material?

[2] Col. BRATTON. That is correct. When I first arrived in G–2 a copy of the day's output was placed on my desk for such information and action as was necessary or advisable. At that time the production of Magic was on a very limited scale and it was a combined product of naval communications, I believe, and the Army SIS. As we progressed in solving various codes and ciphers the quantity and quality of this material naturally improved and it became quite voluminous, and its study and evaluation occupied a large part of my time as Chief of the Far Eastern Section.

Col. CLARKE. Will you state how this material was handled from the time it was received from the Signal Corps, who saw it besides yourself, and what selections were made to go to your immediate chief, also to the A. C. of S., G–2 and to the Chief of Staff.

Col. BRATTON. Initially this material reached me through the Chief of the Operations & Training Branch of G–2. Later on this office was eliminated as a transmitter of this material and I dealt directly with the SIS and their counterpart in Navy communications. The material in later years was broken down as to source or type of code by the Army and Navy so that the Army worked on one type and the Navy on another. Normally the material was collected and coordinated by the Army SIS before it was presented to me. Occasionally, in matters of great interest or importance, an officer of the Navy would bring me a message direct, to save time.

Col. CLARKE. How many copies of this did you receive of each message?

Col. BRATTON. Initially I received no copy of any message. I simply received a statement showing that a message had been sent from one diplomatic post to another diplomatic post on such and such a date, followed by a brief summary of its contents. Later on, to further develop this very valuable source of intelligence, arrangements were made whereby I received exact copies of the decoded or deciphered message.

Col. CLARKE. Do you remember about what date that was, sir?

Col. BRATTON. We started this latter practice, to the best of my knowledge and belief, early in 1941 or late in 1940. It then became my duty to see that the proper officials of the War Department had access to the intelligence contained in these decoded and deciphered messages. This entailed so much traveling around on my part from one office to another that it was a waste of time. So at the direction of the Chief [3] of Staff, transmitted to me through the A. C. of S., G–2. I started the system of having copies made—my office having a very limited number of officers—and instituted a check system whereby all copies were returned to me for destruction. This subsequently proved impracticable because of lack of clerical help and other assistance in the Far Eastern Section, and arrangements were made with the SIS and their counterpart in naval communications to have some six copies of each decoded or deciphered message delivered to me daily for study and evaluation. By this time the volume of

this work had increased tremendously. Many of the messages were purely administrative in character and were of no interest from an intelligence point of view. They were all gone over carefully, however, to make sure that I missed no item which would be of intelligence value. Those that had no intelligence value I destroyed by burning. The others were variously processed.

Col. CLARKE. Were you assigned the duty of selecting the material that went to the A. C. of S., G–2 and to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War?

Col. BRATTON. I was.

Col. CLARKE. By whom?

Col. BRATTON. By the A. C. of S., G–2.

Col. CLARKE. Then you personally made the selection of what part of this material he saw and the Chief of Staff saw?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, they both saw the same material.

Col. CLARKE. In other words, if you decided that a message was of sufficient importance to be seen by the A. C. of S., G–2, it was also of sufficient importance to be seen by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. Is that correct?

Col. BRATTON. Not always, but the reverse was always true. If the message was important enough to be seen by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War, I of course saw to it that the A. C. of S., G–2 saw the same message so that he could talk to the Chief of Staff intelligently about it.

Col. CLARKE. Did anyone else in G–2 see this material besides you and the A. C. of S., G–2?

[4] Col. BRATTON. Initially no, but as the volume increased it became necessary for me to have assistance in handling it, and with the knowledge and consent of the A. C. of S., G–2, certain trusted clerical help and certain of my officer assistants helped me in handling it.

Col. CLARKE. Who made the selection of the material that went to the State Department?

Col. BRATTON. Initially there was no agreement on this. Frequently the Navy Department would take the same message to the State Department that we thought would be of value to them. As it was a duplication of effort we finally came to an agreement that the Army would furnish the Secretary of State with material thought to be of interest to the State Department and that the Navy would serve the President likewise.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall about what date that arrangement became effective?

Col. BRATTON. Not exactly, but it was sometime early in 1941 when a written agreement was drawn up between the A. C. of S., G–2 and the Chief of Naval Intelligence, a copy of which was placed in the G–2 files.

[5] Col. CLARKE. Initially you made a selection of what was to go to the State Department or the President and the Navy made a similar selection. Is that correct?

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

Col. CLARKE. When did you start giving all the material produced to the State Department and to the President?

Col. BRATTON. I am quite positive that at no time was all of the material given to the President for the simple reason that the bulk

of it would have been of no interest or value to him. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the State Department was never given all of the material when I was responsible for its transmission. In other words, I made the selection of what was to go to the Secretary of State and it was left to my discretion to determine the material that would be of interest to him.

Col. CLARKE. In the period from July 1, 1941 up to and including Pearl Harbor, did you ever discuss any individual message or group of messages with either the A. C. of S., G–2 or the Chief of Staff?

Col. BRATTON. Oh yes, on innumerable occasions, with both.

Col. CLARKE. Was the Chief of Staff inclined to take your evaluation on this material or did he want to act on it and place his own interpretation on it?

Col. BRATTON. He almost invariably asked me for my interpretation and evaluation.

Col. CLARKE. What were your relationships with what was then known as War Plans Division? Did you ever discuss this material with the Chief of that Division?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, by direction of the Chief of Staff. They had access in the latter stages of this production and dissemination to exactly the same material that went to the A. C. of S., G–2, to the Chief of Staff and to the Secretary of War.

Col. CLARKE. Who in that Division had that besides the Chief, do you recall?

Col. BRATTON. Initially, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, I took the message that I wanted the Chief of the War Plans Division to read, directly to him, and when he had read it and after discussing it with him—if there was any discussion—removed the message from his desk, took it back to my office and destroyed it. Later on the Chief of the War Plans Division insisted that certain of his section chiefs should have access to the material also. This was approved by the Chief of Staff, and I then made it a practice to deliver this material in a padlocked leather case to the Executive Officer of WPD, obtaining a receipt from him for certain numbered messages. After they had been read by the proper officers in WPD they were returned to me either the same day, in the locked bag, or on the following day when I delivered that day's messages.

Col. CLARKE. Was there ever prepared in the Far Eastern Section of G–2 any summary or evaluation which was based exclusively on the contents of this material?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall any particular one?

Col. BRATTON. I don't recall any particular one but in the early stages of this work I very frequently submitted to the Chief of Staff, through the A. C. of S., G–2, a staff memorandum [6] based upon one or more messages that I had received, concealing the source by some agreed upon code word, so that the reader would know where I had secured the information which I was evaluating. Later on, as this material became of increasing value, the recipients, that is the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G–2 and the Chief of the War Plans Division, deemed it advisable to have access to the raw material themselves so that they could arrive at their own independent conclusions as to its meaning. This was how the practice developed of delivering the raw material to certain officers desig-

nated by the Chief of Staff. Frequently, even after this practice was instituted, I submitted memoranda to various officers in connection with such and such a message, calling their attention to certain implications or trends indicated therein.

Col. CLARKE. From the period November 1, 1941, when the tension increased between the United States and Japan, was there any special handling of this material?

Col. BRATTON. As the tension between Japan and the United States grew we all took much greater precautions in processing and in otherwise handling the material.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have conferences with your opposite numbers in the Navy and in the War Plans Division regarding the interpretation and evaluation of this material?

Col. BRATTON. Yes. I had almost daily conferences with my opposite number in ONI and with the Chief of the War Plans Division as to the true significance of the material under study. I may say at this point that there was complete cooperation and collaboration between my opposite number in ONI, Commander McCullem, and myself.

Col. CLARKE. Did you agree on the interpretation of this material? In other words, was your evaluation agreed upon?

Col. BRATTON. We were for the most part in complete agreement in our evaluations of the material. Where there were differences of opinion we always consulted and came to an understanding as to how we would present these opinions to our respective chiefs. In the event of any major difference of opinion as to interpretation I always gave the A. C. of S., G–2 a summary of the Navy's viewpoint along with my own, and I believe that my opposite number in ONI did likewise.

Col. CLARKE. In the handling of this material, both in evaluation and [7] safeguarding and what not, did you deal directly with the A. C. of S., G–2 or did you go through the Chief of the Intelligence Group?

Col. BRATTON. Initially I went through the Chief of the Intelligence Group, but as tension grew and time became the important factor, at his direction I went straight to the A. C. of S., G–2 first and informed the Chief of Intelligence Branch afterward of my action and the nature of the information that I had transmitted.

Col. CLARKE. To the best of your knowledge and belief, the Chief of Staff was kept completely informed of all information and intelligence which was available to G–2 from this source. Is that correct?

Col. BRATTON. Completely.

Col. CLARK. I wish also to clear this one point up. I understood you to say that it was at the direction of the Chief of Staff that this raw material we served to him and to the Chief of the War Plans Division.

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, you used the term "early stages" of this thing—I wish we could put an approximate date to "early stages" as you referred to early stages.

Col. BRATTON. Well, by early stages I mean during the years 1936 and 1937 before the quantity and quality of the material materially increased.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. May I interrupt? Wouldn't you say that your early stages was from the time you came in, in 1936, up to the bombing of the Panay?

Col. BRATTON. Well I wouldn't extend the early stages to as late a date as the bombing of the Panay—earlier than that.

Col. CLARKE. In other words, you would say from the summer of 1936 to the summer of 1937 would be the early stages?

Col. BRATTON. Let me put it this way. By early stages I mean the period before our relations with Japan became strained.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Approximately when was it that the War Plans Division started getting this Top Secret material?

Col. BRATTON. You mean copies of the raw material?

[8] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Yes.

Col. BRATTON. I am sorry, sir, I can't answer that definitely. My memory won't permit a definite answer. I would say not earlier than the summer of 1941. I would like to amplify that, however, with the statement that prior to the summer of 1941 various memoranda, written by me or by the A. C. of S., G–2, based upon this material were submitted to WPD.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. When these copies went to the State Department or War Plans they were not allowed to keep them on file? You went around and got them?

Col. BRATTON. They were returned to me as soon as the proper officials of the State Department and WPD had seen and initialed them. They did not remain in the files of either office.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were they allowed to make copies of this?

Col. BRATTON. Not by me or any other officer of the War Department that I know of.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You as Chief of the Intelligence Branch or your Chief of the Far Eastern Unit knew generally, did you not, that the United States policy in the Pacific in 1941 was in conflict with policies of the Japanese Government?

Col. BRATTON. Of course.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever have any knowledge of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy addressed to the Secretary of War on or about 24 January 1941 wherein the Secretary of War was warned that hostilities might be initiated at any time by the Japanese by an attack on Pearl Harbor, or that in substance? Did you ever hear of any such letter at that time?

Col. BRATTON. To the best of my knowledge and belief I have never seen or heard of any such letter.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The Chief of Staff never advised you of the existence of any such letter?

Col. BRATTON. I have no recollection of any such advice.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever attend any of the what were then termed War Council meetings?

Col BRATTON. No, I did not.

[9] Lt. Col. GIBSON. In any of your conversations with the Chief of Staff did he ever discuss anything that went on at any conferences he had with his counterpart of the Navy or regarding the Japanese situation?

Col. BRATTON. Not that I recall.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever told, or did you know, in the latter part of November, of a message sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, which was concurred in by General Marshall, to the effect that we might anticipate a surprise and an aggressive Japa-

nese attack, or to be prepared for such a thing, or anything of that substance?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I saw such a message. It was dispatched, to the best of my recollection, on or about the 24th of November.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. From the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel?

Col. BRATTON. That is right.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that message brought to the attention of General Miles at that time or General Kroner?

Col. BRATTON. I think so. I have no way of——

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall how yau acquired your knowledge of the existence of such a message?

Col. BRATTON. I believe that I first learned of the message through my opposite number in ONI, the Chief of the Far Eastern Division. I later saw and read a copy of the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of General Marshall's message of the 27th of November to General Short and other commanders in that general area? A warning message so-called?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you receive at any time during the first week of December 1941 any information either from the Navy or from our own military attaches to the effect that Jap consulates were burning documents and codes on or about the third of December?

Col. BRATTON. I can't recall receiving this information from any local source. I do remember, however, that in various Japanese messages detailed instructions were issued from Tokyo to their consulate and diplomatic officials as to the methods to be used by the latter in destroying their [*10*] codes and ciphers when directed to do so.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The Roberts report states that on December 3, 1941 the Navy Department sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents. Did you at that time ever know of such a message being sent by the Navy?

Col. BRATTON. No, to the best of my knowledge and belief this is the first time I have heard of it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of the bulletin of December 1, 1941 dealing with the Japanese naval situation, issued by the Director of Naval Intelligence?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, this looks very familiar. I believe that I had access to this or a similar document and used it as the basis of a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G–2 and the Chief of WPD to keep them informed as to where the Navy thought the bulk of the Japanese naval forces were located.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, I have here a whole series of these Top Secret messages, or copies of them rather, and I just want to get in the record whether you knew of these at the time. They are Army Nos. 23570, 23631, 23673, 23859, 24373, 24655, 24656, 24878, 25138, 25344, 25390, 25392, 25432, 25435, 25441, 25445, 25446, 25496, 25497, 25548, 25554, 25605, 25644, 25659, 25715, 25725, 25727, 25730, 25731, 25762, 25773, 25783, 25785, 25807, 25817, 25823, 25843, 25850. Have you seen these communications?

Col. BRATTON. Yes I have seen all of these communications before.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Calling your attention to this No. 25432, after you received that did you make some arrangements for listening for broadcasts?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I did, through Col. Sadtler, then in the office of the Chief Signal Officer, who put me in touch with an official of the FCC, a Mr. Sterling, I believe.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever receive, prior to Pearl Harbor, word from the FCC that such a code message had been put out by the Japanese?

Col. BRATTON. I did not, though I was in daily telephone communication with Mr. Sterling or his assistant in connection with this matter. Their understanding was that immediately upon [*11*] receipt of any such message I was to be informed by telephone, day or night. They had my office phone number and my house phone number. I did get from them on one or two occasions messages resembling the Wind Code, but which upon examination proved to be not in that code.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Navy ever give you any information of any such code message being put out?

Col. BRATTON. No, although I did discuss with them certain code messages that had been received which resembled the expected Wind Code messages.

Col. CLARKE. Did Col. Sadtler ever tell you that it was in?

Col. BRATTON. I cannot rmember that he did. I have a vague recollection of a conversation with him about a code message indicating a break in relations between Japan and Great Britain. This, however, was beside the point. Such a break had been expected by all of us for some time. The code message we were waiting for was one indicating a break between Japan and the U. S. It never came through that I know of.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of any message being sent by G–2 to the 14th Naval District to check up on some such alleged message prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. No, I do know, however, that Gen. Miles sent a message to Gen. Short, or to Gen. Short's G–2 directing him to get in touch with Commander Rochefort of the Navy with respect to this type of message as the Navy was completely aware of all the facts in the case.

Col. CLARKE. Well that message actually went to G–2 in Hawaii.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you No. 25138 and ask what your evaluation of that message was, if you remember.

Col. BRATTON. My evaluation of this message at the time I read it was that Japan intended taking military and/or naval action in the Pacific on or after the dates indicated.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And was that evaluation given by you to Gen. Miles?

Col. BRATTON. I believe so. I remember that during this period Gen. Miles and I discussed at some length the meaning or implication of each and all of these messages.

[*12*] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that true also of you and the Chief of Staff?

Col. BRATTON. Not in every case.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect whether it was true or not in this particular case, referring to No. 25138?

Col. BRATTON. I don't remember definitely. I am under the impression that I discussed this particular message both with Gen. Miles and Gen. Marshall, and Gen. Gerow.

It. Col. GIBSON. Would you say the same is true of message No. 25644?

Col. BRATTON. No, but I can state that all three of the officers just mentioned were given copies of this in the present form.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Also on No. 25390. What interpretation or evaluation did you place on that particular message?

Col. BRATTON. I at this time do not recall the evaluation I gave that message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I call your attention also to No. 25554 and 25555. What was your interpretation of this message? Particularly I call your attention to the last sentence thereof.

Col. BRATTON. This message, as is indicated in the text thereof, is an effort on the part of the Japanese Government to inform their diplomatic representative in Germany as to Japanese inability to successfully negotiate a pact with the United States and is an expression of the opinion of the Japanese Government that the United States was and would be allied with England, Australia, the Netherlands and China against Japan.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you at this time, Colonel, consider it a capability of the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. Yes. Many of us considered and discussed the feasibility of such an attack—an attack on our West Coast, an attack on Alaska, an attack on the Canal Zone, an attack on Hawaii and other Pacific installations of ours, the Dutch or the British governments.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. From a reading of these messages at that time did you come to the conclusion that the Japs were about to undertake an attack on some of the United States installations?

Col. BRATTON. It was apparent that there was strong likelihood of some such attack. It was also apparent that the Japanese immediate major objective would be the British and Dutch [*13*] possessions in the west Pacific. I believed at that time that any attack on any American installation would be in the nature of a diversion or have for its purpose the prevention of our going to the assistance of the Dutch or British.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you talked that thought over with Gen. Miles?

Col. BRATTON. I did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. General Kroner?

Col. BRATTON. As to Gen. Kroner, my memory is faulty, but I discussed this feature on many occasions with Gen. Miles, with Gen. Gerow and with the Chief of Staff when asked my opinion in the matter.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you inform the Chief of Staff that it was a capability of the Japs to attack Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. In various G–2 estimates submitted to the Chief of Staff over a period of many months an attack on Hawaii had always been listed as one of the Japanese capabilities against us.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I notice in the estimate dated 29 November 1941 that the capability of the attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't included. I wonder how that happened, if you have any recollection of it?

Col. BRATTON. In reply to that I can only say that those of us in the Army who were studying this situation always listed, mentally at least, an attack on Hawaii as a capability, but in our discussions of the situation with our counterparts in the Navy it was always emphasized by the latter that their forces in the Pacific were alert and so stationed as to make such a Japanese attack impracticable or suicidal, and we therefore relegated such an attack to the realm of remote possibility.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At that time did you feel that there was a fairly reasonable probability that Japan was going to attack the United States in the reasonably near future, I mean at the last of November or the first of December 1941?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, and I had felt for some time—that is over a period of several years—that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you so informed Gen. Miles and the Chief of Staff [*14*] that you, in the last of November or first of December 1941, felt it was probable that the Japs were going to attack the United States in the near future?

Col. BRATTON. Not in that form, but I repeatedly expressed the opinion to my superiors that Japan intended to take some form of aggressive action which would involve her in a war with us.

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one question here before we get these people back. On the morning of December 7 when you got the famous message that they were going to deliver their note at one o'clock, will you recount briefly the actions which you took with reference to that message and also the actions of Gen. Miles and Gen. Marshall?

Col. BRATTON. Will you permit me to refer to a memorandum which I made at the time for the record?

Col. CLARKE. Sure.

Col. BRATTON. The message in question, that is the deciphered message in question, was delivered to me from the Navy sometime between 0830 and 9000 that morning. It was immediately apparent that it was of such importance that it had to be communicated to the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G–2 and the Chief, WPD with the least practicable delay. Neither of these officers were in their offices at that time. I called Gen. Marshall's quarters by telephone and was informed that he had gone horseback riding. I requested his orderly to go out and find him at once and ask him to call me on the telephone as soon as practicable as I had an important message to deliver to him. I then called Gen. Miles and reported the step that I had taken to him and recommended that he come down to the office at once. I do not remember whether I called Gen. Gerow or whether Gen. Miles called him, but we had some discussion as to which one of us would do it and I don't remember now which of us did, but in any event Gen. Gerow was summoned to the office. I waited for the telephone call from Gen. Marshall, which I received some time between ten and eleven. I informed him that I had a message of extreme importance which he should see at once and told him that I would bring it to his quarters if he so desired. He said to report to him in his office as he was on his way there. I reported to him in his office at about 1125 immediately upon his arrival. Shortly thereafter Gen. Miles arrived. The message was laid before Gen. Marshall and discussed. We were all asked by the

Chief of Staff for an expression of opinion as to the meaning or significance of the message, in connection with [15] the lengthy Japanese ultimatum which the Chief of Staff had on his desk and read aloud to us at this time. Gen. Miles and I stated that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply, one p. m., an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that it might be into any one or more of a number of other areas. Gen. Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, Washington time, and that they, the commanders in the areas indicated, should be on the alert.

Part II

Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 15 September 1944.
Time: 1130–1200 and 1340–1455.
Present:
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton.
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

[16] Col. Bratton. General Marshall then called Adm. Stark on the telephone and told him over the phone that he thought we should send out a warning as indicated above. After Adm. Stark replied, Gen. Marshall put down the telephone and stated that the Admiral did not think any further warning necessary since all the forces had already been several times alerted. Gen. Miles and I nevertheless urged Gen. Marshall to send the warnings. Gen. Marshall then wrote out in pencil the warning message. There was some discussion at this time, I believe, as to whether or not the Philippines should be included. Gen. Marshall again got Adm. Stark on the telephone and read to him the message he had just written out. Adm. Stark apparently concurred and asked that the naval forces be also informed. Gen. Marshall added a request to that effect at the bottom of his penciled warning. At about this time Gen. Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived. Gen. Marshall again asked us, in succession beginning with Gen. Miles, our opinion as to the significance of the Japanese message. Gen. Miles said he thought it probably meant an attack on Thailand but that the timing had some significance and that warning messages to our people should be sent. Gen. Gerow, Col. Bundy and I concurred. Gen. Marshall then gave me the message in his handwriting and instructed me to take it immediately to the Message Center for transmittal. As I was about to go out of the door there was some discussion as to whether it should go to Gen. Gerow's office for typing first, but it was decided that as time was an important factor, I was to take it in its draft form to the Message Center. As I left the room Gen. Gerow made a statement to the effect that if there was any question of priority involved, to give first priority to the Philippines. I took the message to Col. French, the Signal Corps officer in charge of the Message Center, explained to him that it was Gen. Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, giving the Philippines first priority. Col. French said that

he would give it his personal attention and processing of the message would commence immediately. I then returned to the office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the [17] message to the addressees. I returned to the Message Center and talked the matter over with Col. French who informed me that the messages would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about 30 minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 1150 a. m. I returned to the Chief of Staff's office and reported to him the information as to speed of delivery that had been given me by Col. French.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did this reply from Japan (No. 25843) start coming in on the 6th of December, do you have any recollection as to that?

Col. BRATTON. I believe that the message started coming in to the Navy on the 6th. My recollection is that I transmitted a copy to the Secretary of State that night.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you conferred with Gen. Miles or the Chief of Staff previously as to when the Japanese reply might be expected?

Col. BRATTON. We knew that some such message was coming. We of course had no way of telling when it would be forthcoming; it might have been a question of hours, it might be a question of days.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Calling your attention to message No. 25445, which apparently was received by you the 28th or 29th of November, you then had some knowledge that a reply might be expected within two or three days from that time. Is that correct?

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Anyway, the first thing you did when you got the message on December 7 was to phone Gen. Marshall?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I called Gen. Marshall at his quarters.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I call your attention to the message sent to the G–2, Hawaiian Department on 5 December, signed Miles, requesting that Commander Rochefort, 14th Naval District, be contacted regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. How was it that this telegram happened to be sent?

Col. BRATTON. When we received the Japanese message concerning the code to be used in weather broadcasts, I discussed the matter with my opposite number in the Navy, Commander McCullom, and his assistant, Lt. Kramer. They informed me that Commander Rochefort was their man in Hawaii, that he had [18] all the information that we had and the same intercepts. They stated that he could explain in detail to the commanding general or his G–2 the significance of the code and suggested that I have our G–2 in Hawaii get in touch with Commander Rochefort immediately as a means of saving time. In other words, we could get the desired information to the commanding general in Hawaii or his G–2 much faster and in much greater detail and with far greater security than by means of a long and involved explanatory message which we would have been forced to send through the Army communication system.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to refer to this so-called Winds message. Did Col. Otis K. Sadtler of the Signal Corps ever, prior to Pearl Harbor, notify you that the Japanese had implemented the Wind Code by broadcasting a message in accordance with that code?

Col. BRATTON. As I have stated before, I cannot remember that he did, although I believe he did speak about one indicating a break between Japan and Great Britain.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know a naval officer by the name of Kramer who at the time of Early December 1941 was an assistant to Commander McCullom of ONI particularly being interested in communications work?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I knew him well and was in constant communication with him at this time both orally, in person and by telephone.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Lt. Kramer at this time ever notify you that the Navy had been advised by the FCC that a so-called Winds message had been intercepted by the FCC monitoring station?

Col. BRATTON. No. We discussed on one or two occasions messages resembling those in the Wind Code but as far as I know no actual Wind Code message ever came through prior to Pearl Harbor.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a cable sent 27 November to Commanding General, Hawaiian Dept., containing instructions of how to act in case hostilities between Japan and the United States occur and notifying him that negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated. Did you know of such a cable being sent?

Col. BRATTON. Not prior to the outbreak of hostilities. However, I have seen a copy of the message since that date.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now paraphrase of a cable dated November 27, [*19*] 1941 sent to the G–2's of corps areas, Caribbean Defense Command, Hawaiian Department, signed Miles. Did you know of that being sent?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I did know of this message and was shown a copy of it on or about the date of dispatch.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you ever see any reply from Gen. Short to that message?

Col. BRATTON. No, prior to Pearl Harbor I have never seen any reply from Gen. Short to any of these messages.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of the sending of this message to the Adjutant General of November 28 warning your corps area and overseas department commanders?

Col. BRATTON. Yes I knew of this message. I am under the impression that I was shown a copy of it on or about the date of its dispatch.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You had nothing to do with the sending of either that message or the other message G–2 sent out of November 27?

Col. BRATTON. I did not. My recollection is that they were both drafted in the office of the A. C. of S., G–2 or that of his executive.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I now show you a copy of a telegram from Melbourne, Australia via Honolulu to the War Department and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, date of sending of the message the 6th, date received December 7, 7:50 p.m. Do you recall seeing such a message?

Col. BRATTON. I can make no positive statement in reply to that question. The message, however, looks vaguely familiar.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have any of the information contained in this particular message prior to one o'clock the afternoon of 7 December 1941?

Col. BRATTON. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you an MID form, subject: Information received from the Orient, dated 3 November 1941, which is information purporting to come from a Mr. Hirota, a presiding officer at a directors meeting of the Black Dragon Society. I ask if you remember receiving this information approximately at that time or shortly before.

[*20*] Col. BRATTON. I do not recall ever having seen this document, nor can I recall being advised as to its subject matter.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Information such as that, in the ordinary course of routine back in the summer and fall of 1941, would be routed through you as an ordinary matter, would it Col. Bratton?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, if this is a report from the Counter Intelligence Branch, which I believe it to be, I received information of this nature from the Chief of that Brance as a matter of routine.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I call your attention to a report of the headquarters, Third Corps Area, dated 18 December 1941, subject: Report of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii. This report is signed by Philip L. Thurber, Colonel, GSC. First I ask if you have any recollection of this particular report.

Col. BRATTON. I have never seen this document before.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The document last referred to of Headquarters, Third Corps Area, of December 18, 1941, on Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii, states in substance that Senator Gillette at Washington warned officials what was going to happen, stating to officials that Japan would declare war on the United States December 19 and would attack Hawaii. This information was alleged to have been conveyed about 3 weeks prior to December 18. Did you ever receive such information from Senator Gillette or from any other source?

Col. BRATTON. I did not.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you copy of a secret radiogram dated 7 July 1941 sent to Commanding Generals of the Caribbean Defense Command, Philippine Department, Hawaiian Department, Fourth Army, which in substance was an estimate of the Jap probable course in the near future, and ask if you are familiar with that radiogram.

Col. BRATTON. I do not recall having seen this message prior to or on the date of its dispatch. However from its context I assume that it was based upon an estimate prepared either in my office or at my direction by one of my assistants as it expresses the views we entertained at that time.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a radio message dated Oct. 27, 1941 from Manila, P. I. to MILID, signed Brink, relative to movement of Japanese shipping in Western Pacific and ask if you saw that message at or about that time.

Col. BRATTON. I can make no positive statement in reply to that question, [*21*] but the message looks familiar to me. I have seen this or one like it containing similar information.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a radiogram dated October 29, 1941 from Manila to MILID, signed Evans, relative to the movement of Jap aircraft carriers and other seacraft. I ask if you had knowledge of that message at or about that time.

Col. BRATTON. This message also looks familiar. I would like to say at this time that during this period messages of this type came over my desk in considerable volume as all of our military attaches, ob-

servers and agents were under instructions to assist us in following the movements of Japanese naval craft and land forces.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a paraphrase of secret message dated November 29, 1941, No. 986, from Ft. Shafter to TAG, signed Short, which answers secret radiogram No. 4820 of November 28, 1941, and gives other data relative to the sabotage situation in Hawaii. I ask if you had ever seen that message prior to December 7, 1941.

Col. BRATTON. No. I have not seen this message before. As the subject matter deals largely with counter espionage and counter sabotage measures the message would not, in the ordinary course of events, have come over my desk but rather over the desk of the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now copies of 5 radiograms sent from Tokyo to MILID, those of July 12, July 14, July 23, 11:32 p. m. and July 27 being signed Creswell, and the one of July 23, 3:21 p. m. being signed Orear. I ask if you have recollection of seeing those cablegrams at about that time.

Col. BRATTON. Yes, all of these messages passed over my desk on or about the date of their arrival in MID.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Earlier I asked you about a brief periodic estimate of the situation December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942, dated 29 November 1941, for the Chief of Staff. I now call your attention to a memorandum for the Chief of Staff entitled: Supplementary Brief Period Estimate of the Situation December 1, 1941–March 31, 1942, dated December 5, 1941. What occasioned issuing a supplementary report as soon after the November 29th report, if you recall.

Col. BRATTON. I do not recall what the occasion was which demanded [*22*] the issuance of this supplementary estimate, but I believe that, as is stated in paragraph 1, the supplemental estimate is arranged in a form more suitable for the Operations Division for use in planning.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did this supplemental report of December 5 correctly represent your evaluation of the Japanese situation at that time?

Col. BRATTON. It did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now copies of memorandums for the Chief of Staff of November 25, 26 and 27 dealing with the Far Eastern situation, Japanese Naval Task Force and Recent Developments in the Far East, respectively. Those reports correctly represent your evaluation of the various situations as outlined therein, did they?

Col. BRATTON. They did. I wrote them.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I also call your attention to an undated memorandum of November 1941 for the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, on the subject of G–2 Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation (for situation and communication maps) with tabs b, c, and d. Did this at that time correctly represent your evaluation of the facts?

Col. BRATTON. It did. I wrote it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you actually have any knowledge yourself as of early December 1941 of exactly what of our naval forces were at Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. Only in a general way.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know at that time that the Navy, or a substantial part of it was tying up for weekends at Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. I did not and had I been in possession of that knowledge I would have urged, through the A. C. of S., G–2, that immediate action be taken to prevent such an assemblage in the Harbor.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At about this time, the first week of December 1941, had you heard from any source that the Fleet was ordered to stay in Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. No. I was under the impression, gained from conversations [*23*] with my opposite number in ONI that the Fleet in Hawaiian waters had been alerted and all components were at their battle stations.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I wish to say in asking this question that I don't have any knowledge that it had been ordered to stay in harbor; I had heard rumors of that, and that is the reason I asked the question.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At that time, the first week of December 1941, were you under the impression that extensive air reconnaissance was being maintained from Hawaii?

Col. BRATTON. I was under that impression.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. These estimates of the situation or summaries of the situation that I have referred to, do you know what their actual dissemination was?

Col. BRATTON. I believe that in each case you will find at the bottom or lower left hand corner of the last page a distribution list which indicates to whom the carbon copies were routed.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you have any recollection on the morning of December 7 at what time it was that you received the intercept message which in effect instructed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver Tokyo's reply to the Secretary of State if possible at one o'clock in the afternoon?

Col. BRATTON. I received a copy of this intercept from the Navy at about 9 a. m.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Could you say you received it at about the same time as you received the reply itself?

Col. BRATTON. No. The reply itself was received the day before. It was a very long one and took considerable time to decipher and typewrite. It came to me as fast as the various sections could be typed.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Col. Bratton, if on or about December 5, or at any time prior to an attack on Pearl Harbor you had been informed that the Japanese had broadcast a code message which implemented message No. 25432, which was the Winds Code message, and had been advised that such message, decoded, in substance meant U. S.-Japanese relations are in danger of being ruptured and their consulates were to burn their codes, what would have been your evaluation and action?

[*24*] Col. BRATTON. My evaluation would have been that Japan would immediately sever diplomatic relations with the United States and that hostilities against our country would ensue forthwith. Had I received such a report I would have taken immediate and vigorous action, through the A. C. of S., G–2, to see that the proper officials were alerted and warned to be on guard against any and all eventualities.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you once more describe in detail how this Top Secret material was handled between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Col. BRATTON. It was delivered daily by the Signal Intelligence Service by hand of an officer to my office. I read all of the material, screening out that which had intelligence value. The other material I then burned. Indeed much that was daily brought in to me did not have intelligence value but was merely routine and administrative in nature. The screened material was then arranged by me in separate piles, one for the Chief of Staff, one for the Secretary of War, one for the A. C. of S., G–2, one for the Secretary of State, and one for the Chief of War Plans Division. I then bound each pile in a cardboard folder, inserted the folder in the proper leather dispatch case, locked each dispatch case and delivered it to the proper office, collecting at that time the bags containing the previous day's output. These bags were brought back by me to my office, opened and the material therein checked prior to destruction by burning.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. It is also your recollection that it was shortly before Pearl Harbor that copies of this Top Secret material were to go also to Gen. McNair, Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, and it was so delivered to him by officer messenger daily for a short time prior to Pearl Harbor and a short time after Pearl Harbor.

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a memorandum dated 6 December signed by James F. Perry and ask if you ever had that called to your attention at that time.

Col. BRATTON. No I have never seen this paper before.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was any of the information contained in that paper ever relayed to you as you recollect at that time?

[25] Col. BRATTON. Not that I recall.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever notified by anybody from the Navy that the Navy had intercepted a message which was an implementation of the Winds Code prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. No, and by Winds Code I mean that phrase which would indicate a rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. My recollection is that Lt. Kramer and Commander McCullom had received what appeared to be garbles of variations of this Winds Codes message on one or two occasions, but to the best of my knowledge and belief no clear cut Winds Code message was received prior to Pearl Harbor indicating that relations between Japan and the United States or Japan and Great Britain or Japan and Russia had been or were about to be severed.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Commander McCullom ever tell you of drafting a warning message of several hundred words long warning the commanders in the Pacific area that war was imminent and that such message was not sent out because his superiors deemed it unnecessary?

Col. BRATTON. No, this is the first I have heard of this matter.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, to make sure to tie in all loose ends, let me ask you this. All of the Top Secret material that you have here identified the carrying dates of translation between October 1 and instant of Pearl Harbor and which are in this case Exhibit 1, were delivered by you or an officer working for you to the Chief of Staff, Secretary of War, Chief of War Plans Division, A. C. of S., G–2 and

the Department of State, were they not? And delivered at times relatively close to the date of the translation thereof as shown on the bottom of each Top Secret document?

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

[*26*] PART III

Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 20 September 1944
Time: 1500–1600
Present:
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton
Colonel Carter W. Clarke
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson

Col. BRATTON. I have a statement to make and I request that it be made a part of the record of this investigation. The allegation has been made, in the press and elsewhere in connection with the disaster at Pearl Harbor, that if G–2 had been "on the job" we would not have been caught so unprepared for our war with Japan. In point of fact, G–2 in general and the Far Eastern Section in particular were very much "on the job," as evidenced by the written record of Estimates, Staff Studies, Memoranda, etc. with which G–2 served the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G–2, WPD, ONI, the State Department and other interested planning and policy making agencies of the Government, to warn them of the increasing menace of Japanese war potential and intentions. G–2 can stand on this record and needs no defense from me. I feel, however, that a part of this record, as presented in the documents I now lay before you, should be taken cognizance of by this investigating committee and made a part of its proceedings if for no other reason than that the documents include some Top Secret papers heretofore known as Magic and many references to others.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do I understand, Col. Bratton, that many of the documents contained in the summaries now being introduced into this investigation, most of which were in the nature of Estimates of the Situation, contain conclusions based upon your knowledge of the material contained in the so-called Magic material?

Col. BRATTON. That is correct. The principal document I show you I secured from the G–2 files. It is labeled, "Summary of Far Eastern Documents." It came into being as a result of a letter from the President to the Chief of Staff, dated July 14, 1943, in which the former requested copies of the dispatches of our military attaches which estimate or express any opinion regarding the probability or improbability of an outbreak of war, or which refer in any way to the estimates of potential military strength of any of the countries involved. The countries which [*27*] concerned the President were Germany, Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, Occupied France, Belgium, England and Russia. He indicated his interest in dispatches from January 1, 1937 until such time as our military attaches left the first seven named countries; his interest in similar dispatches from England dated from January 1, 1937 to the outbreak of the war in September 1939; and his interest in dispatches bearing on this subject from Russia from January 1, 1937 until the present time (that is, the time of his letter of July 14, 1943). This letter of the President was transmitted to me by the

then A. C. of S., G–2, General Strong, who instructed me to start work on a compilation of the desired documents. I was at that time the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, MIS, G–2. I detailed Col. Maguire to exercise general supervision over the assembly of European documents and Col. Pettigrew over the Far Eastern documents. As stated in the explanatory note which you will find on page 1 of the Summary of Far Eastern Documents, the yearly summaries which follow on successive pages are based on information contained in intelligence documents consisting of reports, memoranda, estimates, etc. The summary itself was written in a chronologically arranged narrative form supported by photostats of the original documents in the files of G–2. It was arranged in this way to facilitate the use of the document by historical researchers. The European summaries were similarly compiled and supported by photostats of the original documents. All summaries were transmitted to the Chief of Staff by a covering memorandum signed by the A. C. of S., G–2, General Strong, 20 August 1943. With the covering memorandum was transmitted a memorandum for the President, subject: Axis War Potential, for the signature of the Chief of Staff, which read as follows:

There are forwarded herewith, in accordance with the request of the President dated July 14, 1943, copies of numerous Military Attache dispatches, memoranda, estimates and handbooks dealing with the preparations foor war by Germany, Italy and Japan, and their aggressive intentions on the continents of Europe and Asia from January 1, 1937. Similar documents bearing on Bulgaria, Austria, Occupied France, Belgium, England, and Russia are also included.

These photostatic, carbon, or "true" copies [28] of G–2 dispatches, memoranda, etc., have been arranged in chronological order for each of the above-named countries. To assist the White House Secretariat in studying this material, a brief summary of the contents of each file has been prepared by G–2 and these summaries have also been arranged in chronological order in two volumes. Far Eastern and European, enclosed herewith as Tabs A and B respectively.

It has not been thought advisable to submit all documents on the subject of Axis war preparations to the White House. There are thousands of miscellaneous dispatches and other documents which touch incidentally on German, Italian and Japanese war preparations, but which are only slightly germane to an historical analysis of the information possessed by G–2 on Axis preparations and aggressive intentions.

Furthermore, as the President is aware, during the summer and fall of 1941, G–2 secured from highly secret sources considerable information indicating Japan's determination to resort to armed force in the event that the negotiations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura, then being conducted, did not result in an agreement satisfactory to Japan. It is presumed that the President does not desire to have documents from this source included in this compilation because of the danger to security involved.

Great care has been taken by G–2 to include in this compilation copies of misestimates by Military Attaches or other persons as regards strength and intentions. A few such mis-estimates actually occurred, but on the whole, false conclusions were rare and pertained not so much to the strength and ultimate aggressive intentions of the Axis as they did to the timing of the aggression.

In the case of the document collection pertaining to Germany, a few very important dispatches have been included dealing with the period 1935–1936, inasmuch as these were the years of the largest and most rapid military expansion.

It is thought probable that, after the White House Secretariat commences to study these documents, it will feel the need for examining still further [29] dispatches on matters correlated to the Axis rearmament program. They can be promptly furnished by G–2 in case they are desired.

Col. Bratton. On August 26, 1943, the A. C. of S., G–2 received a memorandum from the Secretary, General Staff, which read as follows:

The attached tab does not comply with the directive in that it contains much material other than MA reports. The Chief of Staff desires that it be revised to contain *only* MA reports.

This memorandum and Tab A, the Summary of Far Eastern Documents, were given to me by Gen. Strong at approximately 2:00 p. m. 26 August 1943, with instructions to revise Tab A as directed. Tab B, the Summary of European Documents, although prepared in the same manner as Tab A, that is, containing estimates by G–2, Staff Studies, memoranda and other entries of evaluated intelligence, was not returned to Gen. Strong. I inferred that it would be forwarded to the President as compiled and that Tab A was to contain only raw, unevaluated military attache reports. I instructed the Chief, Far Eastern Unit, to revise Tab A as quickly as possible as directed in Col. Sexton's memorandum. At about 2:45 p. m. 26 August 1943, Gen. Strong directed me to include military observer reports with military attache reports in Tab A. The revised Tab A, revised as directed in memorandum from the Secretary, General Staff, dated 26 August 1943, was forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 1 September 1943. The Summary as then written and its supporting file of 15 volumes were based only upon reports received from military attaches and military observers. The Summary of Far Eastern Documents which went forward to the President did not contain any references to Magic or any summaries, estimates or Staff Studies based thereon wholly or in part. It is to the first edition or unrevised Summary of Far Eastern Documents that I wish to call the attention of this committee.

It will be noted that many of the documents have a "distribution list" written or printed on the document itself indicating the offices or officers to whom copies were given. Where no "distribution list" appears it may be assumed that the War Plans Division was given a copy, as was the Office of Naval Intelligence, as that was our standard operating procedure. The State Department was given copies when the subject matter would be of interest to that department. Occasionally, when considered of sufficient importance, copies went to the President.

[*30*] TOP SECRET

PART IV

Place: Room 20637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 23 September 1944.
Time: 0950–1005.
Present:
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton.
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, while you were testifying about this meeting in the office of General Marshall on Sunday morning, 7 December 1941, you were using a memorandum to refresh your recollection. When was that memorandum prepared and by whom?

Col. BRATTON. On or about the 8th of December 1941, by General Miles with my help.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Is the above paper a true copy of that memorandum?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to get a few more details about this Sunday morning meeting. After your telephone conversation with General

Marshall in which he told you to meet him at his (General Marshall's) office and that he was on his way there, what did you do?

Col. BRATTON. I called General Miles on the telephone and reported to him the gist of my conversation with General Marshall and recommended to General Miles that he come to the office too as General Marshall would no doubt want to see him also. Either General Miles or I, I have forgotten which, then called General Gerow and asked him to come to the office also as we felt General Marshall would wish to see him also. I then proceeded to General Marshall's office and waited for him either in the anteroom, that is, the office of the Secretary of the General Staff, or in the hallway where I could see the Chief of Staff immediately upon his arrival on that floor. My recollection is that General Marshall and General Miles arrived at about the same time and that I followed the two of them into the latter's office, carrying a copy of the message I wished him to see.

[*31*] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that message the message of instructions to the Japanese Ambassadors to deliver the Japanese reply to the Department of State at one p. m. Washington time?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to ask another question to clear up another point. When, to the best of your recollection, was the Japanese reply, Top. Secret Army No. 25843, delivered to General Marshall's office?

Col. BRATTON. Either on the night of 6 December or early in the morning of the 7th, prior to his arrival at his office.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. When you walked into General Marshall's office, following General Marshall and General Miles, on the morning of 7 December, what did you do?

Col. BRATTON. I handed him the message referring to the time of delivery to the Secretary of State of the Japanese long reply.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did he read it that time or did he read the long Japanese reply first, as far as you recollect?

Col. BRATTON. As far as I recollect, he read the message that I handed to him first, then read the long reply.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, is it possible that the second telephone conversation on that Sunday morning between General Marshall and Admiral Stark was as a result of Admiral Stark's calling General Marshall, rather than General Marshall calling Admiral Stark?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, it is quite possible.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you make two or three trips to the message center with the message penciled by General Marshall on that forenoon of 7 December?

Col. BRATTON. I made only two trips to the message center, carrying General Marshall's penciled memorandum with me for delivery to the officer in charge of the message center on the first trip.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Colonel Bundy go with you on either trip to the message center on that Sunday morning?

Col. BRATTON. He did not.

[*32*] Lt. Col. GIBSON. This 11:25 a. m. when you first saw General Marshall on that Sunday morning, that time is the time as you and General Miles recalled it when you drew up this Memorandum for the Record, is it not?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF COL. EDWARD F. FRENCH

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 28 September 1944.
Time: 1015–1045.
Present:
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Colonel Edward F. French.
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Colonel Edward F. French, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you state your name, rank and serial number and present position, please.

Col. FRENCH. Colonel Edward F. French, O8935, officer in charge of Traffic Operation Branch, Army Communications Service, Office Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you on duty in the War Department in Washington in that position the first week of December 1941?

Col. FRENCH. I was.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. As such, did you have immediate supervision over the War Department message center?

Col. FRENCH. I did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now telegram dated 5 December 1941 signed Miles, addressed to Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G–2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and ask if this telegram passed through your message center for delivery to the addressee on that particular day.

Col. FRENCH. This message was received in the code section of the War Department message center at 11:47 a. m. on the 5th of December 1941, as indicated by the stamp on the reverse side. This message was given a code serial number of 519 and its transmission evidenced by the "Sent No. 519 12–5," as typed on the face of the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that typed by the message center, that particular typing?

[2] Col. FRENCH. No. This clear text message never left the code room but that number and date was typed on there after the return of the coded copy of the coded text itself from the Signal Center.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Who actually did the typing of the words "Sent No. 519 12–5"?

Col. FRENCH. That was typed on there by a clerk in the code room after the return of the message from the Signal Center.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. After the message had actually been sent?

Col. FRENCH. After the message had actually been received by the Signal Center for transmission. Then this copy, as provided for under the routine, was returned to G–2. We do not keep any copies of the original texts in our office; they were returned to the writer within 24 hours.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you explain the routine that then existed between Hawaii and the War Department which was set up to insure that all messages sent were received?

Col. FRENCH. To assure that all messages were received, we had a separate set of serial numbers that was utilized to identify the classified message. These numbers were assigned in sequence and were frequently checked to assure that the message assigned that number reached its destination. In some instances messages have been delayed in transmission or in office routine so that a message would be received in a code room out of sequence. In such instances a service message would be instituted to check for the message not in sequence that was evidently delayed or possibly lost.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, Colonel, if message No. 519, being the telegram in question in this investigation, had not been received by Hawaii, what would have happened?

Col. FRENCH. In checking their numbers off in Hawaii, when Hawaii would receive No. 520 and No. 419 did not appear in a reasonable time, they would query the War Department message center relative to No. 519, and the War Department message center would check the files, verify its transmission and repeat the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you believe this message No. 519 on 5 December 1941 went by cable or by radio?

[3] Col. FRENCH. I believe that that message went via radio as it was a "routine" message and our normal transmitting would be via radio. In the event that our radio was out of service, due to atmospheric conditions, the message would have been transmitted via cable.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Your records of messages sent in December 1941 were kept for how long?

Col. FRENCH. As I recall it, at the time it was 6 months. However, the regulations have since been changed and the messages are now retained for a period of 3 months. The War Department code room is not an office of records, under the provisions of Army regulations. All records pertaining to classified messages rest with the office of origin.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Then as far as you know the Signal Corps have no existing records in Washington that would show any more about the fate of message No. 519 of 5 December 1941?

Col. FRENCH. The only actual record of this message is as indicated on the message itself. The files of the coded text have all been destroyed by burning, as provided for in Army regulations.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to go to the morning of 7 December 1941. Were you on duty in the message center on that morning?

Col. FRENCH. I placed myself on duty on Sunday morning, 7 December.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you there when Colonel Rufus Bratton brought a penciled message to the message center?

Col. FRENCH. I was in my office across the hall from the code room when Colonel Bratton came to the code room with a message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you tell us now what took place at that time.

Col. FRENCH. I heard some commotion over in the code room and I immediately left my desk and on arrival there I found Col. Bratton with a message that he was anxious to have processed for immediate transmission. I asked Colonel Bratton if I could be of any assistance to him and he said he was anxious to get this message processed [4] immediately. The message, as I recall, was written in pencil on a slip of paper. It was rather difficult to read so I told Colonel

Bratton it would be necessary to type the message and have him verify. The message was typed and Colonel Bratton verified and authenticated the message. We immediately processed this message into a code system and after the work was under way I went into the Signal Center to check and determine the method of transmission. I found that our channel at Honolulu was out, due to atmospheric conditions, from about 10:30 that morning. I had the operator check the channel to Honolulu and at that time Honolulu could not be heard. It was determined that Honolulu was working San Francisco but the atmospheric condition was so bad that to transmit the message to San Francisco in a relay to Honolulu would mean that it would have to be sent at slow speed and then copied and retransmitted at San Francisco to Honolulu. I made up my mind that the quickest method of dispatch would be via commercial service and avoid the risk of any garbling or error in relaying the message via Army facilities through San Francisco.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. What did you know about the means of communication between RCA and Honolulu and Ft. Shafter?

Col. FRENCH. Our normal method of transmitting a message, when atmospheric conditions prevent handling via radio, is to utilize commercial facilities that are available in the Signal Center. As this message could be handled directly to San Francisco via the Western Union and on a tube relay of this message to the RCA office in San Francisco, with that excellent dispatch, this method had been chosen. I had learned on Saturday, the day previous, that the RCA was installing a teletype circuit to the Department headquarters at Ft. Shafter, so I assumed that this would be the most expeditious means of getting that message with the least practicable delay to the Department headquarters.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You have no personal knowledge, I assume, of actually what happened to the message when it got to Hawaii?

Col. FRENCH. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Colonel Bratton return to the message center a second time after he had been there the first time as you have described?

[5] Col. FRENCH. Yes, I believe Colonel Bratton was in my office several times during that Sunday morning.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was he there a second time with reference to this particular message?

Col. FRENCH. As I recall, on my return to the code room from the Signal Center, I met Colonel Bratton at the code room door and he asked me how long it would take to get that message transmitted to Hawaii. I informed him that I thought it would be there within a half hour to 45 minutes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Colonel Bundy ever at any time come that morning to your office with Colonel Bratton?

Col. FRENCH. I don't recall that Colonel Bundy came to my office with Colonel Bratton but I very definitely recall Colonel Bundy coming to my office that morning and spending some time with me there.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that before or after this episode?

Col. FRENCH. After this episode. In fact, Colonel Bundy and I reviewed the action taken on certain messages.

Lt. Col. Gibson. Which messages were they that you reviewed the action taken on?

Col. French. Whatever messages were at that time being transmitted through the office.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN

[1] PART I

Place: Room 20637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 16 September 1944.
Time: 1045–1115.
Present:
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.
Mr. William F. Friedman.

Mr. William F. Friedman, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. Clarke. Will you state your name and official position in the U. S. Government.

Mr. Friedman. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, Office Chief Signal Officer.

Col. Clarke. What were your duties in this position during the six months period immediately prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Friedman. I was principal cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelligence Service. I had just been retired from active duty as lieutenant colonel, Signal Reserve, in about April, I think it was the early part of April 1941, and was given an honorable discharge for permanent disability. I had been in Walter Reed hospital for some three or four months and was recovering from a nervous breakdown.

Col. Clarke. In your position you were familiar with and had access to and had read all of the production of the Signal Intelligence Service?

Mr. Friedman. I had access to it. I didn't read it all because at that time, in my condition I was not able to carry on a full day's duty and had been assigned to other work by Col. Minkler who was then the Chief of SIS.

Col. Clarke. Were you familiar with a message which was received on or about November 28 which later became known as the Winds message?

Mr. Friedman. Yes.

Col. Clarke. I gave you this document and ask you to identify it.

Mr. Friedman. I believe that I was familiar with it at the time.

[2] Col. Clarke. Will you state what, to the best of your recollection, is the history of this message, with any implementing message which may have been received in connection with it.

Mr. Friedman. My recollection is so hazy at the moment and I really was not in on the details of cryptanalytic operations at the time, so I would hesitate to make any statement about that.

Col. Clarke. Could you refresh your memory by getting a log of SIS?

Mr. Friedman. I think that would be possible.

Col. Clarke. Do you know whether any implementing message on that was ever received?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not to my direct knowledge at the time. I only learned of it comparatively recently in talking with Col. Sadtler and Capt. Safford of the Navy. If I did know it at the time I have forgotten it.

Col. CLARKE. Would you care to make any statement with reference to the arrangement which was then in existence where the Navy processed messages one day and the Army the next. Would that have contributed to the disaster where you had no continuity of study?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't believe that arrangement had any particular affect on the situation. It was an arrangement that was worked out between Adm. Noyes and Gen. Mauborgne, to have as fair a distribution of work and credit in the results achieved as possible.

Col. CLARKE. The point I am making there though is, would the translators who worked on the same thing day in and out not have had this continuity of thought in mind if the same people had been working on it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Of course the translators in both the Army and the Navy cryptanalytic sections were constantly engaged on the same sort of material. There was a full exchange of material and results. A message might be done one day by the Navy people and another message the next day by the Army people, so that they kept their hands in it together and they were keeping abreast of each other in the work. That of course was one of the aims of that arrangement. I, as a technician, think that it was a poor arrangement from a cryptanolytic standpoint but from a practical standpoint, in trying to share the work on an equal basis and share credit perhaps, that is as good an arrangement as could be worked out, with two separate but cooperating organizations.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Just one question. You received from the FCC a document with three attachments, a letter dated August 18, 1944 having to do with the so-called Winds Message and possible implementation thereof. Is that correct? I show you this telegram.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The documents were not received directly by me from the FCC. I was given a copy by Capt. Safford of the Navy.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And this is the document that I now have in my possession?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is right.

PART II

Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 19 September 1944.
Time: 1030–1200.
Present:

Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.
Mr. William F. Friedman.

[4] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you now have access to the Signal Intelligence Service records of the United States Army for the dates October through Pearl Harbor 1941?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And have you searched those records to see what, if anything, was done about having Army signal stations monitor for the Japanese Winds Code message?

Mr. Friedman. I have examined the files which are extant and find that certain messages were sent and I can present copies of those which were found.

Lt. Col. Gibson. Did the Army ask its stations to monitor for implementations of the so-called Winds messages?

Mr. Friedman. Not specific Winds messages so far as I know, but a general directive was sent to all its monitoring stations on December 2 directing that monitoring stations were to copy all Japanese plain text in addition to code text and that traffic be forwarded with the regular traffic.

Lt. Col. Gibson. Was any other message sent in this regard after that?

Mr. Friedman. On December 7 a message was sent to Signal officers at Manila, Ft. Shafter and Presidio of San Francisco directing that they were to send to the War Department by priority enciphered radio Japanese clear language messages all ending with the English word "stop," copied since November 27 and thereafter.

Lt. Col. Gibson. Is there any record showing that the Army Signal Service received prior to Pearl Harbor any message that implemented either of these Winds Codes?

Mr. Friedman. Not that I have been able to find so far.

[5] Lt. Col. Gibson. Have you made a diligent search from all possible sources available to you to see if the Army Signal Service, through its monitoring stations, ever received any executing message to these Winds messages?

Mr. Friedman. I have made a diligent search but I will not say that it is a completely exhaustive search because of the lack of time. Thus far I have not found a single bit of evidence to indicate that an Army station actually intercepted a Winds execute message.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. L. T. GEROW

[1] Place: Room 3E794 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 25 September 1944.
Time: 1420–1530.
Present:
Major General L. T. Gerow.
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Major General L. T. Gerow, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. Clarke. Will you state your name, rank, organization and station please.

Gen. Gerow. L. T. Gerow, Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding V Corps, Luxembourg.

Col. Clark. What were your duties, sir, from the period October 1, 1941 through December 7?

Gen. Gerow. Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division.

Col. Clarke. In this position, will you state whether or not you received from G–2 any material which was then known to you as Magic.

Gen. Gerow. I did.

Col. Clark. Are you familiar with that material? Do you identify any of it as material which you have previously seen?

Gen. GEROW. I saw material of a similar nature three years ago. I cannot definitely state at this time whether or not I saw these particular documents. I imagine I did.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall having discussed with Colonel Bratton or General Miles a message which later became known as the "Winds" message? In that message there was a statement that if certain words occurred in the weather broadcast that would indicate the severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan or Great Britain and Japan or Russia and Japan. The message is Top Secret Army No. 29432.

Gen. GEROW. I believe I saw the message and discussed it with

[2] Colonel BRATTON. I cannot be sure, at this late date.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall whether on the morning of approximately December 5 or at any other time that you discussed with General Miles or Colonel Bratton any message which implemented that which would indicate the severance of relations between the United States and Japan?

Gen. GEROW. I do not remember any such message.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall, as Chief of War Plans Division, any warning message being sent out on or about November 27, 28 or 29 to the overseas commanders?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, I remember the message sent out on 27 November.

Col. CLARKE. Do you have any recollection of any of this stuff that Sadtler says here in his testimony?

Gen. GEROW. I have recollection of talking to Sadtler only once. I don't recall ever being informed by Colonel Sadtler of the fact that Japan had decided to declare war on Great Britain.

Col. CLARKE. Were you ever informed by Colonel Bratton or General Miles of that?

Gen. GEROW. Not to the best of my recollection.

Col. CLARKE. When Colonel Bratton would bring this material to you, would you just read it or did you discuss it with him?

Gen. GEROW. Ordinarily he would leave it for me to read. On some occasions he would remark that he had something very hot or refer to a particular paragraph which we would discuss.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall ever discussing the contents of any of this, prior to Pearl Harbor, with General Marshall?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, I do recall discussing Magic information with General Marshall on numerous occasions.

Col. CLARKE. Do you remember whether or not any of the warning messages which you sent out, as Chief of War Plans Division, were based on this material?

[3] Gen. Gerow. The warning messages were based on the general situation as we knew it and a part of that information came from these messages.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall ever having gotten a warning from the Secretary of State to the effect that negotiations would very likely break down and that war would ensue?

Gen. GEROW. Of course I didn't get any information as a rule direct from the Secretary of State. On one occasion I recall there was a general discussion in the Secretary of War's office relative to the phrasing of a warning message to go to the overseas commanders. Prior to sending this message out the Secretary of War conferred over the

telephone with the Secretary of State. The result was that a message, dated November 27th, was sent out containing such a statement.

Col. CLARKE. General, will you state what you recollect about the instance of the morning of December 7, with particular reference to any message which may have been brought to your attention by Colonel Bratton or General Miles.

Gen. GEROW. I have here a memorandum for record on that subject which I prepared on December 15, 1941. I would like to insert that memorandum in the record as my answer to your question.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you Top Secret Army No. 25850. Is that the message you refer to?

Gen. GEROW. I cannot definitely identify this message, but I think it is the same one that was under discussion.

Lt. Gen. GIBSON. Do you recall who, if anyone, there wrote a message to be sent to Honolulu?

Gen. GEROW. General Marshall personally wrote the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Referring to your memorandum dated 15 December 1941, do you remember whether General Marshall sent Colonel Bratton back to the message center a second time to check?

Gen. GEROW. I don't recall.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall whether there was any discussion or debate regarding the interpretation on either of [4] these messages in General Marshall's office prior to the writing of this message? Was it discussed freely?

Gen. GEROW. The message was discussed freely. The main point involved was the significance of the time—1:00 p. m.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And who was there exactly besides you, Bratton and General Marshall?

Gen. GEROW. General Miles and Colonel Bundy.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The discussion, as you remember it, was about this one o'clock proposition?

Gen. GEROW. That is right.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you remember whether or not General Marshall asked your opinion, what it meant, or anything of this nature?

Gen. GEROW. He asked all of us for an opinion as to the meaning of the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. This Magic, was that delivered in a dispatch case at that time to your office everyday—a locked dispatch case?

Gen GEROW. As I recall, Bratton used to bring it down himself personally in a locked dispatch case.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. During the day you would go over it and the next day he would come and get that and leave you some more?

Gen. GEROW. I don't think we kept it. I think I went over it as soon as I could and occasionally I would call Bundy, my war planning man, in and let him see parts of it, and then it would be returned immediately to Bratton.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you pretty close to G–2 at the time; did they give you estimates of the situation occasionally?

Gen. GEROW. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And you conferred with them about the enemy situation generally?

Gen. GEROW. That is correct.

[5] Lt. Col. GIBSON. It was your duty, as head of the War Plans Division, to direct the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-

ment as to dispositions, what state of alert to take, or anything of that nature?

Gen. GEROW. Not necessarily that way. If something important would come up it would be discussed with the Chief of Staff and might be discussed by the Joint Board. Messages would result from those discussions.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Generally such instructions sent out would be sent through your office?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, on matters involving WPD responsibilities. If it were purely a G–2 matter, the instructions would go out through the G–2 office. War Plans Division occupied a little different status at that time from what it occupies now.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Navy ever inform you exactly of what their naval schedule was, that is, when their ships would be in harbor and when they would be out to sea, or anything of this nature, particularly referring to the Hawaiian Islands?

Gen. GEROW. No. I don't believe they did specifically inform me. I could have gotten that information, however, from the Navy had I asked for it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you aware that the Navy were coming in and tying up on definite weekends in Hawaii?

Gen. GEROW. No. I was not.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a message dated 27 November 1941 and ask if that is the message that you have referred to in your testimony where the telephone conversation was had with the Secretary of State prior to the sending of that particular message?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, this is the message I referred to. I presume that it is a true copy of the original message.

Col. CLARKE. Yes it is.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I also show you a copy of a secret radiogram dated July 7, 1941 which is in the nature of a warning to the Hawaiian commander and others and ask if you recollect that.

[6] Gen. GEROW. Yes. It carries my signature.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I just wondered if you had any recollection of it now.

Gen. GEROW. Yes. I remember such a message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, even on July 7, 1941, you were giving some sort of warning to these various commanders?

Gen. GEROW. That is right.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. When you sent this warning of November 27, did you consider that as a definite war warning, General?

Gen. GEROW. I considered it very definitely a message to put our forces on the alert in these various overseas garrisons against a possible attack by Japan.

I was called to the Deputy Chief of Staff's office (General Bryden) and there General Miles, Colonel Bundy, General Bryden and I discussed the advisability of including in this message any reference to sabotage or subversive activities. I objected to the inclusion of any reference to sabotage in this message that was being prepared by War Plans Division. As I recall, the decision was finally made by General Bryden that G–2 would sent a message to the G–2 of the Hawaiian Department telling them to be on the alert against sabotage. The original copy of the message that we had at that meeting shows that the

reference to subversive activities and sabotage was stricken out and initialed by me, with the approval of General Bryden.

Col. CLARKE. In view, sir, of what you have just stated, in your opinion this message of November 27 constituted a definite war warning to the overseas commanders and you did not want to confuse sabotage or subversion with an alert?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, I did conceive it to be that, very definitely.

Lt. Col. GIBSON: General, this message of November 27, 1941 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, was considered by you to be a definite warning to be on the alert against a possible enemy offensive against those garrisons.

[7] Gen. GEROW. That is correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now, General, a paraphrase of a radiogram from General Short received in the War Department 29 November 1941 and ask if you recollect that message.

Gen. GEROW. I don't recall having seen that message. If I did see it my initials probably appear on it in the permanent records.

Lt. Gol. GIBSON. Do you have any recollection of having an answer from General Short to your warning radiogram of 27 November 1941?

Gen. GEROW. The War Department records show that such a message was received in the War Department.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You mean an answer from General Short?

Gen. GEROW. Correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect what his answer was?

Gen. GEROW. I have refreshed my memory from War Department records. There was a reply received from General Short which in substance stated that he had taken all the necessary precautions against sabotage and that he had liaison with the Navy.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of the message of November 24, 1941 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, which message stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility; that the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending negotiations, the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of its army and naval forces, supported this opinion, and that the message stated that the Chief of Staff of the Army requested the local senior Army officers be advised that he concurred in the dispatch? Did you know of the sending of that dispatch on or about 24 November 1941?

Gen. GEROW. I knew that the Navy sent such a message and believe that I read it. As to the exact date and wording, I cannot recall at the moment.

[8] Lt. Col. GIBSON. But it was at about that time?

Gen. GEROW. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you also know that on the 27th of November, the date on which this warning message was sent through your office to the Commanding General of Hawaii, that the Chief of Naval Operations was sending a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Pen-

insula, or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. The message further stated that Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts had been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage, that a similar warning was being sent by the War Department. At about that time did you know such a message was being sent by the Navy Department?

Gen. GEROW. To the best of my recollection, at that meeting in the Secretary's office on the morning of November 27, it was agreed at that time that the Navy would send a similar warning message to the one that the War Department was sending out.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know at the time that on December 3, 1941 the Navy Department sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet stating it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents; and that on December 4 and again on December 6 they sent instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet with regard to destroying cetrain confidential documents and means of confidential communication under conditions of emergency. Did you know of such messages being sent?

Gen. GEROW. I have no recollection of having seen such a message although I may have seen it before dispatch. The War Plans Divisions of both the Army and Navy were in constant contact and kept each other advised of action taken.

[9] Lt. Col. GIBSON. At that time, was it your opinion that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the other Commanding Generals of the Departments in the Pacific or of the Caribbean had had sufficient warning against any aggressive action by an enemy, particularly the Japanese?

Gen. GEROW. I felt that they had been sufficiently warned as to the possibility of aggressive action on the part of Japan.

DECEMBER 15, 1941

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 A. M., E. S. T., General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 P. M., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East; CG Caribbean Defense Command; CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army were read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratoon was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach restinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

/s/ L. T. Gerow
L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. HAYES A. KRONER

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 13 September 1944.
Time: 1430–1510.
Present:
Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner.
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank and station.

Gen. KRONER. Hayes A. Kroner, Brigadier General. Station: Rio de Janeiro, Millitary Attache.

Col. CLARKE. When did you first come on duty in G–2, War Department General Staff?

Gen. KRONER. About the first of March 1941.

Col. CLARKE. What were your duties at that time?

Gen. KRONER. I was assigned to the British Empire Section of the Intelligence Branch, G–2 but before taking up those duties I was sent to England for a period of observation of the war. I returned from England early in June, about the middle of June 1941, and took up my duties of Chief of the British Empire Section, G–2 at that time.

Col. CLARKE. How long did you continue on that duty?

Gen. KRONER. Approximately one month.

Col. CLARKE. And then what did you do?

Gen. KRONER. About the middle of July I was informed by the retiring Chief of the Intelligence Branch, Col. C. H. Mason, that he was leaving G–2 and that he had been instructed to turn the Branch over to me as the next senior officer. I immediately took over charge of the Branch and for the next several months was acting in charge and later on I was appointed Chief of the Branch. To the best of my memory it was about September 17 that an order was issued by the Executive Officer, G–2 appointing me as the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, which position I [2] held until sometime in the month of December, when General Lee became Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 and I was then verbally relieved from Chief of Intelligence Branch and made Deputy to General Lee.

Col. CLARK. What did the Intelligence Branch consist of principally?

Gen. KRONER. I found the Intelligence Branch, in July '41, to consist of a very small Administrative Section and of several geographic sections and an Air Section. The Administrative Section was in process of transition. Because of the impact of the war and more information coming into G–2, there was a greater need for proper handling and dissemination of that information. The only geographic section of G–2 which appeared to be expanding at that time was the Latin American Section. By the 10th of October—referring here to the official chart on record—the Intelligence Branch consisted of a headquarters or the Administrative Section, Contact Section, Situation Section, Dissemination Section, and the Air and geographic sections composed of the following: Air Section, British Empire Section, Western European Section, Central European Section, Eastern European Section, South-

ern European Section, Far East Section, and the Latin American Section. The several European sections had been set up to deal with the increased information coming in from the European war and, together with the British Empire Section, it was considered adequate to handle the war in Europe. The Latin American Section was expanding for obvious reasons of hemisphere defense. The Far Eastern Section at this time had not undergone any material change, so far as I remember, for several months. This organization, with a few changes, continued during my tenure of office as Chief of the Branch. The second exhibit of the organization chart of December 5, 1941 indicates that.

Col. CLARKE. I understand you to say then that you were Chief of the Intelligence Group from about July through Pearl Harbor, December 7?

Gen. KRONER. Yes.

Col. CLARKE. During that time was there any recommendation made—first let me ask you this—who was the Chief of the Far Eastern Section?

Gen. KRONER. Col. R. S. Bratton.

Col. CLARKE. During that time was there any recommendation made to you as Chief of the Group for any increase in personnel [3] or expansion of its intelligence gathering activities?

Gen. KRONER. Not any to give me any trouble—there was some minor increase of a clerk or two and perhaps one officer, I don't remember, but nothing in the line of expansion as I have referred to in the European Section. I would say this further, that one of their Far East experts, Col. Pettigrew, was taken from the Far Eastern Section at that time to assist in the reorganization of the Headquarters dissemination, so that I had very close to me at that time an experienced Far East officer on my staff.

Col. CLARKE. Who was that?

Gen. KRONER. Pettigrew. It was, I think, worthy of note just here that Col. Betts, who was the Chief of the Situation subsection, whom I called my G–2–G–3 officer on my own staff, Col. Pettigrew being so-called G–1–G–4 officer, together with my own experience in the Far East, that with Col. Bratton it was a fairly good team of Far East trained officers at the head of the Intelligence Group.

Col. CLARKE. Was there any action taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Group that would lead you to think that any difficulties or hostilities were expected in the Orient that would affect the United States?

Gen. KRONER. None specifically as to direct threat in regard to time or date or place. Japanese possible lines of action were often discussed, as you might expect among officers as closely allied as the ones I mentioned above with Far East training and influence. I left the evaluation of information pertaining to the Far East and its interpretation initially to Col. Bratton, and in that over-all sense to Col. Betts.

Col. CLARKE. What was your chief source of information with regard to the Far East?

Gen. KRONER. Military Attache reports and translations of books and journals which were received from various sources, so far as I was aware.

Col. CLARKE. You had no secret intelligence service?

Gen. KRONER. No.

Col. CLARKE. Was any attempt made to create any during the time that you were in charge?

[4] Gen. KRONER. Yes. I remember the time—I don't remember exactly—but I remember an instance which was partially fulfilled, I believe, that a former Far East trained officer, who I think was retired and living in California, Captain or Major W. C. Clear, was brought into G–2 and given secret briefing by Gen. Miles, to the best of my knowledge, and sent out to the Far East, I think to Singapore, in order to initiate some secret intelligence, of which I have no detailed knowledge.

Col. CLARKE. Did we have any liaison with the Chinese secret intelligence?

Gen. KRONER. Not that I know of. The Military Attache in China may have had such but it did not come to my attention.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have direct communication and contact or a direct reporting system with the G–2 of the Philippine Department?

Gen. KRONER. Yes, we exchanged reports and some telegrams. That I left largely in the hands of Col. Bratton who, as Chief of the Far Eastern Section, encompassed Japan, China and the Philippines and in general the whole Pacific area. In the Intelligence Section, as far as I know, prior to Pearl Harbor the exchange of information was routine; it was automatic. I recall toward the end of the summer of '41 that Col. Bratton got somewhat disturbed because our Military Attache in Tokyo was getting practically no information. The Japanese had practically closed up on him, and we took that as an indication of their general hardening of their relationship towards us.

Col. CLARKE. Did you receive any reports from the State Department agencies such as the Commercial Attache or the consular service?

Gen. KRONER. Yes, all sections in the Intelligence Branch had at that time direct liaison with their appropriate opposite number in the State Department. This was an established standard procedure, and only when something out of the ordinary came to the front was the State Department paper given any special attention. In addition to that I, Chief of the Branch, and Col. Betts talked and discussed things concerning the Far East with various officers in the State Department and also in the Navy Department.

Col. CLARKE. I was going to ask, did you have the same relation with the Navy?

[5] Gen. KRONER. And the same relation with the Navy.

Col. CLARKE. Did that give you, so far as you know, full and complete exchange of information and intelligence?

Gen. KRONER. So far as I know.

Col. CLARKE. What were your relations with the F. B. I.? Did you have any contact with them?

Gen. KRONER. I had none whatever. I got no information—

Col. CLARKE. Did you from any other federal government agency?

Gen. KRONER. The Commerce Department is the only one at that time, I remember.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have access to a source of information which we know as Top Secret or the British known as Most Secret?

Gen. KRONER. Meaning communications information?

Col. CLARKE. Signal intelligence.

Gen. KRONER. No, none whatever.

Col. CLARKE. You mean you didn't get it or your Branch didn't get it?

Gen. KRONER. I personally as Chief of the Branch did not get it. I was aware that something, which later I found out to be of this nature, existed, but I was given to understand, particularly by Col. Bratton and Col. Pettigrew, who sometimes handled the matter for Col. Bratton, that he received information from Col. Minkler, whom I knew to be in the Signal Corps, which perhaps had to do with Japanese troop movements, which he by long custom and by General Miles special desire, was to handle himself directly with Gen. Miles.

Col. CLARKE. Then you don't know what Col. Bratton did with this stuff other than to give it to Gen. Miles?

Gen. KRONER. No official information. I frequently remember seeing him leave his office with several parcels under his arm and be gone for some hours, but I felt it was my duty to follow the established procedure which was apparently pleasing to my own chief, and I didn't question the procedure.

[6] Col. CLARKE. During the time that you were Chief of the Intelligence Group you never had access or never saw any of this material yourself? When did you first see it?

Gen. KRONER. I only saw the material, which later I learned was called material, when I used to receive it from Minkler's hands when Bratton was absent, and lock it up in my safe and give it to Bratton without sorting it out. In other words, I understood, without any specific orders from Gen. Miles, *that he wished it handled that way and therefore I did not violate that procedure.*

Col. CLARKE. Do you know if any estimates were written in the Far Eastern Section based on this material or any prognostications, forecasts, or predictions?

Gen. KRONER. I do not.

Col. CLARKE. If any had been made you would have seen them, wouldn't you, as the Chief?

Gen. KRONER. I think so because estimates were accustomed to being made, not only at regular intervals, but also special estimates from time to time would be made, the Far Eastern part of which was always prepared initially in the Far East, held by Col. Bratton or under his direction brought in to Col. Betts, who revised it and fitted it in with information from other geographic sections. I assumed that the Chief of the Far Eastern Section used all the information at his disposal to make a complete estimate and as accurate an estimate as possible.

Col. CLARKE. Did there exist anything like a central evaluating section where all information came in and was there melted into one estimate or report or summary?

Gen. KRONER. No. There was a trend toward that at the end of the year but we didn't get anywhere with it. It was just in the planning stage.

Col. CLARKE. Well then, you have no personal or official knowledge of who other than Col. Bratton and Gen. Miles saw this Top Secret material?

Gen. KRONER. That is correct. I have not.

Col. CLARKE. Are you familiar with any warning messages that may have been sent to the Hawaiian or other departments?

[7] Gen. KRONER. Only now—not at the time of the sending.

Col. CLARKE. At the time they were prepared and sent you had no knowledge?

Gen. KRONER. No, none whatever.

Colonel CLARKE. When did you first become aware of the existence of these warning messages which were sent out of the War Department?

Gen. KRONER. I remember a few days after Pearl Harbor, when there was naturally a certain amount of excitement in the War Department, hearing it said by someone—I don't remember—either in Col. Ralph Smith or Gen. Miles' office, words to the effect, "I wonder if that message got through in time," and it was several days later that I learned that an official message from the War Department had gone out to the Commanding General at Honolulu either the night before or the day after Pearl Harbor, I am not certain.

Col. CLARKE. Did you know anything about any warning messages that were sent out late in November?

Gen. KRONER. No.

Col. CLARKE. Or early in December before the morning of December 7?

Gen. KRONER. I never heard about those until today.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I would like to ask, General, if you ever asked Gen. Miles yourself whether or not you were to see this Top Secret information or whether it was his desire that you not see it.

Gen. KRONER. No, I am very certain I did not ask him and I have a very good reason and that is because Col. Bratton impressed me so much with the secrecy and the importance of his relation with Gen. Miles, that it was Gen. Miles' wish.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, you received the information from Col. Bratton that that was Gen. Miles' wish.

Gen. KRONER. Not so much the specific information as it was that I received the impression from Col. Bratton that Gen. Miles wished Bratton to handle this information with him.

[8] Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to go back to the State Department liaison. Were you, as head of the Intelligence Division, kept informed of the conversations between the Secretary of State and Admiral Nomura and Kurusu prior to Pearl Harbor?

Gen. KRONER. No, except that Gen. Miles once in a while would make some remark on the subject.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You personally never went over to the State Department or talked with anyone there about the situation?

Gen. KRONER. In regard to communications?

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You never received any warning of any kind from anybody in the State Department?

Gen. KRONER. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did your Intelligence Section, in receiving reports from the Navy receive any submarine reconnaissance reports or reports of that nature from the Navy?

Gen. KRONER. Not to the best of my knowledge. I don't remember any submarine reconnaissance reports until 1942.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you maintain any gathering of information, any contacts with religious societies or anything to gather information about the Far East from missionaries or anything of that nature?

Gen. KRONER. Yes. There were some missionaries who, by habit and custom, maintained certain contact direct with the Far Eastern Section.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I see. How about these big private corporations, banks and companies that deal with local ones throughout the Far East—were they contacted by your intelligence?

Gen. KRONER. I think they were rather few and far between.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was there any contact with the British Secret Service at that time?

Gen. KRONER. Not to my knowledge.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were inquiries made of the Maritime Commission on whether or not shipping was being obstructed out in that area?

Gen. KRONER. There may have been, but I don't remember that. We [9] were building up, you will notice from the chart, the Contact Section and they were beginning to explore the field you were referring to. How far they got I don't remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you maintain close liaison with the War Plans Division—I believe that is what it was called at that time?

Gen. KRONER. Yes. Every section in G–2 knew personally and talked to the Section in War Plans Division.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you personally, for instance, know of what the Fleet consisted of out in Pearl Harbor prior to Pearl Harbor?

Gen. KRONER. Yes, in a general way.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know the extent of our own anti-aircraft defenses and of our radar installations?

Gen. KRONER. A very incomplete idea of that.

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one more question. In any estimate from the time you took over the Intelligence Group up to and including Pearl Harbor, was there ever any prediction or forecast made of a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?

Gen. KRONER. None to my knowledge. I have in mind the last estimate that was made before Pearl Harbor, which was an estimate covering a future period from December 1 to sometime in 1942.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you consider it a capability of the Japanese to successfully attack Pearl Harbor with bombers?

Gen. KRONER. No. The matter was discussed——

Col. CLARKE. Did you identify this document?

Gen. KRONER. Yes. I identified it—this is the document to which I referred—IB 159, November 29, 1941. This particular estimate was considered by the whole division, not only the Intelligence Group but by General Miles himself, as perhaps the most important we had ever gotten out. That importance lay not in so much the danger that we saw from Japan, although danger in that field was pretty thoroughly discussed, but primarily because Gen. Miles wished to focus War Department though on the defeat that could be administered to the Nazi powers. In the [10] preparation of the estimate each geographic section in the Intelligence Branch prepared its part. Colonel—now Brigadier General—Thomas J. Betts put the several estimates together and did what we called "polish them up." He and I discussed the lines of action and capabilities of all the warring powers and especially of each potential enemy to the U. S. A., and I took them to Gen. Miles where they were finally altered to suit him or approved.

This particular estimate does not include in the lines of action open to Japan, an attack on Pearl Harbor, and I remember that so distinctly because when the word came through the radio on that fateful Sunday, December 7, that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor, I was sitting in my office in the Munitions Building reading from this paper the Japanese capabilities. Therefore from my point of view, I feel that Japan's potential capability against Pearl Harbor was left from this estimate because neither Col. Betts nor I had any information which would lead us to believe that they were capable of or planned to do so.

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one final question again just to reiterate the fact that you personally had no knowledge of what Col. Bratton did with this most secret material or to whom he showed it.

Gen. KRONER. That is correct, except to Gen. Miles.

Col. CLARKE. And you don't know what Miles did with it.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 14 September 1944.
Time: 0930–1030.
Present:
Major General Sherman Miles. Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Gibson.

Major General Sherman Miles, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank and station please.

Gen. MILES. Sherman Miles, Major General, First Service Command, Boston, Massachusetts.

Col. CLARKE. During what period were you A. C. of S., G–2?

Gen. MILES. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 from the first of May 1940 until late in December 1941, when I was made Assistant Chief of Staff—that was a technicality—and relieved from the duty the end of January 1942.

Col. CLARKE. In the six months period preceding Pearl Harbor did you have presented to you all information and intelligence which was received in the War Department General Staff with reference to the war making potentialities of Japan?

Gen. MILES. I can't say that all came to me personally. A synopsis of all came to me through my organization. Certain dispatches and reports I never saw in toto. They were handled by the particular Section of the Military Intelligence Division, which I headed, and came to me in the original form if they were of very great importance, but otherwise in the form of summaries, estimates, etc.

Col. CLARKE. Who was the head of the Intelligence Group during the time that you were A. C. of S., G–2?

Gen. MILES. General John Magruder was the Chief. He was succeeded by Colonel Charles Mason, as I remember it, who was relieved in the summer of 1941 and succeeded by General Hayes Kroner.

[2] Col. CLARKE. During this entire period who was your Chief of the Far Eeastern Section?

Gen. MILES. Colonel Bratton.

Col. CLARKE. The entire period?

Gen. MILES. I think so although I wouldn't be positive.

Col. CLARKE. I am sure that is correct.

During this period, information which was received with reference to Japan or the Far East, was that presented to you, when it was important, direct by Col. Bratton or did you have that transmitted through the Chief of the Intelligence Group, Colonel Kroner or Colonel Mason?

Gen. MILES. Such information as came in Top Secret was habitually handed direct by Colonel Bratton to me. This was particularly so in the six months preceding Pearl Harbor. We were tightening up on secrecy to a great extent. Other information normally came to me through the Chief of the Intelligence Branch.

Col. CLARKE. How was this Ultra information presented to the Chief of Staff?

Gen. MILES. It was presented in a loose-leaf folder in a locked dispatch case for which the Chief of Staff had the key. He took the folder out, read the Top Secret dispatches and returned it to its bag.

Col. CLARKE. Who made the selection of what was presented to the Chief of Staff?

Gen. MILES. The Chief of the Far Eastern Section—Colonel Bratton.

Col. CLARKE. Did he present all of that or just what he, Colonel Bratton, considered were the important items?

Gen. MILES. Only what were considered the important items. There was, as I remember, an immense amount of what we called chitter-chatter which came in Top Secret, routine stuff and stuff of no particular significance except to the people to whom it was addressed. This was not put in.

Col. CLARKE. Did Colonel Bratton present this direct to the Chief of Staff or did you present it?

[3] Gen. MILES. It was presented by Colonel Bratton direct to the Chief of Staff. We had a regular system by which it was taken around by an officer courier.

Col. CLARKE. Then Bratton himself didn't always take it to the Chief of Staff and discuss it with him, to the best of your knowledge?

Gen. MILES. No.

Col. CLARKE. Did the Chief of Staff ever discuss with you or Colonel Bratton the contents of any of these messages and their significance?

Gen. MILES. Oh yes, he discussed it with me several times.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall any particular messages of the Top Secret which he discussed with you?

Gen. MILES. No I don't. Strangely, I recall the lack of messages which he discussed with me. The one thing we couldn't understand was why they weren't talking more about our air reinforcements of the Philippines. I remember he discussed that point with me at length although we reached no conclusion.

Col. CLARKE. Were you familiar with what has later been referred to as the "Winds Message" at the time of its receipt?

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember the receipt of the "Winds Message."

Col. CLARKE. Was that discussed with you by the Chief of Staff?

Gen. MILES. Not that I remember.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever receive any information that the Winds Message had been implemented?

Gen. MILES. I have been trying to remember and my memory is very hazy about it. I do not remember seeing any document on it, any written statement on it. I'm sorry but my memory is—

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall any oral discussion you may have had with any individual with reference to that message, with the implementation of it?

Gen. MILES. No I do not, and yet I do know of course that we sent a dispatch to Hawaii early in December, to the G–2 in [4] Hawaii, directing him to contact a certain officer about the Winds Message.

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall what the occasion of the sending of that message was?

Gen. MILES. Sending which message?

Col. CLARKE. The one to contact the officer in Hawaii who was familiar with the "Winds Message."

Gen. MILES. It must have been information that the naval command had in regard to the "Winds Message" but I don't remember the background.

Col. CLARKE. Were any of of the warning messages that were sent from November 25 through to include Pearl Harbor the result of this most secret source?

Gen. MILES. Oh yes, very definitely. The first warning message, the main warning message, written by the War Plans Division, of 27 November was the result not only of what we knew about our own note to the Japanese of the 26th of November, but of the general build-up of Top Secret information, and that also applied to my message to the G–2's of the 27th of November.

Col. CLARKE. At that time did you have direct contact or authority to communicate directly with all of the corps area and department G–2's or did your traffic have to go through command channels?

Gen. MILES. That is somewhat a difficult question to answer because it depended on the message. I realized that I should never put myself, the G–2, in a position of influencing the commanding generals, particularly of overseas departments, on action which had not previously been approved by command channels. I kept in very close contact with War Plans Division, General Gerow, and I remember particularly in my message to the G–2 of November 27 discussing that with Gerow, and I am pretty sure it was his suggestion that I put in the sentence to communicate this only to the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. The general proposition held that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 of the War Department had authority to communicate freely with his G–2's but always under the principal that he did not influence the commanding generals in lines of action not previously approved.

[5] Col. CLARKE. During this period from July 1 through to Pearl Harbor, did the officers of G–2 in the various geographic branches have daily contact with their opposite numbers in the War Plans Division?

Gen. MILES. I can't say that they had daily; they had very close contact I know but how frequent that contact was I think undoubtedly depended on the situation. It might have been two or three times a day in some cases.

Col. CLARKE. In your opinion every piece of vital information that was available in G–2 was made known to the proper people in War Plans?

Gen. MILES. That was my policy and Gen. Gerow's policy—what we were trying to work to at all times. The same applied to ONI.

Col. CLARKE. Then it was the responsibility of War Plans Division and not of yourself to inform these overseas department commanders?

Gen. MILES To promulgate command decisions, yes.

Col. CLARKE. That is what I am trying to bring out. Do you know whether or not there were discussions between the Chief of the War Plans Division and the Chief of Staff regarding this Top Secret material that you weren't a party to?

Gen. MILES. I don't know whether there were such conversations or not.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss any of this material with the Chief of the War Plans Division and its significance?

Gen. MILES. Oh yes, frequently.

Col. CLARKE. These warning messages that you spoke about, they were sent to all overseas departments, Panama, Philippines and Hawaii?

Gen. MILES. My recollection is that the first one drafted by War Plans was sent to all overseas departments. Mine, the one of the 27th to the G–2's, was not sent to the Philippines.

Col. CLARKE. Do you know whether or not messages were received from the overseas commanders of the three overseas depart- [6]
ments at that time indicating that they had been warned and had taken appropriate action?

Gen. MILES. I did not at that time know because I never saw the answers of the overseas departments to the first or War Plans warning of the 27th. I did, however, see General Short's reply to a subsequent telegram of November 28 about sabotage which of course clearly indicated to me at that time that he had at least received that warning.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever have any discussions with the Chief of the ONI with reference to the contents of the Top Secret material?

Gen. MILES. Frequent discussions with him.

Col. CLARKE. Did you and he take parallel action with reference to this material?

Gen. MILES. In the sense of informing our Chiefs, yes. I don't remember any difference of opinion on this evaluation between Admiral Wilkinson and myself or Admiral Kirk and myself on Top Secret.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever receive any information in G–2 from FBI with reference to this material?

Gen. MILES. Top Secret?

Col. CLARKE. Yes.

Gen. MILES. No, not that I remember.

Col. CLARKE. Can you say whether or not this material or copies of the same material that was made available to the Chief of Staff was also made available to the President and the Secretary of State?

Gen. MILES. Yes, definitely.

Col. CLARKE. Would the President and Secretary of State have received any material which the Chief of Staff didn't receive?

Gen. MILES. Of Top Secret?

Col. CLARKE. Yes, sir.

Gen. MILES. No.

[7] Col. CLARKE. Can you state definitely that the same material which was made available to the Chief of Staff here was made available to the President and the Secretary of State?

Gen. MILES. My recollection is that on Navy day the Navy put these things in the file and that the same file copies went to the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, the two Secretaries, the President and Secretary of State. But I see your point—I don't know.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. General, I may ask some rather unintelligent questions because I am somewhat foggy about this whole thing. Did you know of the letter that the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War on or about the 24th of January 1941, wherein the Secretary of the Navy warned the Secretary of War that hostilities might be initiated any time by an attack on Pearl Harbor, and did you have at that time any knowledge of such a letter being written?

Gen. MILES. I had at that time no knowledge of a letter containing a warning of an attack on Pearl Harbor other than this, that I remember in the late winter of 1940–41 that the Navy was worried about our anti-aircraft defense and air defense of Pearl Harbor. I didn't know that it resulted, although I assume it resulted, from some communication from the Navy Department. I never saw the letter, to my knowledge. However I remember that it was a matter under discussion at about that time.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Chief of Staff ever tell you of any such letter being received from the Navy?

Gen. MILES. Not that I remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever attend any War Council meetings during that period of 1941?

Gen. MILES. Those were the ones with Secretary Welles, Assistant Secretary of State and the Chief of Staff?

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Generally, I believe, provided for a meeting of the Secretaries of War, Navy and State.

Gen. MILES. No I did not attend any of them.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Chief of Staff ever talk with you of any matters that were discussed as these War Council meetings during the year 1941?

[8] Gen. MILES. I don't remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you yourself ever have any conferences with the Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary of State or any responsible official in the Department of State relative to their interpretation or understanding of these so-called Top Secret reports during the year 1941?

Gen. MILES. No I did not. I remember, however, once—perhaps twice—going to the office of the Secretary of State, Secretary Hull, rather formally, together with the head of ONI and certain other State Department officials, for a general discussion of the military and naval situations throughout the world. I don't remember in any of these discussions that Top Secret was mentioned.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever informed by the Chief of Staff of any warning from the State Department that war might be expected any minute because of a breakdown of negotiations between the two countries that were then going on in November 1941?

Gen. MILES. No, I don't remember ever having been told by the Chief of Staff that the State Department considered war might result. I did know at the time the general trend, and I think very accurately, the actual substance of our note of November 26 which gave me certainly the impression that war might result.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was your knowledge of that note obtained from the newspapers or from State Department copies of the note?

Gen. MILES. From our liaison with the State Department. We sent an officer to the State Department every day.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall who the officer was at that time?

Gen. MILES. Colonel Betts, generally. I don't know whether he actually did it that particular day.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever advised or told by the Chief of Staff of the message of 24 November 1941 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, which message said it was concurred in by Marshall, warning of a possible surprise aggressive Japanese attack?

Gen. MILES. I was never told by the Chief of Staff of any such message.

[9] Lt. Col. GIBSON. You of course knew from previous history that the Japs were apt to make a surprise attack in starting any war?

Gen. MILES. I knew that they had done that in the Russian war.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have any knowledge from our military attaches or any other information, possibly from the Navy Department, that certain Japanese consulates were burning their documents and codes on or about 3 December 1941?

Gen. MILES. I have no recollection of any such knowledge as of that date.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of the bulletin issued by the Director of ONI on the Japanese situation, on the Japanese naval situation, on December 1 of 1941? I show you a copy of it.

Gen. MILES. I undoubtedly saw this document. I certainly remember that ONI and the Navy Department were persuaded that there was a considerable movement of Japanese naval forces to the south and that there were rumors of forces in the mandates, which were, of course, Japanese waters.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you remember seeing document 23673, message from Berlin to Tokyo?

Gen. MILES. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect seeing Army 23570?

Gen. MILES. Yes I do.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. With reference to this 23570, did you ever talk with the ONI about this conversation between Admiral Turner and Admiral Nomura?

Gen. MILES. My recollection is that I did. Admiral Turner was rather a law unto himself and my recollection is that I discussed it in a friendly way with my colleague. We didn't reach any definite conclusion.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever visit with Admiral Turner about this?

Gen. MILES. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever get any information on how this meeting came about?

Gen. MILES. No.

[*10*] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear from the Navy Department of any other meeting between Admiral Turner and Admiral Nomura about one week prior to Pearl Harbor as a result of which Admiral Turner called a meeting of high naval officials as to what Nomura was alleged to have told Turner at this meeting?

Gen. MILES. No I don't remember having any knowledge of that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Army No. 23631. Had you seen that?

Gen. MILES. Yes I remember seeing this one, which was to indicate that Germany and Italy might act of themselves against the United States.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I ask you now if you remember seeing 23859 at that time.

Gen. MILES. Yes I do.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Would you say that, generally speaking, you saw these shortly after the date shown on the bottom, apparently translated 10–23–41?

Gen. MILES. In all probability the same day.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. That is undoubtedly true of all of these?

Gen. MILES. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you 23860 and ask if you recollect seeing that.

Gen. MILES. Yes I saw that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you 24373 and ask if you saw that.

Gen. MILES. I am pretty sure that I saw that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you 24655 and 24656, which go together, and ask if you saw those.

Gen. MILES. I saw that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you No. 25644 and ask if you saw that.

Gen. MILES. I don't remember seeing that.

Lt. Gen. GIBSON. No. 25390. Did you see that?

Gen. MILES. I don't remember. I would like to say here that those I have said I have seen recall to my mind in each case [*11*] certain things that make me say I have seen them. I don't recall that or the one preceding it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you No. 24878.

Gen. MILES. I recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25773.

Gen. MILES. I recall that because it was about Mamala.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25817.

Gen. MILES. I don't recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25432, which is the Winds Code.

Gen. MILES. I recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And did you have that in mind when this so-called Winds Message was reported to you?

Gen. MILES. You mean the implementation of that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall a message being intercepted on the evening of December 3 or 4 which apparently used this code as shown in Army 25432?

Gen. MILES. Well that question I have already answered. My memory is very hazy about it. I don't remember seeing any document on the subject.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, you yourself never got the intercepted message of December 3 or 4?
Gen. MILES. Not that I remember.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25392.
Gen. MILES. I don't recall this message, which is supplementary to the Winds Code.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25138.
Gen. MILES. No. 25138 I do recall. You want this 25441 too?
Lt. Col. GIBSON. Yes.
Gen. MILES. 25441, yes I do recall that.
[12] Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25435 and 25436.
Gen. MILES. Yes I remember 25435 and 436.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25442.
Gen. MILES. That is a continuation of the summary of our note of November 26. I remember it.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25446.
Gen. MILES. I do not recall that message.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25548.
Gen. MILES. I do recall that message.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25823.
Gen. MILES. I don't recall that message.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25496.
Gen. MILES. Yes I recall that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25497.
Gen. MILES. I don't remember seeing that radio telephone message.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25554.
Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25344.
Gen. MILES. I don't recall that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25762.
Gen. MILES. I don't recall that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25605.
Gen. MILES. I think I recall that, yes that was when they told us they were going to handle the note here, not in Tokyo.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25727.
Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.
[13] Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25783.
Gen MILES. I don't remember that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25715.
Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25659 and 25660.
Gen. MILES. Yes. This is the interview with Sumner Welles. I remember that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25730.
Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25725, and 25721 goes with it.
Gen. MILES. Yes, I think I remember both of those.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25731.
Gen. MILES. I don't remember that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25785.
Gen. MILES. I think I remember that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25807.
Gen. MILES. I don't remember that.
Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25838 and 25843.

Gen. MILES. 25838, yes. 25843, this is an answer. Yes I certainly remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25445.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that. Before we go any further I think I ought to make a statement. You have shown me a series of important dispatches. I believe, from my knowledge of the system then in effect, that I saw them all. I have identified certain ones as being those that I remembered because as I read them I find statements of fact or assumption that ring a bell in my mind. Others I have identified as not having seen, so far as I now remember, because [*14*] I find no such statements or assumptions in them that ring a bell in mind. I am conscious of my oath and I want to make it plain that my memory, after two and a half years, is not of the best and I cannot even be sure of identifying those messages which I think I remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to come back for just a moment to that so-called Winds Cods. I believe you said you did not remember seeing that.

Gen. MILES. I remember seeing the Winds Code. Then there was another code that I don't remember seeing that was in the intelligence summary.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you make any arrangements with the Army or Federal Communications Commission or Navy or any listening agencies to listen—to pick up anything that might be broadcast?

Gen. MILES. We did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And what were those arrangements?

Gen. MILES. These arrangements were that if certain words that we had from the Top Secret were intercepted in any of our monitoring stations we were to be immediately notified by telephone. As I remember, the telephone number that we gave was that of Colonel Bratton—it was to come through that source. We did not, of course, tell FCC what the meaning of this intercepted message would be. They were simply to notify us if they heard it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have knowledge, General, along about the first of December 1941, that there was a Japanese fleet operating in the Marshalls area?

Gen. MILES. I had knowledge that the Navy had received reports that there was a Japanese naval force in the mandated islands.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of your own knowledge or did the Navy tell you as to our own fleet out there around Pearl Harbor, what we had out there, etc.?

Gen. MILES. I knew in general what part of our fleet was in Pearl Harbor. I don't remember that I particularly tried to find out exactly what ships were there but the [*15*] greater part of the battle fleet was there, I knew from general knowledge. Whether it was in Pearl Harbor or in that area I did not know on any particular day.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have any general knowledge from anybody on the state of our anti-aircraft defenses of Hawaii at this time?

Gen. MILES. Yes, I know from my previous knowledge of the defenses of Hawaii pretty generally the number and strength of our anti-aircraft batteries on the island.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know about the practice of the fleet coming in and tying up in the Harbor for the weekends?

Gen. MILES. No, I did not know that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. General, you, I believe, got out an estimate of the situation generally for the Chief of Staff as of 29 November 1941. I will show you a copy for your recollection.

Gen. MILES. I did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. That did not disclose in it that you considered the Japs had a capability of attacking Pearl Harbor by air. I wonder, was that considered before you submitted the report, was that capability considered by you?

Gen. MILES. I presume so. Please note that this estimate starts out with this sentence: "This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat." It was deliberately written that way. I was a little tired of certain defeatist attitudes among certain of my own people and I wanted to get out an estimate of the situation addressed to the objective of the defeat of the Nazis. Now an air attack on Pearl Harbor or any other attack on Pearl Harbor had been, I knew very well, a source of study for twenty years in Hawaii and in the War Department. It is not mentioned in this estimate of the situation presumably because it was so obvious. We had spent several hundred million in defense of Hawaii, we had our greatest fleet out there. That Hawaii could be attacked if Japan went to war was obvious to everyone. I reread that estimate yesterday. I regret that in stating the possibilities we stated an attack on the Philippines and did not state an attack on Hawaii, Alaska, West Coast, Panama, etc. It was an omission, but I think a rather obvious omission.

[*16*] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever talk with the Chief of the War Plans Division as to the possibility of a Jap attack on Hawaii?

Gen. MILES. I don't remember specifically talking with him on that subject, no. We both were thoroughly familiar with the defense plans and I don't remember that the subject came up.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. These reports, these Top Secret reports, when you got them did you evaluate them yourself or did you have somebody else give you their evaluation of them?

Gen. MILES. I evaluated them myself in my own mind. Colonel Bratton was evaluating them and putting his evaluation into the big estimate.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The only dissemination that you made of the evaluation of these reports would be to Colonel Bratton or WPD or the Chief of Staff?

Gen. MILES. As I say, I do not remember that the Chief of Staff ever discussed the effect of the Top Secret dispatches except their absence in not talking about our reinforcement of the Philippines. I don't remember any particular discussion that I had with General Gerow on evaluating them. These were highly important dispatches which all three of us saw and after all I assumed that the command channels could evaluate about as well as I could, in plain English, what the Japanese were saying and thinking.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever take it upon yourself to go up to see the Chief of Staff and say you thought a very serious situation was being revealed by these things and jog him on it?

Gen. MILES. Not until the morning of December 7th. The seriousness of the situation was, obviously, known to him.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. On what occasion on that particular morning did you go up and personally see him?

Gen. MILES. Well, upon the receipt of the long Japanese telegram reply. That, I notice, is dated December 6. I first knew that it was in that evening and of course we were watching for it very eagerly. We knew that that meant some very definite decision regarding the conference. It was being translated all night. [*17*] I knew that the first part of it was translated on the evening of the 6th but that did not give away the whole business. I went to the office the morning of the 7th and got the whole thing, also was informed that it was to be delivered that afternoon, and arrangements were made to see Secretary Hull. That of course alone was enough to go to the Chief of Staff.

Col. CLARKE. These messages which you have identified here and which you say according to the system you are sure you had seen all of them, you are positive these were seen by the Chief of Staff, to the best of your knowledge?

Gen. MILES. They were all seen by the Chief of Staff and all seen by me to the best of my knowledge. Certain ones, as I say, ring a bell in my mind. I feel morally certain that I saw them all and the Chief of Staff saw them all.

Col. CLARKE. Were you ever told by the Assistant Secretary of State or the Under Secretary of State in July of 1941 that in their opinion war was inevitable and that the War Department should get a secret intelligence service started and get their agents planted around through the world while there was yet time?

Gen. MILES. No, I have no recollection whatever of being told by the Secretary of State or Assistant Secretary of State.

Col. CLARKE. What was the occasion when you started censorship in the War Department?

Gen. MILES. It is rather a long story. A censorship plan had been drafted in the War Department, largely in MID, before I came in May 1940. My recollection is that that plan was approved by the Joint Board. It must have been because I distinctly remember it went to the President and was disapproved. From then on there were many attempts to revise some form of censorship plan. It was obviously a war necessity if war did occur between us and the Germans or Japanese or anyone and a necessity which could be filled only by pre-preparation and training, in other words, you had to train censors. During 1941, or perhaps as early as late 1940, the Navy, without approval of the President, quietly began to train censors and my naval colleague at that time, Admiral Anderson, Chief of ONI, used to spur me on—"why don't you do this too?" I remember several conversations about that. We were trying, as usual, to play the game and do only what was approved, but as the thing warmed up all over the world, our lendlease and other [*18*] approaches to war, it became obvious that the War Department had to do something about it and I started the censorship school, as you remember, over here in Clarendon.

Col. CLARKE. That had nothing to do with any of this material, it was the general knowledge inherent within you that——

Gen. MILES. It was just the general trend. We knew we had to prepare for censorship immediately.

Col. CLARKE. You had close contact with ONI but not with the Naval Operations—is that true, at that time?

Gen. MILES. That was very true. Admiral Turner was practically Naval Operations through a large part of that time. Neither Gerow nor McNarney nor McCloy nor myself could get very far with him.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. So the only real liaison you had was with ONI, which really had the strategic intelligence data and not the actual up-to-the-minute operations of the Navy?

Gen. MILES. Yes. The liaison which I should have maintained with the Navy was with ONI. I had nothing officially to do with the Naval Operations.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did ONI ever give you any information of Naval Operations or what Naval Operations were doing or what messages they sent to their fleet in Hawaii?

Gen. MILES. Yes. I knew, for instance, through ONI of the naval telegram that went out paralleling ours of November 27. I am pretty sure that I knew other definite moves that were made.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Your liaison was an officer that went from here to the Navy, ONI?

Gen. MILES. Several officers, but more directly my own relationship with Admirals Anderson, Kirk and Wilkinson, the latter two of which happened to be very old friends of mine.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did your liaison with the State Department merely consist of getting cables that were coming in to the State Department?

Gen. MILES. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. It didn't consist of contacting the Under Secretaries [19] or Secretary of State or the experts on the various country desks to ask for their judgment on what was picked up?

Gen. MILES. In a sense it did. Our liaison officer, particularly Colonel Betts, who was extremely successful as a liaison officer, established very personal relations in order to carry out his job with various people of the State Department, from whom he could get this information, not only the factual information but what they thought of it. I had that close relationship also with Assistant Secretary Berle. I saw Under Secretary Sumner Welles at times. I saw Mr. Hull at least once and perhaps more, I don't remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At this time while these critical negotiations were going on in November 1941, did you yourself or Colonel Betts go over particularly to ask the State Department what the result of this thing was going to be?

Gen. MILES. I did not. I don't know if Colonel Betts did or not.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT O'DELL

[1] Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Colonel E. W. Gibson, and Lt. O'Dell. 6 October 1944, 9 A. M.

CWC: All right, now tell me your story. We got the story that you wrote to Kemper and said you knew who did Pearl Harbor, or something to that effect; so you can start telling us what you know.

O'D: Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I thought might not have come out through other sources. There was a cable that was sent on the fifth of December to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments concerning the movement of a Japanese Task Force in the South China Sea. The information had come to the Military Attache through the Australian

Government, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, who called Colonel Merle Smith and myself to his office.

CWC: You were then Merle Smith's assistant?

O'D: That's right. There were the two of us, and he is now dead. That's the reason I stuck my nose in this. We were called over on Thursday afternoon about 5 o'clock. Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, myself, and Colonel Merle Smith and Commander Saom, who is the Naval Liaison Officer from the Dutch East Indies. The information was primarily in regard to the Netherlands, to the Indies, and, as I say, principally concerned itself with the movement of a Jap Task Force in the South China Sea. However, within an hour after we had gotten there some additional information came in, the exact nature of which I wasn't told at the time, but when we went out, Colonel Merle Smith had me prepare a cable which he revised to send out and the principal part of that other than the movement of this convoy was that the Dutch had ordered the execution of the Rainbow Plan, A–2. I remember, it's been almost three years now, and I can distinctly remember that particular part of the cable where it said A–2, repeat A–2, which was a part of the joint Abducan plan only to be taken in the event of war. It provided for specific occurrences they would counteract by certain other action. In other words, A–1 would have been some other direction expected attack, A–2 was from a particular direction, and they ordered the execution of this A–2. That was significant because the plan called for joint operations for the Australians and the Dutch and to the best of my knowledge our Navy if nothing else. That was to go into effect only in case of war and here the Dutch had ordered it. That was the definite information that it had gone into effect. There was a bit of flurried excitement with that, and Sir Charles Burnett asked us not to send that cable and Colonel Merle Smith, although impatient to send it, said that he would wait twelve hours at Sir Charles Burnett's specific request. In other words, they didn't say they wouldn't let that cable go out, but I dare say they probably would have stopped it had we tried to launch it.

[2] CWC: Let me ask you—now that was on December 5?

O'D: Sir, that was Thursday, the 4th, and we held it.

CWC: In other words that's the 3rd our time.

O'D: That's right, sir.

CWC: And you didn't send it actually until the 5th?

O'D: Well, the reason for the delay was that there was a War Cabinet Meeting at which Sir Charles Burnett was to report this information to the Australian War Cabinet which was meeting in Melbourne that evening, and he went from his office to the War Cabinet meeting. We, on our part, held the cable twelve hours, and I coded it and had it ready for dispatch and held on to it. In the cable (it was extremely urgent) this convoy, they had it doped out, could get to somewhere, either the Philippines or the Indies within, I believe it was, 60 hours, and that is the way that we had figured it. So we sent the cable one copy to General MacArthur in his code that we had then and another copy in a different code to Hawaii with a repeat to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the request to repeat it to Washington. In other words, we sent none direct to MILID as we would have done if time hadn't been such a factor. But, we were extremely laborious in writing——

CWC: In other words, you fellows instead of having a drop copy for Hawaii, you gave it to Hawaii and told them——

O'D: And told them to repeat it here, sir, and then send another copy to the Philippines. There was no hint of Pearl Harbor in this whatsoever. It wholly concerned itself with the Philippines and the Indies, and it looked like the Indies at that precise moment would be the first to get it. Now, we sent that cable, that would be the morning of the 5th their time, and I see in the papers where Dixon denied that his country had any information of an attack on Pearl Harbor, and it was reported to the press in that way, which is so. But they did have a warning of action in the Philippines or in the South Pacific Area. I would say it is inescapable that they did. I don't know—we never had any acknowledgment of the cable from either Hawaii or the Philippines, and we never heard anything from MILID to let us know whether or not it had reached them. Of course, the subsequent events were such that it might have been overlooked. The file copy was destroyed—ah, this looks like it. That's it, sir, Netherlands Far East Command on Execution of Plan A–2. Naval moves in Mindanao—(interrupted)

CWC: General Osmun, this is Lieutenant O'Dell.

RAO: O'Dell.

[3] O'D: How do you do, sir.

RAO: Mighty glad to know you.

O'D: Pleased to meet you, sir.

CWC: He's giving us some information here in connection with this Pearl Harbor business.

RAO: I've heard about it.

CWC: You've heard about Pearl Harbor?

RAO: Ha! Ha! I'll tell you sometime about a year from now at Christmas we'll all get together and celebrate that. I'm glad to have met you.

O'D: Thank you, sir.

O'D: What made us particularly angry about this was that the next morning the newspaper came out in the early edition with a certain part of this information about the Indies. And, after we had held the cable up at their request, Colonel Merle-Smith naturally raised a great deal of trouble over why we had had to hold our cable and the press had gotten an inkling of it; they hadn't gotten the works, sir, but they had an inkling. That is the message in particular, sir. That is the one.

CWC: Notice the footnote down there.

O'D: "And relayed to War Department message center" (reading from message).

(Interrupted by telephone. CWC talked for some time with General Strong)

O'D: We expected action to take place on Sunday our time, and we all went down to the office on Sunday and waited with bated breath, and nothing happened Sunday. That led us to believe that, well, this was another of those scares. As you can probably guess, sir, we had had several previous warnings of impending action in time to reflect that in the reports and cables that we had sent. One other positive action was that Kopang—two days before this happened—received fifty (the Japanese Consul received) cases which he wished to have in under Diplomatic privilege and it was refused by the Dutch and opened by the Dutch before he could get them back on this Japanese ship.

I think that was the trouble, there wasn't a Japanese ship that he could put it on. And, when they opened it, they found a complete, well not radar because radar wasn't in the state that we now know it, but it was a sending and receiving radio set, and we had had information about that. Also, [4] of course, all the Japanese shipping had been pulled back into Japanese waters for at least sixty days before. And, then on the afternoon that this was sent, we sent that in the morning, the Japanese consul in Melbourne, who was under surveillance, was seen to burn all of his codes in the backyard. Nobody, of course, was able to make a move to stop him, but they saw that.

CWC. You're sure this was sent out from Singapore, or where was it sent from?

O'D. From Melbourne, sir.

CWC. Melbourne on the fifth.

O'D. The fifth, in the morning, sir.

EWG. According to this copy, Colonel, this was received by Signals Hawaii, don't know when, but it was relayed to the War Department, arriving here at the night of Pearl Harbor day, December 7, with a memo on it that this was addressed to CG, Hawaii and relayed here with request for decipherment and repeat back to them.

CWC. Well, we got that in there with old man Smith's note.

EWG. Yes, we have that. The only thing is, it is curious why Signals Hawaii held that so long. They couldn't decipher it; maybe they thought they could, I don't know.

O'D. It was sent positively in a code which Hawaii had.

CWC. What did you use?

O'D. The information that was on the code and cipher. We used the secret book with the cipher table.

CWC. Did you use the black book or the red book? Do you remember?

O'D. If I saw it, of course, I could identify it. As I remember it, it was gray. I don't remember. There was a thick confidential and a thin secret and then there were the cipher tables that were changed every thirty days, and we were very careful to pick one. That's why we had to code it twice, once in a code that we knew Hawaii had and once in one the Philippines had because the Philippines had different codes entirely from Hawaii, and we had to—well, you can imagine, that is a rather laborious job, a message like that.

CWC. The message we got in said it was held 17 hours.

O'D. That was 17 hours, sir, from one afternoon until the next morning. I see they have a question mark under what government. It was the Australian government. We put that in the message.

[5] EWG. Did you ever in Australia hear of any information indicating that there was a task force sailing toward Pearl Harbor?

O'D. Not toward Pearl Harbor, sir. We never had any information or anything in that direction. We knew of a task force in the South China Sea, and whether it was headed for the Philippines or whether it was headed for any part of the Indies, the reconnaisance information that was available to us did not specify.

CWC. Did you know about the build up of a task force in the Marshalls?

O'D. Yes, sir.

CWC. You did know about that.

O'D. Yes, sir, through the Australian Government again. Mostly the RAAF. They were the ones rather than the Army or the Navy, it was the RAAF that was feeding us what information of value——

CWC. How far in advance of Pearl Harbor did you know that, do you recall?

O'D. I should say it was in that same week. Probably early in that week. That was toward the latter part of the week. I should say in the early part of that week, sir. We had been following the Japanese disposition of troops and had sent a report, a regular M/A report on the disposition of all Japanese divisions about a month before all this came up, which was used merely to confirm what other reports were here. It was just how the Australians had the disposition of the Japanese Army and which we sent in confirming the other information here. Shipping, as I say, we knew that all the Japanese shipping had been moved back into its own territorial waters. Most of our information led us to the definite and inescapable conclusion that war was going to break here, nothing about Pearl Harbor, sir.

CWC. Well, of course, that is a typical Jap stunt. Now, who is this Sir Charles Burnett again?

O'D. He was Chief of Staff of the RAAF. He has been sent back to England now. He is an RAF officer who was on loan, and it was through him and Air Commodore Hewett, he was an intelligence officer, that we had disposal of whatever information they had, and they did, of course, cooperate a great deal with us. But the message that you have there, sir, which is the same one exactly as we sent it out, and a pretty good decipherment as well, Colonel Merle Smith was exceedingly careful, and he was the opposite of an alarmist. He would not put anything in a cable that he didn't have absolutely down under his thumb perfectly.

CWC. Yes, I knew Merle Smith. I knew him very well.

[6] O'D. And you can see from that cable, sir, that he put nothing that would tend to alarm that wasn't definite fact that he could attribute to something precise.

EWG. Do you know whether or not Hawaii knew what this plan A–2 was?

O'D. We believed that they did. That point came up because of the Naval, because of Pearl Harbor being the Naval Headquarters and the Plan A–2 being for U. S. participation mostly in a naval manner. We certainly assumed that if anybody knew A–2, Pearl Harbor did know it. Now, whether the Army would show that to the Navy and that sort of thing, we naturally left up to them. But this Naval Plan, you see there was a Naval Attache in Melbourne, Captain Coursey, and we informed him of that and curiously enough Captain Coursey did not send any message like that. I do not believe he did. I'm not qualified to say for certain, but he was not in the same state that we were about it. What I am trying to say is that what we sent back might not have seemed such a positive indication, but that everything where we were definitely led to the assumption that war was going to break out. This was about the third or fourth time it had happened, but this time it really seemed in a state where in 60 hours that task force was going to be somewhere and with all this code burn-

ing and various other indications from all sorts that I knew about and no doubt they knew more than I did, it looked like this time it was going to be the end, and, as I say, we expected it on our Sunday and that Sunday came and went and nothing happened, and we had a let down, and then of course it was Monday, our time, that it happened. He put nothing in that cable that wouldn't be——

EWG. Well, this cable says the Netherlands Command at 8 A. M. on 7 December reported planes to have reached Kopang. Could you have sent it before?

O'D. That was added, sir, on the morning as was the fact that it was delayed. In other words we had to re-write it because the situation was changing momentarily.

EWG. Then you don't think that this was——

O'D. No, sir, that went out on Friday.

EWG. Do you think that might have been a mistake in deciphering?

O'D. Yes, sir. You see the meat of the thing: the suggestion that the RAAF likewise take reciprocal action. In other words "we're going to live up to our obligation——".

EWG. This date bothered me. That's all.

O'D. Well, it bothers me a bit, sir. That is the only copy that I know of in existence. The file copy was destroyed by the present Military Attache with all old papers, about two years ago.

[7] CWC. Do you think that the Australians notified their people here? Do you have any way of knowing that, or any opinion?

O'D. I know that our own Minister was not informed of the situation. You see, of course, the capitol, sir, is in Canberra, and we were stationed in Melbourne because that was the scene of activity. The War Cabinet met the previous night. That's when Sir Charles Burnett had told them this information. Whether the War Cabinet, who would be the body then who would have instructed them to let Washington know——. Sir Owen Dixon wasn't here then. He was a shipping man in Australia, and Mr. Casey was here.

CWC. Casey was the guy that was here then.

O'D. That's right, sir. Mr. Casey.

CWC. I know there was a roar about it when they pulled him out of here.

O'D. Yes, sir, that's right, sir, jealousy I think. Whether or not they sent a cable to—I rather doubt that they did, sir, because, as I say, the Australian Government wasn't too happy about our sending this out even after the delay. I mean they realized that it was inescapable, and we had to keep our government informed, but——.

CWC. Well, there is one thing I'd like to get straight in my own mind. Now, when Burnett gave Merle Smith this information, he gave it to you with the understanding that you not transmit it.

O'D. No, sir, when he told it to us we were getting ready to send it out. It was only after we had the cable—you see, we were there over an hour, over two hours, that afternoon, and the information was dribbling in in spurts, and we had that and it was only when we were getting ready to go, which was around seven o'clock, that the War Cabinet meeting was called. I shouldn't say before six thirty, at the time we came out there, it wasn't scheduled. They called this emergency meeting and at that time when we had prepared the cable and were getting ready to go code it, Sir Charles Burnett requested very specifically that it not be sent, that we hold it up until he had

informed the War Cabinet. I rather think that that is why he didn't want the information to leave Melbourne. In other words, he hadn't told his own government yet.

CWC. In other words he wanted to spring it on his people first.

O'D. Before there was any chance of our sending anything out, sir.

CWC. That's logical.

O'D. I might say, sir, that because there were only two of us and because everything was happening day and night then, that was one of the last messages that we sent out in our own code. From then on we used the Australian cipher section back and forth.

[8] CWC: Why?

O'D: Well, sir, we weren't too sure of our codes to the Philippines. We knew they had the cipher device, but we weren't sure of the security afforded by the cipher device.

CWC: You mean the cylindrical?

O'D: That's right. After the outbreak of war, you see, sir.

CWC: But it was secure before the outbreak of war?

O'D: Once the show broke and we were going back and forth between General MacArthur's headquarters and Australia, we were given the use of the Australian code and it was mostly of a liaison nature, anyway, as to whether General MacArthur could send a plane here on reconnaissance or a plane there or what could be expected in one way or another. There were so many messages coming and going. General MacArthur would send us messages. Sir Charles Burnett would ask us for certain information from the Philippines. You see Washington was pretty far removed from us at that time. We didn't know what delays would be encountered in the cables going through Hawaii to Washington, which was the only means of sending any message here, and there were matters which would come up which we would want answered in 5 or 6 hours, which we knew we'd never get to Washington and back in that time, and it concerned what General MacArthur would be able to tell us and which Washington would only have to ask someone else for. So, we had quite a bit of correspondence back and forth by cable and wireless from the Philippines to Australia as soon as the war broke out. We simply didn't have the means, I mean it would take at least three hours to do a job like that message there. By that time the information was not even wanted. So, we had this coming and going. We moved our office right into the RAAF Headquarters.

CWC: They had the machines then, too, didn't they?

O'D: No, sir, they did not. They had—I can assure you that Colonel Merle Smith went into it to the last detail, no violations of any security.

CWC: Oh, no, I wasn't thinking about that. Mine was just a question of the time factor. There is one question I want to ask you. This has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor. Were you aware of that convoy which was at sea when Pearl Harbor hit?

O'D: Yes, sir.

CWC: Were you aware of the correspondence when they sent it all over the whole damned South Pacific?

O'D: Then, sir, we started getting messages from General Marshall in a code that was, at first one message came and we didn't have the code. They repeated the message in a different code, and we had that code, and curiously went through that and got that, it was a

[9] double transposition, which, of course, didn't use the book. We got that, and, of course, that was a long one there again. We were having our troubles. We got that deciphered, and it was from General Marshall, and we called that the Pensacola, sir, that was under escort by one cruiser, which was the Pensacola. We would do about ten of those in one message, sir. One little error in the first, and you go back and do the whole thing over again, and you can't tell until after you've finished that you've made an error, when you start to get your word groups. But we had heard, we got several cables about the arrival of the Pensacola convoy, including what was on it. As I remember, there were A–24's and P–40's. There were, I think, 26 P–40's and 18 A–24's. Immediately Sir Charles Burnett wanted to know what was the A–24. Well, sir, frankly the means at our disposal there, the Air Force manuals on what the A–24's were, we didn't get far, and that was a little annoying.

CWC: That was that Mitchell dive bomber?

O'D: That's right, sir, single engine and, of course, the A–20 was a twin engine, and the question in Sir Charles Burnett's mind was, is it a single engine or is it a twin engine. They wanted those planes and they had to make arrangements for staging areas for them and discharge and so forth, and it was rather difficult to do without that information. Still, by the time we wired to Washington to ask them (we didn't, of course, because, with everything happening all over) they were going to land. They were due on the 23rd of December, sir. They arrived in Brisbane and we went up to Brisbane to meet the convoy.

CWC: Some of my old gang in the Second Air Force were on that. That interceptor outfit that came out with them.

O'D: Yes, sir, they were destined, of course, for the Philippines and South Hawaii. General Brereton had sent a mission down. General MacArthur had sent General Brereton with a mission of about eight men, eight officers, from the Philippines in the latter part of November, and General Brereton had arrived at Darwin and Colonel Merle Smith went up to Darwin and flew over to Rabaul with them, and I met them in Brisbane and they went on this mission. They were primarily concerned with the fueling facilities for B–17's being flown out from Hawaii via Rabaul, Darwin and then up through the Indies to the Philippines. They were trying to arrange for petrol from the Shell Oil Company and airports, airports principally. That was where we got about a 60 day start, not quite that, about a 45 day start on building airports around Darwin which were later used when they evacuated the B–17's, these strips through the jungle. General Brereton, of course, had come down in plain clothes. He wouldn't have been allowed in the country in uniform at that time. He had flown down here, and we took them all around looking for airports where we could land them. Then, of course, this Pensacola convoy came in.

CWC: Yes, I remember all those things. Well, I don't think there is anything else unless you have something you want to add to what you have said.

O'D: No, sir, I just wanted you to have——

CWC: All right. Well, I'm awfully glad you came in, and I appreciate your taking the trouble. It's nice to have seen you.

O'D: Thank you very much, sir.

TESTIMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 16 September 1944.
Time: 0945–1030.
Present:
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler.
Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony:

Col. CLARKE. Will you state you name, rank, organization and station.

Col. SADTLER. Otis K. Sadtler, 03577, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, War College, Washington, D. C.

Col. CLARKE. When did you become Chief of Army Communications Service, approximately what date?

Col. SADTLER. About the 7th of August 1941.

Col. CLARKE. You held that position at the time of Pearl Harbor?

Col. SADTLER. I did.

Col. CLARKE. As such were you responsible for the production of what is known as Magic or Ultra intelligence?

Col. SADTLER. I was.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have access to this?

Col. SADTLER. I did.

Col. CLARKE. Did you read the messages before they were sent to G–2?

Col. SADTLER. In general yes, not always.

Col. CLARKE. Were you familiar with a message which was received in the SIS on or about November 28 which later became known as the Winds message?

Col. SADTLER. I am familiar with that message.

Col. CLARKE. I hand you that and ask if you can identify it—#25432.

Col. SADTLER. That is the message, yes.

[2] Col. CLARKE. Will you state what, to the best of your knowledge, belief and recollection, you know of the history of this message and any implementing message which may have been received regarding it?

Col. SADTLER. It is my recollection that that message was intercepted by the Navy and we asked the Federal Communications Commission to monitor all press broadcasts from Japan as a result of that message.

Col. CLARKE. By "we" you mean Signal Corps?

Col. SADTLER. Yes, and Col. Guest, as I recall, was the man who made the arrangements. The FCC put their Wharton station on these broadcasts from Japan and made arrangements with the telephone company to contact Col. Bratton, the G–2 liaison officer at that time, directly if they heard anything regarding the implementing of that message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Meaning message #25432.

Col. SADTLER. That Winds message. We contacted the FCC from time to time and asked them whether anything had been heard that would give us any clue as to when that was going to happen, etc. The

first information that I had regarding any new developments on that message was on the morning of December 5, when Adm. Noyes called me and said, "Sadtler, the message is in," or words to that effect. Adm. Noyes was the head of Navy communications service which included this code and cipher work. I went immediately to General Sherman Miles' office, who was G–2 of the Army at the time, and told him that the message was in and that it was to the effect that war would be declared between Japan and Great Britain. He said, "Wait a minute, I will get Col. Bratton." Bratton came in almost immediately. I told him what Adm. Noyes had told me and he said, "What was the word?" I told him I didn't know what the word was. He took out a little slip of paper he had in his pocket which had the Japanese words shown in this message and asked me if it was one of those. I said, "I don't know but it is the one that means war with Japan and Great Britain." He said, "Do you think you can verify this?" and I said, "I will go back and call Adm. Noyes." The reason I had to go back to call Adm. Noyes was that the secret phone was in my office. I called Adm. Noyes and he said something to the effect that, "I don't know any more Japanese than you do; it's the one of Japan and Great Britain." I said, "Do you think you can verify it?" He said, "I can't do it [3] now because I must report to the Chief of Naval Operations but I will do it later." I said it would be too late then.

I then returned to Gen. Miles' office and told him that Adm. Noyes did not know the word but that it was the one that war was going to be declared between Japan and Great Britain. They said, "Well unless there is something definite as to the meaning of this word this may be a false alarm." There was some other conversation on the subject, and as I recall I was instructed by Gen. Miles to make sure that FCC and other agencies listened on that Japanese press broadcast and to let him know of any future developments. I then returned to my office.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss this with anybody else? Did you make any report of this to the Chief Signal Officer, for example, or to the Chief of Staff or Secretary of General Staff?

Col. SADTLER. No, it wasn't told to anyone else in the Signal Corps because the Chief Signal Officer was in Panama at the time. That was discussed in War Plans Division and it was to some extent discussed with the Secretary of the General Staff, Col. Smith.

Col. CLARKE. Did they evidence any interest in this case?

Col. SADTLER. Not a great deal. As I remember, Gen. Gerow made a statement that they had been adequately warned.

Col. CLARKE. By they you mean the department commanders?

Col. SADTLER. Hawaii, Panama and Philippines. Col. Smith decided that nothing further should be done because it had been discussed with G–2 and War Plans.

Col. CLARKE. Will you state what you know about any action that may have been taken on the morning of December 7.

Col. SADTLER. I did not go to the office on the morning of December 7. Anything that I can say about December 7 is as a result of going down to the office afterwards.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. This Col. Smith is Col. Bedell Smith, now General?

Col. SADTLER. That's the one.

[4] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you talk to Col. Smith personally about the 5th of December?

Col. SADTLER. It was the morning of the 5th, Friday morning, after I talked to G–2.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And he asked you if you had talked with G–2?

Col. SADTLER. He asked me what I had done as a result of this and I told him I had been to G–2 and that I had visited WPD and had seen Col. Gaily and Gen. Gerow. Gaily had nothing to say but Gen. Gerow said they had had plenty of warning.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever, prior to Pearl Harbor, tell this to Gen. Marshall?

Col. SADTLER. Personally, no.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you know of anybody who did?

Col. SADTLER. I don't know if Gen. Marshall ever knew it.

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

[*1*]

Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 14 September 1944.

Time: 1330–1430.

Present:

Major General Sherman Miles.
Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner.
Colonel John T. Bissell.
Colonel Rufus Bratton.
Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Gibson.

Gen. MILES (to Col. BISSELL). Definitely you confirmed yesterday my impression that the information we got from F. B. I. through the translations or intercepts of their messages at Hawaii was not given to us and was not available in fact to F. B. I. until after Pearl Harbor.

Col. BISSELL. That is correct.

Gen. MILES. I think you also said that we got nothing from the F. B. I. before Pearl Harbor indicating the possibilities of an open break of war with the United States.

Col. BISSELL. That is correct, too.

Col. CLARKE. Where did this message come from here on December 3 that they were burning the codes? Where did that information come from—it is in the Roberts Report. It apparently was the Navy and it must have had something which McCullom didn't make available to you. Bissell says he knew about burning the codes on the morning of December 7. That was in the papers of course.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was there much interchange between the F. B. I. and G–2 prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. Oh yes, there was a great deal but not of this nature.

Col. CLARKE. It was all on domestic intelligence.

Gen. MILES. Oh, no, there was a lot on South American stuff and a lot on Japanese stuff. I had a personal meeting with Hoover and ONI once a week.

[*2*] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you ever asked them if they had anything on Hawaii, any information of Japanese activities in Hawaii prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. Yes, to a great extent. The F. B. I. kept us informed as to the locations of these Japanese military attaches and then when they passed into Panama I in turn notified the G–2, with Gen. Miles'

consent, where they were going, and they in turn shadowed them in Panama, and if they turned up in Hawaii we got information both from the F. B. I. and our own people.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Why was it that the F. B. I. suddenly started to turn over to you after Pearl Harbor information that might have been helpful before Pearl Harbor?

Col BISSELL. They didn't have it before.

Gen. MILES. They were held down.

Col. BRATTON. I would like to clear this up. I understand that you (Col. Bissell) and Gen. Kroner have stated that this material (referring to Top Secret) was not made available to you prior to Pearl Harbor. I am of the distinct impression that, under orders from Gen. Miles, I did make it available to you before Pearl Harbor in the form of memorandums that had to do with certain subversive activities. I told you sometime before Pearl Harbor that I had a source of information which——

Col. BISSELL. I don't remember the date. That may have been before Pearl Harbor.

Col. BRATTON. I am of the distinct impression that that was initiated sometime before Pearl Harbor, and I am also of the distinct impression that these things were made available to you, at Gen. Miles' order, prior to Pearl Harbor and that you (Gen. Kroner) and Betts used to read them in the evening in the office.

Gen. KRONER. That is not my impression. I am aware of such (Top Secret) existing but I remember very clearly——

Col. BRATTON. Pursuant to instructions to you and an understanding with the General here, when anything was hot I used to run to General Miles first and I always acquainted you with what I had done afterwards at your convenience.

[3] Gen. KRONER. I do not remember that procedure with regard to signal intelligence or what was known as Magic. I do not remember any specific instance.

Col. BRATTON. I cannot recall any specific instance, but I am under the impression you knew what had gone between General Miles and myself.

Gen. KRONER. Well I have just the opposite impression, and that is that it was General Miles' wish, not expressed specifically but as I got it in working with you and his not talking about it to me specifically, that he wished it to continue to be handled between you two and that would form the basis of information, with your general information, and you advised me about the Philippines or about the Far Eastern situation according to the information you had available to you.

Gen. MILES. Your section, Bratton, was part of Kroner's Branch. Now it is true, I remember, that we were always closing in on Magic, making it more secure all the time—trying to—and that we had several people outside of the Munitions Building to serve. It was my definite desire and direction, I think, that you would handle the mechanics of Magic direct with me and the Chief of Staff, and later WPD, ONI, etc., but that you were to inform your Chief of anything important and certainly use Magic in your estimate of the Far East that you were giving to your Chief, Gen. Kroner. I am pretty sure that was the definite arrangement.

Col. BRATTON. That is my understanding too.

Gen. KRONER. My only comment on that is that I was never told or never received the impression that you wanted me to be specifically informed, but I assumed from our association that you expected Bratton to use the information in an all around appreciation of what was available to him when he gave me an opinion about the Far East.

Gen. MILES. I would like to ask Gen. Kroner if you can remember what your general impression of the Far Eastern situation was, of the probabilities of Japanese action whether against us or foreign powers, late in November or early in December.

Gen. KRONER. That there were a number of lines of action open to Japan, mostly connected with the Asiatic Continent, [4] which she would be more likely to take in case she decided to go to war against England or America, and that my attention was focused, after frequent discussions with Col. Bratton and Col. Betts, on the Asiatic Continent rather than toward the South Pacific.

Gen. MILES. Then I would like to ask both of you this. I have just read today that excellent summary that you prepared last year on the information received in MID. From that I get the very distinct impression, and I can remember this was my impression at the time, that the bulk of our information, all of it including Magic, indicated the major proability of a Japanese move to the south, Indo China, Siam, Thailand, perhaps the Dutch West Indies, perhaps Malaya, that our general impression at that time was that that was the most probable Japanese move. We did not exclude war with the United States since we specifically mentioned the Philippines as being part of the Japanese southern push and in a war with the United States of course there was a possibility, particularly with the Japanese, that a surprise attack might be made anywhere, certainly including Hawaii which had been armed and prepared for such an attack for twenty years.

Col. BRATTON. But that initially, as I have testified this morning, any attack against an American installation in the middle or eastern Pacific would be in the nature of a diversion and having as its objective the immobilizing of any force that we might call in to help the Dutch and British in west and southwest Pacific, but as you say their primary initial objective was the destruction of Great Britain's power in southeast Asia and the seizure of——

Gen. MILES. We don't very greatly differ there. I don't know that I would have said at the time that an attack on Hawaii or the Panama Canal, if made, would be a diversion. It would be a pretty serious attack to attain the objective, but not likely in view of the mass of information that we had as to the southern push. Is that more what you remember, Kroner?

Gen. KRONER. Yes.

Col. CLARKE. In view of what you have just stated here with reference to this great mass of information, didn't you consider it was equally the responsibility of the Chief of the War Plans Division to advise the Chief of Staff, as much [5] his responsibility as it was yours with reference to any potential attack which we might expect from Japan or any line of action that Japan might take?

Gen. MILES. It was the primary responsibility of Military Intelligence, always is and always will be, to advise the Command what the enemy may do and possibly do or more probably do. It is certainly the responsibility of Operations to advise the Chief of Staff

what we should do as the result of information received in Military Intelligence from their sources. I certainly considered it then a part of my business to know, in general terms, the disposition of American forces and rather specifically our defense plans of vital installations such as the Panama Canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines. I certainly knew the location of the major parts of the U. S. fleet.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, General, once you informed the Chief of Staff and the War Plans Division the possibility of an attack, it was then up to the WPD, through the Chief of Staff, to inform our forces what plan to put into effect?

Gen. MILES. Yes, a command responsibility. Now Bratton, in reading your testimony, it gave me the impression that the Magic that you selected for the Secretary of State might not be and was not in some cases perhaps quite the same as that presented to the Chief of Staff and to me.

Col. BRATTON. No, if you got that impression from anything I said I wish to correct it at this time. The Secretary of State never saw any document that was not presented to you, the Chief of Staff and WPD, as far as I am concerned.

Gen. MILES. Vice versa, was any document presented to the Chief of Staff that was not also presented to the Secretary of State?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, very often.

Gen. MILES. Really?

Col. BRATTON. Initially, but in our final breakdown of the thing it was the understanding that Mr. Hull was to see all [6] the communications that you and General Marshall saw.

Gen. MILES. And that had been in effect for sometime previous to Pearl Harbor.

Col. BRATTON. Yes. When I first started handling this stuff the State Department didn't see any of it. It was not until our relations with Japan became rather strained that I was instructed to serve it to the State Department at all.

Gen. MILES. I remember that, but for months preceding Pearl Harbor exactly the same selections from Magic which you made went to the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G–2, WPD, and the Secretary of War.

Col. BRATTON. Identical.

Col. CLARKE. This meeting is primarily for the purpose of getting the four of you together here to iron out any little differences.

Col. BISSELL. After Bratton talked, I do recall now—I was thinking primarily of Japanese information at the time—Bratton did give me in the summer time various things which applied to domestic things as Communism and things of that nature. It was not primarily Japanese.

Col. CLARKE. One thing I want to bring out, you did not receive any raw material?

Col. BISSELL. I never got any raw material until after Pearl Harbor.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Going back to this so-called Winds matter again. Gen. Kroner, do you have any recollection of how this telegram was sent to G–2, Hawaii—how it happened to be sent on December 5, 1941, asking them to contact Commander Rochefort immediately regarding a Tokyo weather reference?

Gen. KRONER. No, I have no knowledge of it.

Col. BRATTON. I wrote that, had General Miles' O.K. and had it dispatched.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Who initiated it?

Col. BRATTON. I did. The basis is in one of those messages there.

Col. CLARKE. That message is November 19 and this is December 5.

[7] Col. BRATTON. There were a number of these messages about this boogey-woogey they were going to send out on weather broadcast. They changed them a number of times and finally it became apparent this was what they were going to do.

Col. CLARKE. It has never been clear in my mind what brought this on. Sadtler said the message came in on the night of December 4 and on the morning of December 5 is when he went to General Miles with reference to this. This message is dated December 5. I wondered if by any chance you could recall whether or not Gen. Miles talked to you about it and told you to have the message sent, or whether McCullom, or maybe Sadtler.

Col. BRATTON. I had discussed this weather announcement system with Commander McCullom of the Navy and was informed by him that the officer in Hawaii who had complete knowledge of all of these Magic messages and who could explain most readily to the Army officials the significance of the radio broadcast, was Commander Rochefort.

Gen. MILES. So then this was a means of getting the information to Hawaii that the Winds message was out. Is that what you mean?

Col. BRATTON. No, that this would be the most expeditious way of telling our people in Hawaii that relations between Japan and one or more countries would be broken off.

Gen. MILES. If a certain message came through?

Col. BRATTON. They were monitoring them in Hawaii; they got them there before we got them. They were listening to the same stuff we were, so my idea here was that if our G–2 got in touch with Rochefort, he having already received this code by broadcast, could tell our G–2 at once what it meant. It was a means of saving time.

Col. CLARKE. Why did you wait two weeks? You got it on November 19 and told Hawaii on December 5. I am not clear on that. Circumstantial evidence points to the fact that Sadtler is partly accurate in what he says.

Gen. MILES. The message of November 19 gave us the word which they would use in three cases. Now what Bratton is saying, if I understand correctly, is that this message of December 5 was a means of letting our G–2 know thoroughly not only that this code had been arranged [8] but the implementing message was in, which would account for the date of December 5. My recollection about that is very vague.

Col. BRATTON. This accounts for some of the discrepancy in the timing. It wasn't translated until the 28th.

Gen. MILES. The Winds Code message was not translated until November 28.

Col. BRATTON. And may not have been given to me until the 29th.

Col. CLARKE. What I am trying to prove is, was there any knowledge in G–2 of the implementing message?

Gen. MILES. I think that that is the correct explanation but, as I say, on that particular thing my memory is hazy, of the implementation of the Winds Code. I can conceive, however, of no reason for

sending that message about Commander Rochefort except that Rochefort was in position not only to know the code but to know the implementation of the code.

Col. BRATTON. There were several nights when I sat up all night waiting for this thing to come through.

Gen. MILES. I am not trying to excuse my poor memory, but I can say that certainly from the 5th to the 7th of December there was little doubt in my mind that war was going to ensue. I wouldn't have said it was inevitable, but on the 6th the President appealed direct to the Emperor of Japan and there wasn't much doubt in our minds here that we were in a very difficult crisis.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. It seems to me that if you had notice that the Japanese were ordered to burn their codes on the 5th of December you wouldn't have forgotten that anyway.

Gen. MILES. This (Winds message) says that these words mean "east wind rain" which means, according to this code, that the Japanese-U. S. relations are in danger and also means that these code papers will be burned, but we knew damned well that the Japanese-U. S. relations were in danger. I cannot say that I did know of the implementing message. I can't explain why I knew and why Bratton didn't know if I knew. That is a blank in my memory.

[9] Col. BRATTON. It isn't conceivable that you would have known of this without saying something to me about it because we were both waiting for the thing.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

17 AUGUST 1945

Subject: Investigation regarding certain testimony of William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department, regarding alleged destruction of certain War Department records pertaining to Pearl Harbor

1. The report of the investigation regarding statements of fact made by William F. Friedman in testimony before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the U. S. Navy sometime prior to 5 July 1945 is attached hereto as TAB A.

2. In view of the fact that the investigation being conducted by Admiral Hewitt is on the same level as that being conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, it would seem that the release of information to the Navy, as requested by Admiral Hewitt in his letter of 5 July 1945, is a matter for determination by the Secretary of War. It is recommended, therefore, that the request of Admiral Hewitt and the results of this investigation be referred to Lt. Col. Clausen for preparation of such portion of the testimony in this case as the Secretary's office deems desirable to furnish Admiral Hewitt.

CARTER W. CLARKE
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS

1 Incl.
Tab A

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

13 AUGUST 1945

Subject: Investigation regarding certain testimony of William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department, regarding alleged destruction of certain War Department records pertaining to Pearl Harbor

1. The undersigned was appointed by the A. C. of S., G–2 to conduct an investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled, under authority of a letter of 9 September 1944 which read as follows:

It is desired that you designate officers of your Division to conduct an investigation and interrogations, in accordance with the oral instructions issued to you by the Chief of Staff regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications were handled.

The officers designated to conduct this investigation will be authorized to administer oaths for this purpose.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J. A. Ulio
J. A. ULIO
Major General,
The Adjutant General

2. The investigation was completed in September 1944.

3. On about 8 July 1945 the undersigned was instructed to reopen the investigation to investigate certain statements made by William F. Friedman in testimony before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the Department of the Navy earlier in July 1945.

4. The investigation was re-opened on 13 July 1945 in Room 2E780, Pentagon Building. Testimony under oath was taken of Mr. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, [2] Signal Security Agency, War Department; Col. Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Officer of the Army Ground Forces; Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding, presently stationed at Ft. McPherson, Georgia; Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith, presently Military Attache to France and, during the days of Pearl Harbor, Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division; and Brig. Gen. John T. Bissell, Headquarters 89th Division, Artillery, APO 89, c/o Postmaster, New York. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Gen. Bissell was Chief of the Counter-intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division. There was also introduced into evidence the testimony of Mr. William F. Friedman as given before Admiral H. K. Hewitt.

5. All the testimony taken was stenographically reported and transcribed.

6. All the testimony and evidence received have been considered and, as a result of this consideration, I find the following facts:

a. That shortly before 5 July 1945 William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department, testified before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the Department of the Navy in an investigation pertaining to the Pearl Harbor disaster. In his testimony Mr. Friedman testified, along with other things, as follows:

Approximately a year and a half ago I had a conversation with Colonel Sadtler, who came to duty in Washington about then, and we talked about

Pearl Harbor because of the fact that he had been the head of our communications service at the time, and he indicated that he had tried his best to urge that some specific warning message be sent out to the Department commander. He indicated that the "winds" code execute message had come in on the—some time on the 4th or 5th of December. I don't think that he was clear himself as to which of those two days it was. If I remember correctly, he was either notified himself by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes, that the message was in—"It's in," as I recall it, was the expression used—or it may be that the Navy source called Army G–2 and indicated that they had had word that the message was in, and that Colonel Sadtler was then called to G–2 to corroborate the interception of the message.

At any rate, there was a question as to the exact word, the Japanese word, that was used and when Colonel Sadtler couldn't indicate the word, because he hadn't seen the message himself, I think they tried—I think he said [3] that they tried to get a verification from whoever it was—Admiral Noyes—but they weren't successful, whereupon the G–2 authorities simply passed the matter over. There was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the message.

Then, if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy, but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by General Marshall. Of course, I regarded this as merely hearsay evidence and nothing more than that: highly inconceivable that such a thing would happen. And when I talked over the Pearl Harbor story with Captain Safford, I probably just passed that out as one of those crazy things that get started. I shouldn't have done it. I certainly had no idea that he would repeat it.

b. I find that Mr. Friedman was not told by Col. Sadtler the facts as outlined in the last paragraph of Finding a, but was told by Col. Sadtler at some time in 1943 that Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding had told Col. Sadtler that Brig. Gen. J. T. B. Bissell had told Gen. Spalding that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed.

c. I find that Col. Sadtler was told by Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding sometime in August 1943 that Brig. Gen. J. T. B. Bissell had told Gen. Spalding that certain messages, pertaining to Pearl Harbor, had been received and were in the files of G–2 on 7 December 1941 and that Bissell had deemed it most necessary to destroy them.

d. I find that Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding was not told by Brig. Gen. J. T. B. Bissell that certain messages had been received and were in the files of G–2 and that he (Bissell) deemed it most necessary to destroy them.

e. I find that Col. Sadtler did not tell Mr. Friedman that Gen. Spalding had told Col. Sadtler that certain messages implementing the Winds Code message were destroyed as a result of an order or direction of Gen. Marshall.

f. I find that no written message implementing the Winds Code message was ever received by G–2, and I find that no records pertaining to Pearl Harbor have been destroyed by G–2 or by anybody connected with G–2.

CARTER W. CLARKE,
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS

PART II

PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

(On the oral directive of the Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke is now re-opening the investigation concerning Pearl Harbor)

13 JULY 1945

FINDINGS

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN

[1] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.
Date: 13 July 1945, 1:00 p. m.
Present: Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
Colonel E. W. Gibson.
Mr. William F. Friedman.

Gen. CLARKE. I have been directed by Gen. Marshall to reopen this investigation on the basis of the old order that we had here last September 9 when we started this investigation. I would like to remind you that you are still under oath with reference to that and I would like to re-swear you in, in connection with this new investigation. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do.

Gen. CLARKE. State your name, rank, position and organization.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department.

Gen. CLARKE. I would like you to refresh your memory on this matter by looking that letter and statement over before we ask you some questions about it. It is a statement sent by the Navy bearing date of 5 July 1945 enclosing your testimony before Adm. Hewitt, together with letter from Hewitt to Marshall.

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state, to the best of your knowledge and belief and recollection, just what conversations you have had with Capt. Safford on this whole subject of the Winds message from the very beginning.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well that would go back to a period of about 18 months ago when Capt. Safford apparently began to collect material, either on his own behalf or at the direction of some higher authorities, having a bearing upon the Pearl Harbor attack. In the course of his studies he prepared a list of the pertinent message or messages which he thought pertinent that came out of the Navy cryptanalytic bureau. Of course at that time we were working very closely with the Navy on the diplomatic side and we exchanged fully translations and technical data. There were some cases in which he wanted to piece out some things which might have been missing from his list of messages. He asked the Signal Security Agency—well he asked me first—to

supply [2] certain of this material, which was supplied only after approval had been obtained to supply whatever was necessary. In the course of getting together these materials we compared notes of our recollections and of the dates because at that time he was the head of the Navy cryptanalytic unit and I was principal cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelligence Service, and naturally I had a deep interest in the whole affair. At about the same time as Capt. Safford began his studies, I thought it would be interesting to collect material of that nature too. And I had a good deal of such material collected in the form of messages and in the form of reports, for example, the Roberts published report, periodical literature that was pertinent, and of course the technical files at the Agency were available for gathering together such material as I was directed to gather together upon three or four instances—I don't remember now just how many times. Well Capt. Safford came over to see me at my office.

Col. GIBSON. When, about?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I wish I had brought my notes. I can't place the date accurately enough for this purpose, I am afraid.

Col. GIBSON. Do you have notes that could place it?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have some notes of dates of conversations, etc. I could place it fairly accurately that way. It is 18 months ago anyhow and possibly more.

Gen. CLARKE. Suppose you refresh your memory on that from your notes and——

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I will do that. Then I was a member of a special committee in connection with cryptographic security, and ad hoc committee, and we had occasion to go over to the building where Capt. Safford had his office from time to time, and every time I passed by he would ask me in or I would stop in to exchange a pleasant word or two with him, because he is a long-standing friend of mine. We had not only official relations of a cordial nature but also in a personal way we were fairly well acquainted. It was in that sort of way that we exchanged ideas about Pearl Harbor, and it was from him that I first learned of the Winds execute message. I had a very good recollection of the Winds code setup—well I had a knowledge of the Winds code setup from the old days of pre-Pearl Harbor, but I hadn't had any recollection whatsoever, if I even had knowledge at the time, of the existence of a so-called [3] Winds execute message. It was in these conversations that Capt. Safford stated on several occasions that there had been such a Winds execute message, that he believed that a copy of it was still in somebody's safe in the Navy Department, but that all of his attempts to local a copy of the Winds execute message in the official files of OP–20–G had been fruitless. And he naturally wanted to know if we had anything of that nature, and I told him I didn't know and I didn't look for anything like that. But some time thereafer—months thereafter—an official request came through from somebody higher up in the War Department—I think it might have been Gen. Bissell—who directed that a search be made through our files at Signal Security Agency to see if we could locate such a Winds execute message, and that was fruitless.

Capt. Safford was very firm in his conviction that there had been a Winds execute message and moreover that he himself had had it in his hands and that there was no question in his mind of the actual transmission of the Winds execute message, of its actual interception,

of its translation in accordance with the terms of the Winds code setup, of its having been handed over in the proper translated form to the Navy people in Naval Intelligence who had jurisdiction of dissemination. Also, he was apparently quite convinced that dissemination had been made to the Army, if not to the Signal Intelligence Service then to somebody in G–2. And he felt that there was some very excellent reason why no copies of this message could be found, and of course it left a number of questions and inferences in his mind which he naturally transferred to my mind. Well he also had apparently definite knowledge that certain testimony before one of the several Boards investigating Pearl Harbor showed clearly that there had been a Winds execute transmission and he believed that the Roberts Board had some definite knowledge about its having been transmitted, etc.

Well this mysterious disappearance, according to him, of all copies of the Winds execute message naturally was of extreme interest to me, and some time after my first, or possibly second, conversation with Capt. Safford, I learned of the return to Washington for duty of Colonel Sadtler. We were old friends. I have known him for certainly 20 years. And when he came to Washington—I don't know whether he called me or I called him—I can't recall that—but being old friends, naturally we wanted to get together. Shortly after he came back he came over to my office one day—and I don't know whether he had specifically in mind to talk about Pearl Harbor [4] he may have, but at any rate in the course of our reminiscences about those days, he told me some very startling things. I might say he was quite positive about what he said and left me more or less breathless at one part of his news. I don't know whether I should call it information or what, but at any rate, when I asked him about the Winds execute message his recollection was apparently extremely clear, and he certainly was positive about his recollection of the fact that such a Winds execute mesage had been intercepted by a Navy source, because he told me that he was called over to either Gen. Miles' office or Col. Bratton's office—I don't recall which one—but at any rate he was called over to—well we may have to go back—I recall now that he said that Adm. Noyes called him one morning and my recollection is that it was on December 4—might have been the 5th—1941, saying—and this stands very bright in my memory—he actually quoted what Adm. Noyes said to him on the telephone: "It's in," meaning that the Winds execute message had been transmitted and had been intercepted and that it meant a break in relations between Japan, and he said, if I recall correctly, a break in relations between Japan and England, and that he had then gone over to either Gen. Miles' office or to Col. Bratton's office—or Adm. Noyes had telephoned the same message or the purport of the Winds execute message to Gen. Miles or to Col. Bratton. At any rate, Col. Sadtler was either summoned or presented himself to G–2 and said that the Winds execute message had come in and that something should be done right away. Well Col. Bratton, who was the Japanese language expert, wanted Col. Sdatler to tell him what the Japanese word was that had been included in the Winds execute message. I don't think it is necessary for me to indicate the nature of the Winds code setup, but at any rate, Col. Bratton wanted to know what the Japanese word was. Well Sadtler said

that he himself had not seen the message, he had gotten the information from the Navy source by telephone and that he therefore couldn't give the Japanese word. He was directed to go get the Japanese word. And here my recollection isn't very clear as to whether he actually went over personally to Adm. Noyes' office or whether he tried it on the telephone, but he apparently wasn't able to get the Japanese word, whatever it was. He want back to Col. Bratton or Gen Miles when he was unsuccessful in getting the Japanese word, or perhaps even a copy of the message—which is something I don't understand—at any rate when he was unable to produce the message or the Japanese word they said there was nothing they could do, that perhaps there was disbelief on their part in the allegation that [5] the message had been transmitted and intercepted. That of course was very interesting to me. And then I asked him whether he had a copy of the Winds execute message, and I am pretty sure in my recollection that he said that he never had had one and of course didn't have any now. He did have certain things put away in a safe deposit box, and I don't know what sort of documents he might have put away. But he did mention one document which was of very great interest to me. I have naturally not seen it—I didn't ask him to show me a copy of it, but this, to the best of my recollection is what he told me about that. He said that on Friday, possibly earlier than Friday, December 5th, he, being deeply concerned about the threat of negotiations with the Japanese Government and noting the tenor of the messages that we were turning out in translation, became extremely apprehensive that war might break out at almost any hour without any declaration on the part of the Japanese. And he felt that somebody high up in the War Department ought to send a message out to Gen. Short warning him that—well I remember the words in general of what he said was the type of message that he actually prepared in his own hand: "Break in relations between Japan and United States may be expected within the next 24 or 48 hours. Take all necessary steps to insure that there will be no repetition of Port Arthur." Now by that of course he meant that in the Russo-Japanese war the Japanese attacked at Port Arthur without warning, and the implication was quite clear what he had in his own mind. Well he tried to interest some of the people in the higher echelons in sending such a message, and I don't recall the various steps he took. He tried somebody in G–2; he tried somebody in Operations Division; the Secretary of the General Staff—I can't enumerate them all now—but at any rate he said that he got turned down all the way and nobody would pay any attention to him. He claims to have a copy of such a proposed message, or rather a draft of a message, still in his possession.

Well, in the course of this conversation I asked him, "What do you suppose happened to the Winds execute message which we believe so firmly was intercepted?" Well he said he was told that they were ordered destroyed. And that sort of took me aback, and I said, "By whom?" And he said, "By Gen. Marshall." It was something that I just couldn't believe, swallow, or give credence to, and I expressed my disbelief, but he was pretty firm in his statement and there was no checking him in that. Now where he got it from I don't remember. I do know that on a subsequent occasion or two—because we met each other once or twice thereafter—my disbelief of the story was discredited by [6] him apparently, because he still remained

very firm in his belief that all copies of the Winds execute message, both in the Army and in the Navy, had been destroyed and ordered to be destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. Did he say who told him this story that these messages had been burned—at Gen. Marshall's order?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He did.

Col. GIBSON. Who did he say told him that story?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The name is Ike Spalding, but I don't recall his grade or rank. It is possibly Col. Spalding—I don't recall whether or not he told me of the official position which Spalding occupied. Now, while I am at it, I recall that Col. Sadtler stated that there were two messages ordered destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. Did he say that as of his own knowledge or that somebody had told him there were two?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am quite sure that it was not of his own knowledge. He was passing on second-hand information. Now what credence he gave to the story that was told to him I don't know—I don't recall—but the other message which was allegedly also one that was destroyed was a message which was supposed to have—well as I recall it—a message was sent by the War Department a day or two after Pearl Harbor, maybe Monday, to the Signal Officer, Col. Powell, asking him whether the radar installation in the islands was in operative order at the time of the attack. And the answer came back in the affirmative. Now whether the question and answer were destroyed, or rather alleged to have been destroyed, or just the answer, I don't recall, but at least there were two different things involved.

Gen. CLARKE. In order words, they were on two different subjects?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. This talk took place in your office?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In my office.

Col. GIBSON. You don't know the exact day?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I could place that because I made very, very rough notes of the substance of the conversation after——

[7] Col. GIBSON. Will you supply us the approximate date? Was anybody else in your office when that took place?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. There were just the two of us.

Col. GIBSON. Was that the first talk you had with Col. Sadtler after he came back in the War Department?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The very first.

Col. GIBSON. And after that you had two or three other talks with him?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. Those took place where?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think there was one more occasion when he came over to the office and the other time or two was when we were socially having dinner together or something like that. At my home I know there was one evening that we talked about it privately, just the two of us, in my own study.

Col. GIBSON. He never claimed to you to have seen the Winds execute message himself?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He never did.

Col. GIBSON. What did he say he had in his safe deposit box other than a copy of the draft of the message he tried to get sent out?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that he said anything. I may have asked him, "What else do you have there," and he either passed it off with a remark, "Well never mind, I am not telling anybody." But I rather got the impression that he felt that as head of the Army communications at the time and the superior of the officer in charge of the Signal Intelligence Service, he might be called upon some day in connection with an investigation and that he had put certain things away. I might say that, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, Col. Sadtler didn't inmpose any secrecy upon what he was telling me. Oh naturally he trusted to my discretion, but I don't know whether he had in mind that I might or might not communicate the information to others entitled to know about such things or not. I certainly wouldn't have said anything to Capt. Safford about it if he had imposed some sort of secrecy upon what he was telling me, and of course you understand that, not giving any credence to it myself, I didn't feel that Safford would believe any of it. But to my astonishment. [8] Safford seemed to think there might be something to it, at least he thought there was a Winds execute message and now it can't be found.

Col. GIBSON. Did Safford come to your office for some of these conferences?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, he was over to my office two or three times in an official way—I mean getting together the data that he wanted. He supplied us with digests of his series of messages and I think he turned over a copy of everything he gave me to Gen.———. I do have rough notes made of some of these conversations. If they are necessary I will put them at your disposal.

Gen. CLARKE. I think that would be highly advisable, because I hope this is the last round-up and I think that you ought to come back in the morning——

Mr. FRIEDMAN. General, I am going to take for the air tomorrow. I had better do it this afternoon.

Col. GIBSON. At the time of Pearl Harbor and before or somewhat prior, you were not working with Jap cryptography, were you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I was not directly engaged in it because, as you know, I had been ill, had had a nervous breakdown.

Col. GIBSON. You were putting in part time at that time?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, when I came back to duty after I was discharged from Walter Reed, Gen. Mauborgne and Col. Minckler told me I was to take it easy and come and go as I pleased. I used to come in about a half hour or an hour late in the morning and leave a half hour before the end of the day so as to avoid heavy traffic. I was not in direct touch with the cryptanalytic work, although I did see, whenever I wanted to, the messages that came out.

Gen. CLARKE. Who was in direct charge of the Japanese at that time, while you were ill?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well of course at the time of Pearl Harbor it was Col. Minckler, who was in charge of Signal Intelligence Service, and then I think he was ranked as Captain—Capt. Doud, Capt. Svensson and then Rowlett was in technical charge of the Jap diplomatic operation.

Gen. CLARKE. Do you know whether or not Col. Sadtler saw the output of the institution?

[9] Mr. Friedman. I am certain that he saw the very important messages but I don't know that he saw everything that came out.

Gen. Clarke. Did Gen. Mauborgne?

Mr. Friedman. The same situation. He saw the important messages.

Gen. Clarke. Of course Olmstead was in there—not Mauborgne.

Mr. Friedman. Well Gen. Olmstead didn't take as much interest in that sort of thing as Gen. Mauborgne did. He may have seen occasional messages. As a matter of fact, I recall Sadtler said that four or five days before Pearl Harbor, Gen. Olmstead was planning on going to Panama on an inspection tour and that Col. Sadtler tried to dissuade Gen. Olmstead from taking this trip, saying that "conditions are extremely critical and I believe war is going to break out within the next 72 hours; maybe you had better stay around." Well Gen. Olmstead didn't agree with him and decided to go ahead with the trip, and he did. I think he came back within a day or two after Pearl Harbor.

Col. Gibson. How many were engaged in the cryptanalytic work on this Japanese traffic at the time of Pearl Harbor by the Signal Intelligence Service?

Mr. Friedman. You mean right in the Munitions Building—exclusively the intercept personnel?

Col. Gibson. Yes.

Mr. Friedman. I prefer to wait until I get my notes to answer.

Col. Gibson. Was our section as big as the Navy section?

Mr. Friedman. They were comparable in size. I think there were just as many on the diplomatic side as on our side.

Col. Gibson. Did the Army process its material as speedily after receiving it as the Navy did?

Mr. Friedman. Oh yes. I believe that there is little to be said about comparative speeds. We were both most anxious to get these things out as expeditiously as possible, in fact there was a good deal of competition in getting out the translations and if, of course on isolated occasions, we found that they were a bit slow or we were a bit slow, we would inquire to see what had happened. Well it might have been a key had to be reconstructed or—I couldn't [10] say that we processed a certain message faster than they because there was no way of telling.

Col. Gibson. Who set the priorities as to which code should be read first?

Mr. Friedman. Those were set by the Chief Signal Officer and the Director of Naval Communications in conference with the technical people, etc. As a general rule we processed the messages in the Purple system under a first priority because our experience had been that that was the system that carried the most important traffic. What came after that I don't recall exactly. It might have been the combined PA–K2, as I remember one designation. That was an enciphered code system. Then there was a J–19, also an enciphered code system, and the least of the codes in priority was what we called LA, and of course below that would come plain language.

Col. Gibson. The Army and Navy agreed on this priority?

Mr. Friedman. Oh yes, the priorities were set by mutual agreement.

Gen. CLARKE. That was done in conference from the Director of Naval Communications and the Chief Signal Officer. Do you mean by that those two individuals or their representatives?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. At that time, Gen. Mauborgne, who was in office as Chief Signal Officer when the odd and even date was set up as the basis for operation, took a great interest in this work, much more so than the Chief Signal Officer. I can't say absolutely at the moment that he himself sat down with his opposite number—at that time Adm. Noyes—and decided the priority scale, but I thing those two officers would certainly approve a schedule recommended by the technical people. Naturally the technical people would have to have a hand in determining those priorities because of technical considerations, the difficulty of each system, etc. I should have said also that the A. C. of S., G–2 would have a very vital word to say in the processing of priorities.

Gen. CLARKE. You never got any guidance from the Chief Signal Officer or the A. C. of S., G–2 in your case, or the Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy, on interception or anything of that kind? As you got this stuff you worked on it according to the classification of the code and its degree of security? Is that what I understand?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't understand your question. Are you asking did the technical people process these messages in accordance with their own ideas?

[*11*] Gen. CLARKE. Their own ideas, or did they get guidance from on high?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Guidance from on high. The decision to process Purple messages, for example, would be one for the people of a higher echelon to say, "Yes, process those first." In fact, even in connection with the intercept operation and the forwarding operation, those things were all set up by priorities. The material that came from Honolulu, for example, had to be sent according to some priority system.

Gen. CLARKE. Is it correct in your opinion—something that I have heard—that the most important traffic came in a lower grade system and not in the high grade Purple?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I wouldn't subscribe to that. We occasionally did encounter a case in which a message of considerable importance would be in a low or medium grade code, but largely because it came from a place which didn't have the higher level material, or there have been cases in which some sort of a condition of a breakdown of a machine at a station which was provided with a machine would cause a message to go in a code of a lower category.

Gen. CLARKE. In our discussions here we have referred a number of times, and so have you, to the so-called Japanese Purple system. Will you state approximately when that was solved and by whom it was solved?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. To the best of my recollection, the first complete translation was handed in some time in August, it might have been the early of August or the middle part of August. We had been working on the Japanese Purple system. This system had superseded a system known as the Red, which was also a machine cipher. But when the Purple system was first introduced it presented an extremely difficult problem on which the Chief Signal Officer asked us to direct our best efforts. After work by my associates when we

were making very slow progress, the Chief Signal Officer asked me personally to take hand. I had been engaged largely in administrative duties up to that time, so at his request I dropped everything else that I could and began to work with the group. Naturally this was a collaborative, cooperative effort on the part of all the people concerned. No one person is responsible for the solution, nor is there any single person to whom the major share of credit should go. As I say, it was a team, and it was only by very closely coordinated teamwork that we were able to solve it, which we did. It represents
[12] an achievement of the Army cryptanalytic bureau that, so far as I know, has not been duplicated elsewhere, because we definitely know that the British cryptanalytic service and the German cryptanalytic service was baffled in its attempts and they never did solve it. After we solved the Purple system, the technical data necessary to operate the system and a machine constructed by ourselves were turned over to the British so that they were in position to process Purple messages also. We did the same so far as concerns the Navy. We provided them with a Purple machine or two.

Gen. CLARKE. On approximately what date did we give the Purple machine to the British?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I recall that very clearly. A joint U. S. Navy-U. S. Army cryptanalytic mission consisting of four officers, two from each service, went to London for the purpose of establishing technical cooperation with the British cryptanalytic service. It was at that time the Army furnished a Purple machine and the technical data to the British.

Gen. CLARKE. To the best of your knowledge and belief then, was all of the traffic which has since become known as the Pearl Harbor traffic in these Pearl Harbor investigations available to the British at the same time as it was available to the American Army and Navy?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that to be a correct statement. The only thing that they might lack would be certain intercepts which they were not in a position to——

Gen. CLARKE. You mean by that individual messages?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.

Gen. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss or hear them discuss the Pearl Harbor traffic?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No.

Gen. CLARKE. Or any of the traffic leading up to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. The only thing that I do know is that there exists in the files one or two messages which came from British sources out in the Far East. If you remember, the British had some relations with the Dutch in the East Indies.

TESTIMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER

[1] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.
Date: 14 July 1945.
Time: 10:00 a. m.
Present:
Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
Colonel E. W. Gibson.
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler.

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, you realize that you are under oath and you are fully aware of what your rights are?

Col. SADTLER. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. I want to ask you first if you ever saw a so-called Winds execute message?

Col. SADTLER. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, was such a message ever in the War Department?

Col. SADTLER. It was not.

Col. GIBSON. And all that you know about that message and all contact that you had with it is in your former testimony?

Col. SADTLER. That is right. I might further add that the information came from Adm. Noyes.

Col. GIBSON. Mr. William F. Friedman has testified before Adm. Hewitt of the Department of the Navy recently as follows: "Then if I remember correctly, I asked Col. Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by Gen. Marshall." Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had been told by somebody that the copies of the Winds execute message had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by Gen. Marshall?

Col. SADTLER. I will make an absolute flat denial of that statement made by Mr. Friedman because, as far as I know, that message was never in the War Department and I never made any statement that Gen. Marshall ordered it destroyed or that anyone told me that Gen. Marshall ordered it destroyed.

[2] Col. GIBSON. When did you return to duty in Washington this last time?

Col. SADTLER. About March 28, 1944.

Col. GIBSON. After your return during the following summer and fall on occasion did you visit with Mr. Friedman?

Col. SADTLER. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. And did you visit about Pearl Harbor, amongst other things?

Col. SADTLER. Yes. We had discussed what had happened at that time.

Col. GIBSON. Did some of those discussions take place in Mr. Friedman's office?

Col. SADTLER. Well I assume they did because I have been in his office several times. I had talked to him on occasions about what had happened, not only in his office but at his house.

Col. GIBSON. At some time did somebody tell you that messages pertaining to the Pearl Harbor affair were being destroyed?

Col. SADTLER. Yes. Some time during 1943 Gen. Isaac Spalding at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J. T. B. Bissell had told him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. Is it possible that you told that to Mr. Friedman in one of your conversations?

Col. SADTLER. It is possible.

Col. GIBSON. You have been an old friend of Mr. Friedman for many years?

Col. SADTLER. I have known him for over 25 years.

Col. GIBSON. This Colonel, now Brigadier General J. T. B. Bissell, that you speak of, do you know him personally?

Col. SADTLER. I do not.

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge have you ever met him?

Col. SADTLER. Yes, I have met him casually but I doubt if I would recognize him today if I saw him.

[3] Col. GIBSON. During the period immediately prior to Pearl Harbor did you have any official business of any nature with the then Col. Bissell?

Col. SADTLER. No.

Col. GIBSON. And your only business of an official nature that you did with G–2 at that particular time was done with Col. Rufus Bratton and Gen. Miles?

Col. SADTLER. Yes, and Hayes Kroner. Mostly with Bratton and Miles. They were my normal contacts.

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, Mr. Friedman also has testified that on or about the time Adm. Noyes advised you that the Winds execute message was in that you prepared a draft of a message that you wanted to suggest be sent to the Commanding Generals of the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama. Is that so?

Col. SADTLER. That is correct.

Col. GIBSON. Will you relate now what happened about that?

Col. SADTLER. In substance the message was about as follows: "Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future. Take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur. Notify the Navy. Signed Marshall."

Col. GIBSON. Did you type that message out yourself or who did the typing?

Col. SADTLER. I am positive that I did it because Miss Robinson says she never saw it.

Col. GIBSON. Did you have that message with you when you went to discuss Adm. Noyes' message to you that the "Winds Execute" message was in, with Col. Bratton and Gen. Miles?

Col. SADTLER. I did not. After leaving Gen. Miles' office where Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton more or less casually threw off this information about the execute of the Winds message, I went back to my office and thought that something ought to be done. That message was typed up and I went to see Gen. Gerow and talked this over for a few moments with him and suggested that he notify them. Gerow's reply to the effect was that they had been adequately notified, as I recall it. I then went to see Secretary of General Staff, Col. Bedel Smith, and told him what had been done and [4] suggested he send a message. His reply was to the effect that he refused to discuss it further.

Col. GIBSON. Did Gen. Gailey or Gen. Gerow see the message you had prepared—or Gen. Bedel Smith?

Col. SADTLER. No, I don't think so.

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, I also want to ask you if it is true that early in December you tried to dissuade Gen. Olmstead from making a trip to Panama because you felt sure that war was going to break out.

Col. SADTLER. That is correct—on December 1.

Col. GIBSON. Tell us about that.

Col. SADTLER. On December 1, when Gen. Olmstead was making preparations to go to Panama, I attempted to dissuade him from his trip because I felt positive that war would be declared before he returned and I thought that it was his duty to be in Washington.

Col. GIBSON. What did he say?

Col. SADTLER. He said, "I am going anyhow and that's all there is to it."

Col. GIBSON. When did Olmstead return, do you know?

Col. SADTLER. About the 20th of December.

Col. GIBSON. Did he have any conversation with Marshall when he got back, do you know?

Col. SADTLER. He said that he had gone to Gen. Marshall or had visited Gen. Marshall and Gen. Marshall had told him that his men that he had left in charge while he was gone had not performed 100 percent, or words to that effect. Olmstead said, "Why didn't you act on the information you already had?"

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, have you ever talked anything pertaining to Pearl Harbor over with Capt. Safford of the Navy?

Col. SADTLER. No.

Col. GIBSON. Have you discussed it with any naval officer who had any direct contact with naval communications at the time of Pearl Harbor?

[5] Col. SADTLER. Only with Adm. Noyes.

Continued—17 July 1945, 9:30 a. m.

Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.

Present:

Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
Col. E. W. Gibson.
Col. O. K. Sadtler

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, Mr. Friedman has also testified that you told him that you had heard that in addition to the Winds execute message being ordered destroyed by Gen. Marshall, there was a second message that was ordered destroyed by Gen. Marshall. This second message was a message which was the result of a message sent by the War Department a day or two after Pearl Harbor to the Signal Officer, Col. Powell, asking him whether the radar installation in the Islands was in operative order at the time of the attack, and the answer came back in the affirmative. Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had heard that the message of inquiry relative to the working of the radar installation in the Islands or the answer thereto had been destroyed?

Col. SADTLER. I did not. The circumstances attending that message are about as follows: I sent the inquiry, with the approval of the General Staff, inquiring as to the operation of radar on December 7. Upon receipt of that message Col. Colton, Acting Chief Signal Officer, personally took a copy of it into Gen. Marshall's office. I gave a copy to Geo. Gerow. Col. Colton, upon his return from Gen. Marshall's office, said that he wanted all copies of that message collected and held intact as, inasmuch as radar and the damage done at Pearl Harbor secret at that time, the information was not to be disclosed. Gen. Gerow kept his message and I think that Col. Handy had it and he held it.

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, did Gen. Marshall ever order this radar message, either the original inquiry or the answer thereto, destroyed?

Col. SADTLER. No. To my knowledge, he did not.

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear from any source that he had ordered either of those destroyed?

Col. SADTLER. No.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. ISAAC SPALDING

[1] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon Building, Washington. D. C.

Date: 17 July 1945.

Time: 9:30 a. m.

Present:

Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding.
Col. E. W. Gibson.
Col. O. K. Sadtler.

Gen. CLARKE. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give in this case will be the truth, so help you God?

Gen. SPALDING. I do.

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and present station?

Gen. SPALDING. Isaac Spalding, serial number O3383. Brigadier General, USA, Station Ft. McPherson, Georgia.

Gen. CLARKE. What were your station and duties in the three months preceding Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SPALDING. I was on duty as Chief of the Officers Branch of the office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1, War Department up to the night of December 3, 1941, and on the morning of December 4, 1941 I became Chief of the Army Exchange Service, which lasted for some time after the Pearl Harbor incident.

Gen. CLARKE. Had you previously been on duty in the old War Plans Division?

Gen. SPALDING. I had. I was on duty in the War Plans Division from the summer of 1932 to the summer of 1936.

Gen. CLARKE. But you were not in the War Plans Division on your return from that tour of duty you were then on just preceding Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SPALDING. No. I was placed on duty in G–1, War Department, on January 11, 1941 on my return from overseas service in Hawaii.

Gen. CLARK. Were you on occasion called into conference by the War Plans Division with reference to Hawaiian war plans?

Gen. SPALDING. During my four year tour you mean?

[2] Gen. CLARKE. While you were with G–1.

Gen. SPALDING. I don't remember ever talking with anyone in WPD about any war plans. I had many friends there and would occasionally go over and see them on matters connected with personnel. I remember someone in the summer of '41—I think it was Gen. Gerow—stating that a message had been sent to the Philippines making Gen. MacArthur the head of all our Army forces over there, but I think that is the nearest that I ever came to anything connected with the war plans in any way. I don't remember talking about Hawaii with anyone in '41, nor do I remember who was in charge of the Hawaiian Defense Project.

Gen. CLARKE. Did you have knowledge of the intercepted traffic which was being produced by the Signal Corps at that time?

Gen. SPALDING. No. My friend Spencer Akin was in charge of some kind of a secret room which was right over G–1 in the same wing of the Munitions Building, and I had planned to go up and visit Akin and see what was going on but I never did go and Akin was transferred away. I knew they had some kind of a secret room up there and I thought it was something with breaking down codes but I don't know what they did.

Col. GIBSON. General, Mr. William F. Friedman, who is at present Director of Communications Research of Signal Security Agency of the War Department, has testified that sometime in 1944, in a conversation with Col. O. K. Sadtler, that Col. Sadtler told him that he had been told that a certain message pertaining to a warning on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which we called the Winds execute message, had been ordered destroyed by Gen. Marshall and that another message dealing with the question of whether or not the radar installation on the Hawaiian Islands was in operation on the date of Pearl Harbor, and the answer thereto, had been destroyed by Gen. Marshall's order. Mr. Friedman further testified that Col. Sadtler told him that he had been told this story by you. Thereafter Col. Sadtler testified that he had never told Mr. Friedman that he had heard that Gen. Marshall had ordered this so-called Winds execute message destroyed or the radar message destroyed, but that he had been told by you at Ft. Bragg sometime in 1943 that the then Col. J. T. B. Bissell, now Brigadier General Bissell, had been ordered to destroy all matters pertaining to Pearl Harbor, or that in substance. I want to ask you, having given you this background, first, did you tell Col. Sadtler that in substance?

[3] Gen. SPALDING. I did not tell him that in substance, answering specifically your question, but I did tell him certain things. But at no time was the name of Gen. Marshall ever brought into the conversation or discussion.

Col. GIBSON. What was it you did tell Col. Sadtler?

Gen. SPALDING. I would like to make a rather full statement. By so doing maybe I can answer questions which you might specifically ask me later. I wish it to appear in my testimony that it is my full belief that the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, and the Chief of Staff, Gen. Marshall, are not involved in any way whatsoever with the testimony which I am about to give, and it is my belief that neither one knew anything of it.

I was around in the War Department for a year preceding Pearl Harbor and for six months thereafter, and of course there were various conversations about Pearl Harbor after that "blitz." It was all very vague to me as to why the A. C. of S., G–2, Gen. Sherman Miles, had not diagnosed this coming war, and it was rather queer to me that soon after the blitz he was transferred to other duty and Gen. Raymond Lee was brought back from England to be the War Department G–2. This transfer aroused my curiosity but I never did know why it was done.

In the summer of 1943 I was stationed at Ft. Bragg, and certain troops at Ft. Jackson, South Carolina, came under my command. It was my custom to visit the troops at Ft. Jackson about once a week for from one to three or four days at a time. In July of 1943 I moved

my whole headquarters and headquarters battery from Ft. Bragg down on to the reservation at Ft. Jackson for two weeks field training. Previous to that time and during July and for several weeks after, Col. John T. Bissell, Field Artillery, commanded one of my artillery groups at Ft. Jackson, and so I requested him to make the necessary reservations for camping space and maneuver ground on the Ft. Jackson Reservation. Upon my arrival at this camp site I found that Col. Bissell and his staff had made arrangements preliminary to our entering the camp and Col. Bissell himself had established his command post under canvas within a few hundred yards of my camp site. We were thus camped close together for several days and during that time we often sat under the trees and talked in the late afternoons and early evenings. Bissell had been on duty in the War Department and I believe part of his [4] duties were connected with secret service operators. Naturally we talked about matters which were of interest to each other and I had some curiosity on our secret service, but I learned nothing from him except such generalities as that we had considerable such effort now that the war was under way. I remember telling him that G–2 denied during peacetimes that they ever had any operators, but I didn't believe those statements. He made no remark as to whether they did or didn't. I remember telling him that I had always wanted to be a sleuth or a detective of some kind but I didn't think I would be a success at it. But I was always curious concerning detective stories, etc. It is my opinion and recollection that Bissell in no way whatsoever revealed any secrets connected with his duties concerning our secret operators. I remember that I would have liked to have him talk more but he didn't.

We talked about the Pearl Harbor incident. I remember expressing to him my failure to understand how Sherman Miles and the Navy could fail to discover that those Japanese vessels had left home ports. I was under the impression from my experience in both the Army and Navy War Colleges and in the War Department General Staff and in my dealings with the Navy while on duty in the General Staff, from all these experiences I had thought or believed that our Navy kept track of every vessel carrying the Japanese flag, both commercial and war vessels, and I didn't see how those vessels in peacetime could get away from Japan and come down near Hawaii without our Navy knowing it. I was astounded at their ignorance or inability to detect that! I remember shooting off my mouth about Sherman Miles, for whom I didn't have a very high regard professionally, and I think I remember telling him what I told Walter Krueger when he asked me what I thought about Sherman Miles, I told him that I thought Miles was a "stuffed shirt," and Krueger was astonished that I should think that about him. And so by our talking we got into the subject of Pearl Harbor and the information which we must have had and which the Navy must have had and our failure to give some kind of a better warning to Gen. Short. I remember expressing my disgust at those airplanes up at Wheeler Field all lined up for Saturday morning inspection and were still there on Sunday morning, and I told him of my disgust that those radars weren't working, that I knew when I left Hawaii in 1940 they were being installed. And Bissell said that certain messages had been received and were in the files of G-2 and he deemed it most necessary [5] to destroy them. I got the impression that these messages were derogatory to

the War Department and that he (Bissell) on his own responsibility destroyed them. I had the impression that they were secret information which it was most desirable that the President, Congress, the public, Mr. Stimson and Gen. Marshall not know about. I had the feeling that Bissell destroyed them without even Gen. Raymond Lee, the G-2 at that time, knowing they were in existence.

Now the question may come up as to sobriety on this occasion. We were out there under the trees and upon my arrival a bottle of Scotch and two or three bottles of soda water had been presented to me and when I broke camp 14 days later I returned the unopened bottle of Scotch and possibly the soda water to the officer who had given them to me upon my arrival at Ft. Jackson. I may have had some liquor of my own with me and Bissell and I may have had a drink or two of Bourbon which I provided—I don't remember—but it is customary for me to drink one or two highballs after the day's work is over. Sometimes the day's work is not over until late at night, midnight or later, and then of course I don't drink, but I am sure I was sober all the time I was down there in camp with my headquarters battery and headquarters staff.

Gen. CLARKE. Was Bissell sober?

Gen. SPALDING. Yes. Bissell and I, in the course of three or four months that he was in my command, we would have a bottle of beer together or over at his quarters before supper have a bottle of beer or a highball. I loafed with him considerable, was with him a lot during duty hours, and never knew him to take a drink during duty and after retreat we would have a drink or two, but I never remember taking more than two. Bissell carries liquor very well and did not drink to excess.

Now about this occasion of my talking to Sadtler. It is natural that we talk about those things which worry us a little and Sadtler dropped into my house one evening at Ft. Bragg about August of 1943 and we talked for an hour or two there in my home. Col. Sadtler does not drink alcoholics, to my knowledge, and didn't there at my house. I knew that he was interested in Pearl Harbor and I told him of this incident of my talking with Bissell out there under the trees and [6] Bissell having told me that he had destroyed what I would call vital records which, if known, would be very unpleasant for the War Department. I don't remember that Bissell used those expressions but that is the impression which I got.

Gen. CLARKE. I got the impression from your statement that these messages were from secret operatives. Was that your impression?

Gen. SPALDING. No, they might have been either, but they were so hot that if Gen. Marshall had known about them it would have been very disagreeable for Gen. Marshall, but what the source of them was I don't remember that Bissell indicated it in any way whatever.

Col. GIBSON. You definitely understood, then, from him that this destruction was done on his own initiative and not at the suggestion of anyone else?

Gen SPALDING. That is absolutely the impression I have.

Col. GIBSON. Have you ever heard from any other source of any of these Pearl Harbor records, the claim that they were destroyed?

Gen. SPALDING. No. Bissell was the only man who ever told me anything, that I remember. I hope it is clear in here that I wouldn't want anything I say to transgress the integrity of Mr. Stimson or

George Marshall. They are two of the finest men in the world and they would hew to the line I know.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. RALPH C. SMITH

[*1*] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.
Date: 18 July 1945.
Time: 10:05 a. m.
Present:
Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith.
Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
Col. E. W. Gibson.

Gen. CLARKE. Do you solemnly swear that the statements you make in this case will be the truth, so help you God?

Gen. SMITH. I do.

Gen. CLARKE. Are you familiar with your rights as a witness, self-incrimination?

Gen. SMITH. I am.

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and station.

Gen. SMITH. Major General Ralph C. Smith. Presently Military Attache, Paris, France.

Gen. CLARKE. What were your duties in the three months preceding and approximately 3 months following the so-called Pearl Harbor incident?

Gen. SMITH. During the period specified and for something more than a year previous, I was Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division.

Gen. CLARKE. Under General Miles?

Gen. SMITH. Under General Sherman Miles, until his relief in December 1941. Thereafter I occupied the same position with respect to Brig. Gen. Raymond Lee.

Gen. CLARKE. You never were Executive Office under Gen. Strong?

Gen. SMITH. My recollection is that Gen. Strong was actually designated as G–2 after I left the G–2 Division. He was acting as G–2 for a week or so prior to my departure.

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state in a general way what your duties as Executive Officer were?

Gen. SMITH. As Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division I was charged primarily with responsibility for all administrative functions of the Division. As Executive Officer I was also head of the Administrative Branch. I conceived my mission to be to relieve the [*21*] G–2 from as much concern about the routine operation of his Division as possible. The Administrative Branch included matters such as finance, personnel, both military and civilian, allotment of office space (Which I may say parenthetically was a terrible headache at that time because we were being moved from one part of the Munitions Building to another). I also had charge of the filing system, the records room and the general procedure of handling records. The Translation Section was also included. Being charged primarily with administrative responsibilities, I did not have any direct responsibility in the intelligence chain. Because of my close relationship with the G–2, I was aware of a great deal that was going on in the intelligence and counter intelligence part of the

Division's work, but I did not have any direct responsibility for operating that. The chain of responsibility passed directly from G–2 to the heads of the Intelligence Branch, Counter Intelligence Branch and Plans and Training Branch.

Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of the existence at that time in 1941 of the so-called Magic material?

Gen. SMITH. I was. Of course, as you know, every effort was made to limit to the very minimum, persons who had contact with or even knowledge of the existence of Magic material. However, because of my position, I knew of course, of our work in the Signal Intelligence Service of intercept and I was aware of our success in breaking the Japanese codes. I knew that this material was being handled in the raw in the Far Eastern Section by Japanese experts and that the product of the code-breaking work was being distributed in locked leather pouches to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, G–2 and later to the State Department and the White House.

Col. GIBSON. Will you state your recollection as to how this Magic material was handled between the period of 1 July 1941 and Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SMITH. The head of the Far Eastern Section, Col. Bratton, and his principal assistant, Col. Pettigrew, were the principal ones involved in handling this material. I knew that they had a great deal of contact with Gen. Miles, the head of G–2, on this material and I was generally cognizant of its nature and sometimes of its context, but I made no effort to pry into the exact nature of it because it did not concern my direct functions.

[3] Col. GIBSON. At some time did you read this material?

Gen. SMITH. Along in the late summer, as I recall it, Gen. Miles gave me a key to the Magic pouches. If I remember correctly, it was when he was absent on leave for a few days. For a period of several weeks or a month, approximately, I saw the pouches and read the contents of most of them. Later in the fall, it was about September, Gen. Miles told me that the Chief of Staff had expressed the desire to restrict to the absolute minimum persons having access to and knowledge of the Magic material. Therefore I returned to Gen. Miles the key to the pouches that I had and after that date I did not see any of the material, so far as I remember.

Col. GIBSON. Who delivered those pouches to Gen. Miles?

Gen. SMITH. As a matter of routine, Col. Bratton. Sometimes Col. Pettigrew. I do not recall their being handled by any other person.

Col. GIBSON. Was that delivery made daily?

Gen. SMITH. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. On occasions did you see Col. Bratton with several pouches in his possession?

Gen. SMITH. Yes. Col. Bratton would have several pouches because similar ones were being given to the Chief of Staff, to the best of my recollection. I believe that the same copy went from the Secretary of War's office to the Chief of Staff, and I know that there was a separate copy for G–2. Whether there was a third copy I am not certain.

Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that WPD had a pouch?

Gen. SMITH. Yes. I am certain that Gen. Gerow had access to the material because I remember some incidents through the fall when I made contact with Gen. Gerow and arranged a meeting with him for Gen. Miles and vice versa. I also know that the Navy was handling

the material because I remember there were conferences of Adm. Wilkinson with Gen. Miles and Gen. Gerow in the G–2 office.

Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that the State Department received a pouch?

[4] Gen. SMITH. Yes. A pouch went to the State Department, delivered there in person I believe by Col. Betts, who was the liaison officer with the State Department at that time. That I am a little hazy on, whether it was Col. Betts or Col. Bratton that took it over. And I know a pouch was taken to the White House on many days.

Col. GIBSON. Will you describe how the contents of the pouch looked when you saw them and about how many sheets might be in the pouch?

Gen. SMITH. The Magic pouches were leather brief cases, I believe, with a zipper opening and susceptible of being locked with a padlock. On removing the padlock and opening the zipper the material inside was contained in a loose-leaf red board cover. In the ones that I recollect seeing there were always from three to a dozen or 15 pages. They were always carbon copies of other messages.

Col. GIBSON. Did Gen. Miles destroy the contents or what happened to them?

Gen. SMITH. Gen. Miles would read the material, place it in the locked pouch and leave it on his desk and I would return it to Col. Bratton or Col. Pettigrew the next time they came up.

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear of a so-called Winds code message prior to Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SMITH. Not that I can recall.

Col. GIBSON. Were you in any conferences of G–2 immediately prior to Pearl Harbor or the month prior to Pearl Harbor where the question of Japan and its capabilities and intentions were discussed?

Gen. SMITH. I did not attend such conferences. I think I recall a meeting in Gen. Miles' office attended by Col. Kroner, Col. Bratton, Col. Pettigrew, Col. Betts and some of the other members of the Intelligence brain-trust. I did not participate in the conference but I knew it was being held.

Col. GIBSON. These estimates of the situation that were being prepared by the various intelligence branches during that period of time, did they come through your office?

Gen. SMITH. They came through my desk. The volume of business in my office was increasing in geometric proportions at [5] about that time. I tried to read those estimates insofar as I could because I wished to keep abreast of the general situation. However, many of them I was unable to touch; they would go over my desk to G–2 and out again.

Col. GIBSON. The Military Attache reports and observer reports that came in from the field did not cross your desk?

Gen. SMITH. They did not. They went directly from the mail room where they had a processing system that would get them with the minimum delay to the interested section in the Intelligence Branch. About the only thing that came to the front office would be the evaluations and estimates based on the Military Attaches' raw material. Sometimes I know, when a report would be of particular interest, it would be brought up and shown to Gen. Miles. I remember some particularly good reports by Gen. Lee's office in London and from the office in Germany.

Col. GIBSON. Were you informed prior to Pearl Harbor of the contents of the message that our Government had sent to the Imperial Government of Japan along in the latter part of November 1941?

Gen. SMITH. I recall vaguely that such a message was in existence, but I do not remember that I saw it in the course of my official duties.

Col. GIBSON. In early December 1941 were you preparing to leave the War Department?

Gen. SMITH. A list of senior colonels had been prepared by the G–1 Division with an indication of possible dates when they might be called for active combat duty with the new divisions that were being contemplated. I remember that my name was on that list, as well as the names of Col. Bratton, Col. Compton, Col. Pettigrew and several other officers. From other divisions of the General Staff I knew Col. Huebner, Col. Ridgeway and others were likewise on this list. The Chief of Infantry had arranged a special two-weeks' refresher course at Ft. Benning for the benefit of colonels who might be relieved from staff duty and assigned to active command in the next few months. My name and that of Col. Bratton were submitted for this course. Bratton's name was later removed because of conversations going on at the White House with the Japanese special envoy and the general tense nature of the Japanese situation. The course was actually planned to begin on the 8th of December. I remember distinctly that I left Washington on the train from the Union [6] Station for Atlanta about 6:00 p. m. December 6th. Ralph Huebner, Mat Ridgeway and several others were on the same train with me. I remember distinctly that we reached Ft. Benning soon after noon of December 7th. We were at the Officers' Club having luncheon when the announcement by radio of the attack on Pearl Harbor was received. A few hours after this, perhaps about 5:00 p. m., I received a telephone message from Gen. Omar Bradley, Commandant of the school, that Gen. Miles had called by phone and asked to have me return to Washington by the quickest available means. Gen. Bradley loaned me a car to drive to Atlanta, where I got a plan and reached Washington Monday morning. I must admit that because of this course and my preparations to leave, that happenings in the office on the morning of December 6 are quite hazy in my mind. My place during my absence was taken by the late Col. Roderick, my Assistant Executive Officer.

Col. GIBSON. In the immediate few days prior to Pearl Harbor, any messages that were sent out from G–2 to the Commanding Generals of the Philippines, Hawaii or Panama, would clear through your office?

Gen. SMITH. They would clear through my office. The volume of messages had reached a formidable proportion at this time and in order to clear them out in the evening, I had had an autograph rubber stamp prepared that was kept locked in my deck or in the desk of one of my assistants. Whenever a message came up properly authenticated with the initials of one of the Chiefs of Branches or Sections, this message would be cleared by one of my assistants without ever coming to my attention.

Col. GIBSON. As a matter of routine then, any message that came to your office at that time to be cabled to the field or sent to the field would be stamped by someone in your office and sent forward for dispatch provided that the Chief of a Branch had initiated the same?

Gen. SMITH. That is right. The functions of my office were to verify that the message had been properly coordinated within the G–2 Division prior to being sent. I assumed no responsibility for the actual context of the message except that it made sense. I had instructed my assistants to read through and see that the message was understandable to them and there were no obvious errors.

[7] Col. GIBSON. The wisdom or the propriety of sending such a message was not a duty of yours?

Gen. SMITH. No. I had no function on that score. I accepted any message that had the approval, as indicated by initials, of any Branch or Section Chief, and I had delegated that responsibility for approval to my assistants.

Col. GIBSON. In fact in your administrative duties, you were kept so busy that you didn't know enough of the intelligence situation to really pass sound judgment on these messages. Is that correct?

Gen. SMITH. I am sorry to say that that is an understatement, if anything. The office was a beehive of activity about this time.

Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of certain warning messages that were being sent out by G–2 to the field during the first week in December?

Gen. SMITH. As I have reflected on the events of that week in retrospection, I have a vague awareness that such messages were going out and there was a tense atmosphere in the office. I of course knew about the presence of the Japanese Ambassador and knew that the conferences were not going satisfactorily, but that is about the limit of my detailed knowledge.

Col. GIBSON. Any answers to these messages that were sent out in either the latter part of November or the first week of December, the answers being from Department Commanders, did you see?

Gen. SMITH. Not that I recollect. Our system of office procedure was such that the handling of such messages would be expedited to get them to the interested agency as quickly as possible. Outgoing messages did pass through my office. Incoming messages were handled directly from the Record Section to the interested agency.

Col. GIBSON. Do you ever recall seeing or knowing about a message from Gen. Short, the Commanding General in Hawaii, to G–2 in answer to a warning message that G–2 had sent out either the latter part of November or the first week of December?

Gen. SMITH. I have seen references to the message which I know you mean since, but I am certain that I had no knowledge of it prior to December 7.

[8] Col. GIBSON. After you returned from Ft. Benning on the morning of 8 December, then what were your duties?

Gen. SMITH. My duties continued unchanged as Executive Officer of the Division until approximately the end of March.

Col. GIBSON. Then from the 8th of December until the end of March you were in charge of the records of G–2?

Gen. SMITH. In a broad supervisory sense, yes.

Col. GIBSON. If any records were to be copied or destroyed or transferred to any other source, would you in the ordinary course of your duties have had to pass on it?

Gen. SMITH. I am certain that my subordinates would not have accepted any orders to tamper with the records, either in changing

them, removing them or destroying them without having reported the fact to me.

Col. GIBSON. At any time during your service in the War Department in 1941 and until you left in March 1942, to your knowledge were any of the records of G–2 destroyed?

Gen. SMITH. Categorically, no. The only recollection of any destruction of records that I have occurring during my administration was in the early part of my function as Executive Officer in 1941 when we were making an effort to collect out of the files and eliminate a lot of obsolete material dating back to World War I in order to conserve filing space. A considerable cleaning up of the Record Section was done in 1940 and 1941, as I recall it, in order to place with the National Archives material that should be kept of permanent record, and material of no permanent value was destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. After that time to your knowledge was any material of any type destroyed?

Gen. SMITH. I am very certain that no permanent records after January 1941, perhaps, were removed or destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. At any time did you ever receive any order from anyone after Pearl Harbor while you were in the War Department to destroy or have any records destroyed?

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

[9] Col. GIBSON. Or held?

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. Or tampered with?

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. Or touched in any way, shape or manner?

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. As far as you know, are the records of G–2 that pertain to Pearl Harbor for 1941 and up until March 1942 complete?

Gen. SMITH. To the best of my knowledge they are.

Col. GIBSON. Until you arrived at the War Department yesterday, did you ever hear of any story to the effect that some of the Pearl Harbor records or reports bearing on Pearl Harbor had been destroyed?

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. Prior to yesterday had you ever heard any comments made that if certain records in G–2 became known or were made public that it would be very damning to the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff?

Gen. SMITH. No I had never heard any such comment.

Col. GIBSON. Did you know Col. J. T. B. Bissell?

Gen. SMITH. I did.

Col. GIBSON. And was he on duty in the War Department in G–2 at the same time you were?

Gen. SMITH. Col. Bissell was, first, assistant to Col. Lester and later became Chief of Counter Intelligence Branch. He occupied that position, as I recall it, in December 1941.

Col. GIBSON. Now let me ask you this question. Did Col. Bissell, to your knowledge, ever destroy any records in G–2 in the War Department?

Gen. SMITH. He did not during my tenure of office; and I believe that if he had I would have known about it from my subordinates.

[*10*] Col. GIBSON. Let me ask you this. Did Col. Bissell ever tell you that he had destroyed some records dealing with Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SMITH. He did not.

Col. GIBSON. Had you ever heard, until yesterday, any story alleging that Col. Bissell had said he did destroy certain records?

Gen. SMITH. I had not.

Gen. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss any of the incidents leading up to Pearl Harbor with Col. Bissell?

Gen. SMITH. I have no recollection. It is true that we were both members of the G–2 Division for the 3 months following Pearl Harbor. It is possible that we may have discussed it in general terms but I have no specific recollection.

Gen. CLARKE. I would like to ask one question here. Do you know whether or not the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group, Col. Bissell, had at his disposal all of the information and intelligence which was available to the Intelligence Group?

Gen. SMITH. I have a vague recollection that some point was brought up either shortly before Pearl Harbor or possibly afterward that some sources of Counter Intelligence data were in existence but not being exploited to the maximum. I think I can state as a certainty that the Counter Intelligence Branch did not receive the pouch containing the full Magic material. I do, however, have a vague recollection that the Far Eastern Branch had some contacts with the Counter Intelligence Branch on activities of Japanese agents in this country.

Gen. CLARKE. What about Japanese agents in Hawaii?

Gen. SMITH. I have no recollection on that specific score.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN T. BISSELL

[*1*] Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.

Date: 4 August 1945, 3:10 p. m.

Present: Brig. Gen. John T. Bissell.

Col. E. W. Gibson.

Col. GIBSON. Gen. Bissell, Gen. Clarke has been directed by Gen. Marshall to reopen this Pearl Harbor investigation on the basis of the old order that he had here last September 9 when this investigation was commenced. I would like to remind you that you are still under oath. With reference to that I would like to reswear you in, in connection with this new investigation. Do you solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Gen. BISSELL. I do.

Col. GIBSON. You of course are aware of your rights?

Gen. BISSELL. I am.

Col. GIBSON. Will you please state your name, rank, position and organization.

Gen. BISSELL. John T. B. Bissell, Brigadier General, O8624. Headquarters 89th Division, Artillery, APO 89, c/o Postmaster, New York.

Col. GIBSON. You are here as a result of receiving cable orders to return here for purposes of this interrogation?

Gen. BISSELL. I am.

Col. GIBSON. Since your arrival here have you read the sworn testimony of Mr. Wm. F. Friedman of 13 July 45 before General Clarke

and myself, of Col. Otis K. Sadtler of 14 July 1945, and of Brig. Gen. Isaac Spaulding of 17 July 1945 pertaining to this Pearl Harbor matter?

Gen. BISSELL. I have.

Col. GIBSON. Did you also read a copy of the letter that Adm. Hewitt sent to Gen. Marshall calling Gen. Marshall's attention to certain testimony of this Mr. Wm. F. Friedman before Adm. Hewitt's board?

Gen. BISSELL. I did

[2] Col. GIBSON. Gen. Bissell, you testified previously on this matter in September 1944?

Gen. BISSELL. That is correct.

Col. GIBSON. And you have refreshed your memory by reading over that testimony?

Gen. BISSELL. I have.

Col. GIBSON. Do you know Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding?

Gen. BISSELL. I do.

Col. GIBSON How long have you known him?

Gen. BISSELL. I reported to him in June of 1943 at Ft. Bragg, N. C. while he was in command of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade. I had just been ordered to take command of the 112th Field Artillery Group which was part of that Brigade.

Col. GIBSON. Had you known him before that?

Gen. BISSELL. I had not.

Col. GIBSON. How long did you serve under Gen. Spalding at Ft. Bragg?

Gen. BISSELL. From about the 12th of June until some time in October. I was stationed with my Group at Camp Jackson, S. C.

Col. GIBSON. During this period of time did you have many occasions to converse with Gen. Spalding?

Gen. BISSELL. I conversed with him frequently as he came down from Ft. Bragg about once a week.

Col. GIBSON. How far is Jackson from Ft. Bragg?

Gen. BISSELL. Roughly, 70 miles.

Col. GIBSON So that he was stationed at Bragg and you were down at Jackson all of this time?

Gen. BISSELL. Yes.

Col. GIBSON. There did come a time when his Headquarters Battery did come down to Jackson for some training?

Gen. BISSELL. That is correct. It was in the latter part of July as I remember.

[3] Col. GIBSON. At some time in your acquaintance with Gen. Spalding during those months in 1943 did he ask you about what G–2 knew about the Pearl Harbor attack?

Gen. BISSELL. Yes, he asked me several questions about it.

Col. GIBSON. Did he ask you that on more than one occasion?

Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall. I think he may have.

Col. GIBSON. Is there any particular occasion that you have in mind when he did talk with you at some length about it?

Gen. BISSELL. Yes, I recall his saying that he could not understand why the airplanes at Pearl Harbor had been lined up on the fields when conditions were as strained as they were.

Col. GIBSON. Where was that?

Gen. BISSELL. I think that was at Camp Jackson. It might possibly have been at Bragg, as I was up there several times.

Col. GIBSON. Do you remember conversing with him about Pearl Harbor when you were sitting together under some trees on the training grounds at Jackson?

Gen. BISSELL. I don't remember the incident. It may well have occurred there or somewhere else. I don't remember the details.

Col. GIBSON. Gen. Spalding has testified that, among other things, you told him that certain messages had been received, these messages pertaining to Pearl Harbor and were in the files of G–2 and that you deemed it most necessary to destroy them. Did you ever make such a statement?

Gen. BISSELL. No, I did not.

Col. GIBSON. I show you Gen. Spalding's testimony, pages 3, 4 and 5 of his testimony of last July, and ask if you will give your recollection of the talk you had with Gen. Spalding.

Gen. BISSELL. As I recall it, Gen. Spalding asked me a great many questions with reference to the Counter Intelligence operated by the Military Intelligence Service of which I had been the Chief. He was particularly interested in knowing about how we had placed agents, etc. I tried to avoid the issue as much as possible and give [4] no information that I thought should not be revealed. Following that, he discussed at some length the Pearl Harbor disaster and stated that he could not understand why G–2 had not been more alert and why the planes on the fields at Pearl Harbor had been assembled together. He asked me what I know about the matter and I told him that G–2 had been afraid of sabotage and that a message had been sent out to the Hawaiian Department alerting them to be on their guard against possible sabotage. He endeavored to draw me out and as it was a matter that was more or less closed, he asked me what I had personally done in the matter. I stated that I had been directed by the A. C. of S., G–2 to draft a message to the G–2, Hawaiian Department, and I believe possibly to some of the other Defense Commands and Panama to be prepared for possible sabotage on account of the very strained relations with which everyone in G–2 was familiar. He asked me further details of the matter and I stated, as I recall it, that I had stayed in the office one evening until about eight o'clock, at the direction of Gen. Miles, who was then the A. C. of S., G–2, and had prepared a message alerting the Hawaiian Department for possible sabotage and stressing the strained relations between the U. S. and Japan. I took the message in to Gen. Miles personally. He read the message and change it materially, stressing the sabotage angle more than I had. That message, as far as I know, was sent. The draft which I drew Gen. Miles destroyed as it was marked Secret.

Col. GIBSON. I show you a message, a Memorandum for the Adjutant General, dated 28 November 1941, subject: Warning to Corps Area and Overseas Commanders, signed Sherman Miles, and ask if that is a copy of the message that you refer to just now in your testimony as being the message which Gen. Miles drew and substituted for the message that you had prepared.

Gen. BISSELL. That is the message Gen. Miles drew in substitution for the one which I drafted.

Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that Gen. Spalding expressed to you his failure to understand why Sherman Miles and the Navy

had failed to discover that these Japanese vessels participating in the Pearl Harbor attack had left their home ports?

Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall that. He may have discussed it but I don't recall it.

[5] Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect Gen. Spaulding telling you that he believed that Mies was a stuffed shirt?

Gen. BISSELL. I think in the course of conversation he did state that he believed that Miles was a stuffed shirt?

Col. GIBSON. Did he tell you of his disgust that the radars on Hawaii weren't working because he knew when he left Hawaii in 1940 that they were being installed?

Gen. BISSELL. As far as I remember he never made any mention of radar.

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, while you were connected with G–2 were ever any records pertaining to Pearl Harbor or anything else destroyed?

Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know.

Col. GIBSON. And once a message was okeyed and sent it was kept?

Gen. BISSELL. It went to the file immediately.

Col. GIBSON. And no files were ever destroyed?

Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know.

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear of any being destroyed?

Gen. BISSELL. No, except in 1940 when we cleaned out the World War I excess material that had no value.

Col. GIBSON. Again to clarify the record, your job in G–2 in 1941 and 1942 was always connected with the Counter Intelligence work of G–2?

Gen. BISSELL. That is correct.

Col. GIBSON. You had nothing whatsoever to do with the signal intelligence?

Gen. BISSELL. I didn't until after Pearl Harbor.

Col. GIBSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you receive summaries of what you later found to be information based on signal intelligence?

Gen. BISSELL. Yes I did. I knew that the summaries which I got emanated from signal intelligence. They pertained principally to [6] suspected Japanese again in this country, in Panama, in Hawaii, and in Alaska.

Col. GIBSON. Shortly after Pearl Harbor you began to see such material in the raw pertaining to the matters you have just outlined?

Gen. BISSELL. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw materially more of the signal intelligence material.

Col. GIBSON. Did you tell Gen. Spaulding at any time, in substance, that you had destroyed what you would call vital records, records which if known to exist would be very unpleasant to the War Department?

Gen. BISSELL. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever tell him anything from which he might infer such?

Gen. BISSELL. No.

EXHIBITS OF THE CLARKE INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS 1 TO 8

HANDLING OF CERTAIN TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 1

TOP SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 14, 1941
Purple
#943 (Part 1 of 2)[a] (To be handled in Government Code)

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Washington
October 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#671

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three Power Alliance she had

[a] For part 2 see S. I. S. #23516

concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japanese-American negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and you.

(Separate wire)

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pace, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET

From; Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
1 October 1941
(Purple)
#1198

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I, and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by Germany in this report to you.

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with newspaper correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the pretence that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations without consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting Japan.

Please convey this to the army and navy.
Relayed to Rome.

23673 JD-1: (H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 22, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objection. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 6017 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
5 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#736

(Of utmost secrecy)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1: 6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo

1. I sent MOORE [a] to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

[2] He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."

24655 ARMY Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

[a] Frederick Moore—Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

(Part 2 of 2)

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the bases of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.

24656 ARMY Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple (Ca) (Urgent)

#———

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090,[a] and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to the fundamental policy laid down in my #725.[b] Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736,[c] and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

ARMY 24,878 JD-1: 6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941
Purple CA (Urgent)

#812

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736.[d] You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or

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[a] See JD-: 6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.

[b] S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.

[c] S. I. S. # 24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

[d] See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 6710 25138 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

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[1] From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

Japanese	*English*
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai	Nyuu Yooku
(Three-Power Treaty question)	(New York)
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai	Shikago
(The question of nondiscriminatory treatment)	(Chicago)
Shina Mondai	Sanfuranshisuko
(The China question)	(San Francisco)
Soori	Itoo Kun
(Premier)	(Mr. Itoo)
Gaimudaijin	Date Kun
(Foreign Minister)	(Mr. Date)
Rikugun	Tokugawa Kun
(The Army)	(Mr. Tokugawa
Kaigun	Maeda Kun
(The Navy)	(Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo	Endan
(Japan-American negotiations)	(Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo	Kimiko San
(President)	(Miss Kimiko)
Haru	Fumeko San
(Hull)	(Miss Fumeko)

[2] *Japanese*	*English*
Kokuaijoosei	Shoobai
(Internal situation)	(Trade)
Jooho Suru	Yama Wo Uru
(To yield)	(To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sezu	Yama Wo Urenu
(Not to yield)	(Not to sell the mountain)
Keisei Kyuuten Suru	Kodomo Gaumareru
(Situation taking critical turn)	(The child is born)

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya 4617
Section Chief KASE: Yotsuya 4793
The Minister's residence Ginza 3614
The Vice-Minister's residence Ginza 1022

ARMY 6841 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

To: Nanking.
15 November 1941

From: Tokyo
(Purple)
#499
Re your #818*
To Naval authorities:
We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a while.

25390 JD–1: 6848 (F) Navy Trans. 11–27–41 (6–AR)

*Not available.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 Novmber 1941
(J19)
Circular #2354

When diplomatic relations are *becoming dangerous* we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations

"HIGASHI"

(2) Japan Russian relations

"KITA"

(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI)

"NISHI"

The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at the beginning and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.

SIS–25392 JD–1: 6850 SECRET Navy Trans. 11–26–41

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:
(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
See Supplementary Information File.
(Voice broadcasts)

SIS–25432 JD–1: 6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11–28–41

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From Nomura and Kurusu.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

(Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

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[1] From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1189. (Part 1 of 2)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary Hull and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.
[2] (4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI SHEK.
(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

25441 ARMY Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[1] (Part 2 of 2)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objective of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)
In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumb-founded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete [2] control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 28, 1941
Purple. (CA)

#844.

Re your #1189[a].
Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180[b] and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

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[a] S. I. S. #25441, #25442.
[b] S. I. S. #25435, #25436. The man is the Navy Minister.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 November 1941
(Purple)
#843

Broadcast schedule as follows:

6 p. m.	To Pacific Coast	JVJ	12275	
6:30 p. m.	To Western Hemisphere	JUO	9430	and
		JVJ	12275	
7:00 p. m	To the Coast	JVJ	12275	
8:00 p. m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160	
9:00 p. m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160	
10:00 p. m.	To the Coast	JHL	5160	
10:30 p. m.	To Europe	JHP	11980	

(Note: All times Tokyo time)

SIS 25446 JD-1: 6899 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
29 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#857

Re my #844*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

SIS 25496 JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

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*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de factor" ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)
Telephone Code

TransPacific
Radio Telephone

(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night)

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There

is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one." (i. e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y: "Is there any special significance to this?"

K: "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y: "Is that so."

K: "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y: "We *are* being careful."

K: "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this." (i. e. Premier's speech)

(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code)

K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y: "No particular—(one or two words faded out)—."

K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y: "Yes."

K: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches! ! ! ! Do you understand? Please, all use more discretion."

Y: "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K: "Let's see . . . this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K: "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y: "Well then—Goodbye."

JD–1: 6922 (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R–5) 25497

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941.
Purple.

#1214. To be handled in Government Code.

Re my #1190 [a].

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our confeerence of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers: "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

ARMY 25548 Trans. 12-1-41 (2)

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[a] S. I. S. #25444 and #25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption.

[1] From: Tokyo
November 30, 1941
To: Berlin
Purple

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional idealogical tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

[2] (Part 2 of 2)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple-CA)

#865

Re my #857.*

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information).

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

SIS-25605 JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6921.
**JD-1: 6710.
***Not available.

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941
(J-19)

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are not doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

SIS-25644 JD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

[Completed Translation]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple

#1232

(Part 1 of 2)

Re my #1231.

Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233.[a] Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made that statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between

[a] Not available.

submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

25659–B Trans. 12/3/41

*Original translation Incomplete from this point on.

(Part 2 of 2)

[1] Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here."

25660 ARMY

[2] Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233.[a]

ARMY 25660 Trans. 12–3–41 (7)

[a] Not available.

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941
(Purple)

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available).

(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.)

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in this direction.

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China _____ the government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army and navy; the landing

*Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.

of various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was they they feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in the southwestern Pacific area).

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality, that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces in that area.

25715 JD-1: 7042 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (7)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)

#875

Chief of Office routing.
Re your #1232*

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seems to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indo-China border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

25725 JD-1: 7057 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7021. (SIS #25659-60)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941
(Purple)

#1227

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U.S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U.S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure

does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727 JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1) Copy

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941.
Purple. (Urgent)

#1234.

Strictly Secret.
Re your #862.[a]

I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the newspaper of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please advise them hereafter concerning this point."

25730 JD-7059 Trans. 12-4-41 (2)

ARMY

[a] Not available.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941.
Purple (Urgent)

#891.

To be handled in Government Code.
Re your #1256.[a]

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my #875.[b] I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message.

25731 JD-7105 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

ARMY

[a] Not available.
[b] S. I. S. #25725.

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 30, 1941
Purple

#1224

Re your #857.[a]

I at once requested HULL for an interview; however, I failed to be notified of the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's ex-

[a] See S. I. S. #25496. Tokyo instructs Washington to make one more attempt verbally to the effect that the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why the United States, in view of the fair position it has always taken, should have changed in their front with regard to the China problem.

pected arrival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity and so will you transmit your message at once to Ambassador GREW? (7:30 p. m.)

25762

ARMY JD 7089 Trans. 12/5/41 (2)

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 18, 1941
J-19

#113

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,[a] and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 25773 7063 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S)

[a] Probably means Mamala Bay.

From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Purple)

#893

* * * In the event that Manchuria participates in the war * * * in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident to Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

[Handwritten:] Codes Manchukuo, etc.

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR) SIS 25783

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941
(Purple)

#1223

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25785

JD-1: 7098 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

#1410

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
J-19

#222

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 [a] on that day.
Area A[b]—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
Area C [c]—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Arear D.[d]

3. At 10: 00 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.
Relayed to ———.

ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

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[a] Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.
[b] Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
[c] East Loch.
[d] Middle Loch.

From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
29 November 1941
(J19)

#122

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.
SIS 25823
JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 1 of 14)

Separate telegram
Memorandum

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best effort to prevent the extention of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on

fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

(Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

(Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

(Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

(Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr----- (45 letters garbled or missing)---been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the -----es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate

the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

(Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n—(50 letters missed)—sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

(Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

(Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, *ANDND** presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

(Part 14 of 14)

(Note: in the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT").

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

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*Probably "and as"
**Probably "China, can but"

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET,(M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941. (S-TT)
25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent—Very Important)
#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902.[a]

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

[a] JD-1: 7143—text of Japanese reply.

CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 2

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)

Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations:
NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

(Voice broadcasts)

S/S 25432
JD-1: 6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41

CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 3

SECRET

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather message which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such messages was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p.m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

/s/ T. J. Slowie
T. J. SLOWIE
Secretary

(SEAL of the F. C. C.)

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 4

SECRET

DOCUMENT No. 1

Group One is EAST WIND RAIN
Group Two is NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
Group Three is WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
Groups repeated twice in middle and at end of broadcast

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

DOCUMENT No. 2

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow slightly cloudy and fine weather.

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds.

Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean surface calm.

Weather message from Tokyo Station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.

DOCUMENT No. 3

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow north wind and later from south (repeated 3 times).

Weather message from Tokyo Station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

DOCUMENT No. 4

English	*Romaji*
This is in the middle of the news but today, specially at this point I will give the weather forecast:	Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga honjitsu wa toku ni koko de tenki yoho wo moshiage masu
WEST WIND, CLEAR	NISHI NO KAZE HARE
WEST WIND, CLEAR	NISHI NO KAZE HARE
This is in the middle of the news but today, at this point specially I will give the weather forecast:	Nyuso no tochu de gozaimasu ga kyo wa koko de toku ni tenki yoho wo moshiage masu
WEST WIND, CLEAR	NISHI NO KAZE HARE
WEST WIND, CLEAR	NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

Sent No. 519, 12/5
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandment Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather

MILES.

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

/s/ RALPH C. SMITH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Executive Officer, G-2.

Secret Cablegram
las

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 5

TOP SECRET

From Tokyo
To Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 1 of 14)

Separate telegram

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941

Purple
#902 (Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)— The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those previously prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-⅛-41 (3)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiatoins.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-⅛-41 (3)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principal applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-⅛-41 (3)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941

#902 (Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

JD: 1 7143
25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression past between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD: 1 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans 12-6-41 (S)
25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr—— (45 letters garbled or missing ——been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the ——es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n—(50 letters missed)—sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of

the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in all its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiations, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking. *ANDND** presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of *CHTUAL YLOKMMTT*** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD:1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843

*Probably "and as"
**Probably "China, can but"

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
7 December 1941
(Purple—Eng)

#902 (Part 14 of 14)

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this report, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD:1 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)
25843

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 6

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent—Very Important)

#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902[a].

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

[a] JD-1: 7143—text of Japanese reply.

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 7

SECRET

WPD 4544-30

WPD
CKG

DECEMBER 7, 1941

Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

OCSigO 311.23 (Gen) (12-8-41) 1st Memo Ind. O Br.

War Department, OCSigO, Washington, December 10, 1941. To: A. C. of S. G-2.

1. Following is the log of the message requested in basic memorandum:

	Honolulu Time	E. S. T.
Filed War Department Message Center	12:00 noon	6:30 AM
Sent Western Union	12:17 PM	6:47 AM
Received RCA, Honolulu		7:33 AM
Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu		11:45 AM
Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department		2:58 PM

2. Attached hereto is paraphrase copy of secret message received from Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

For the Acting Chief Signal Officer:

O. K. SADTLER,
Colonel, Signal Corps.

1 Incl—Paraphrase of radiogram

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 8

SECRET

Paraphrase

1087 DECEMBER NINTH

Re your five four nine radio five two nine RCA received this message at their Honolulu station at seven thirty three morning December seventh and this message was delivered Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh the Adjutant General received the deciphered copy at two fifty eight pm

SHORT

Incl #1 DECEMBER 8, 1941

Memorandum for: The Chief Signal Officer.

Subject: Warning order to Overseas Departments

1. At about 11:30 a. m. Sunday, December 7, a secret radiogram, written by the Chief of Staff, was handed in to the Message Center by Colonel Bratton of this division. Colonel Bratton reported verbally to the Chief of Staff that the message would be in the air in about eight minutes as he was assured by the Message Center. This radio was a highly important warning to all overseas departments including Hawaii regarding the timing of the Japanese ultimatum on that afternoon.

2. It is recommended that steps be taken to determine the exact time of arrival of this message at Honolulu, the time when the deciphered message was transmitted by the Signal Corps to the Staff, and by what office it was received in the Staff. Prompt action on this message might have averted disaster.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2.

G2/WAH

MID 336. (11–3–41) Haw. Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G–2
WASHINGTON, D. C., November 4, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2

1 Enclosures:
336. (1103–41)—MID Sum. of Info. re Information received from the Orient; dtd. FMH
Mailed G/2 ——— ——— Nov 5, 1941 Reg. #910405.

MID 336. 11–3–41

G2/C1
FMH

WAR DEPARTMENT
M. I. D.
November 3, 1941.
(Date)

Subject: Information Received from the Orient.

Summary of Information:

The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941, is considered reliable:

1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) "to complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific.

All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November."

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would best begin in December or in February."

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days."

G2 Note: Full name of individual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who is reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.

Distribution:
All Corps Areas
All Departments
Alaska
FBI
ONI
STATE
File
J. B. Cognizant

Evaluation	
—of source	—of information
X	Reliable
	Credible X
	Questionable
	Undetermined

Source: Dr. Cho. Date of original paper 10/28/41 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Fort Shafter, T. H.

6 September 1941.

In reply refer to:
350.05 (G–2)
Subject: Summaries of Information.
To: War Department General Staff,
Military Intelligence Division G–2,
Washington, D. C.

REC'D–B–2 SEP 17, 1941

1. It has been noted that many of the Summaries of Information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

Kendall J. Fielder
KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieut. Colonel, Inf.,
Acting A. C. of S., G–2.

FAR EASTERN
G2/1
RSB

NO. 519 sent out December 5, 1941
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS
G–2 Hawaiian Department
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii

Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.

MILES

[Handwritten:] From Boogy Woogie.

Date dispatched SIS No. Date translated	From	To	Extract
11/19/41 25040 11/20/41	Tokyo	Washington	"— please present our B proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concession can be made. If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured the negotiations will have to be broken off."
11/22/41 25138 11/22/41	Tokyo	Washington	There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans, if the signing can be completed by the 29th . . . we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen."

Warning Mess. No. 1. OPNAV. 24 Nov.

"These are very doubtful chances—"

11/14/41 25322 11/27/41	Tokyo	Hongkong	"Should the negotiations collapse . . . we will completely destroy British and American power in China."
11/26/41 25344 11/26/41	Tokyo	Washington	"The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief Yamamoto of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code . . ."
11/19/41 25432 11/26/41	Tokyo	Washington	"In case of an emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the [2] daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast. (1) In case Japan-U. S. relations in danger: Higashi no Kazeame (east wind rain). This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forcast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers etc."
11/19/41 25392 11/26/41	Tokyo	Washington	"When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: (1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations "Higashi". . . . The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end."
11/26/41 25349 11/26/41 Trans Pacific telephone conversation	Washington	Tokyo	Kurusu to Yamamoto: "I have made all efforts but they will not yield."

Warning Messages Nos. 2 & 3

OPD "Negotiations with Japan appear G-2." Advise only the Commanding Officer. 27 Nov.

11/28/41 25445 11/28/41	Tokyo	Washington	"Therefore with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal, which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. . . . However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off, merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions."

Warning Message No. 4 28 Nov.

[Lines immediately above and below the cross rule are handwritten]

Date dispatched SIS No. Date translated	From	To	Extract
		G-2 "Critical situation demands that all	
11/26/41 25460 11/29/41	Washington	Tokyo	"Should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us."
11/29/41 25496 11/30/41	Tokyo	Washington	"We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines: . . . [3] (in carrying out this instruction please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations).
11/30/41 25497 11/30/41 Telephone conversation	Washington	Tokyo	Kurusu: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?" Yamamoto: "Yes."
12/1/41 25545 12/1/41	Tokyo	Washington	"When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attache's office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand for this purpose."
11/30/41 25552 12/1/41	Tokyo	Berlin	"The conversations . . . between Tokyo and Washington . . . now stand ruptured, broken. . . . lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude . . . They are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia . . . we will have to counter by also moving troops . . . war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan."
11/30/41 25553 12/1/41	Tokyo	Berlin	"Say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet . . . however, right now it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north."
12/2/41 25640 12/3/41	Tokyo	Washington	"Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped, burn those now being used in connection with the machine. Burn every "O" code . . . stop at once using the machine and destroy it completely . . . Burn all the codes Kosaka brought you."
		Warning message No. 5 Dec.	
[4]		G-2 "Contact Commander Rochefort	
12/1/41 25787 12/5/41	Tokyo	London	"Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately."
12/5/41 25836 12/6/41	Washington	Tokyo	We have completed destruction of codes but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine."
12/6/41 25838 12/6/41	Tokyo	Washington	"The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States . . . when you receive it I want you to keep it secret for the time being. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States I will wire you in a separate message."
12/6/41 25843 12/6/41	Tokyo	Washington	The memorandum referred to in 25838 above. A 14 part telegram in reply to the American proposal and concluding with the sentence—"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

Date dispatched SIS No. Date translated	From	To	Extract
12/7/41 25850 12/7/41	Tokyo	Washington	Re my #902 (see 25843 above) will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government, if possible to the Secretary of State, our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, your time.

Final message 7 Dec.

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m."

FAR EASTERN
G2/1
RSB

No. 519 sent out December 5, 1941

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS
G–2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.

MILES

ANNEX TO ORGANIZAT ON CHART, GENERAL STAFF (G-2)

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff G-2
Brigadier General Sherman Miles

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Colonel Ralph C. Smith

Lt. Colonel Thomas E. Roderick
Assistant Ex. Officer
2d Lt. E. R. W. McCabe, Jr.
2d Lt. Warren S. Richards

ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH

Colonel Ralph C. Smith

MILITARY ATTACHE SECTION

Lt. Colonel John S. Winslow

American Military Attaches, Missions, Observers abroad, and Language officers.

FOREIGN LIAISON SECTION

Lt. Colonel Lawrence Miggins

Foreign Attaches, Missions, and Officials in the U. S.

COORDINATING SECTION

Lt. Colonel F. F. McMahon

Certain special contacts.

FINANCE SECTION

Lt. Colonel Robert F. Richards

Finance and Property.

PERSONNEL SECTION

Captain George F. Ashworth

Administration of commissioned officers in G-2, WDGS, and all MI-Reserve officers.

RECORD SECTION

1st Lt. Malcolm May, Jr.

Records and files.

TRANSLATION SECTION

Colonel Ralph C. Smith

Translations and Preparations of Dictionaries.

CHIEF CLERK

Mr. John S. Calvert

Civilian Personnel, classification and employment of applicants for civilian positions, miscellaneous correspondence of Division.

SPECIAL STUDY GROUP

Lt. Colonel Percy G. Black

INFORMATION CONTROL BRANCH

Major A. P. Corderman

Plans and regulations for National Information Control in collaboration with the Navy Department. Training of Information Control Personnel. Liaison with Foreign Information Control Organizations. Liaison with other Government Departments on information control matters.

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Colonel Hayes A. Kroner

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

Lt. Colonel M. W. Pettigrew

All administrative matters of Intelligence Branch
Personnel
Cables and Messages
Drafting
Stenographic Pool

FIELD PERSONNEL SECTION

Captain R. V. Rohrer

Handles selection of places (not personnel) for new observers and attaches. Training of Military Intelligence personnel.

SITUATION SECTION

Lt. Colonel Thomas J. Betts

Charge of information bearing on the situation all parts of world. The heart of the Intelligence Branch. Maintains situation maps both in G-2 and for the Secretary of War. All special studies, etc., emanate from here.

CONTACT SECTION

Colonel Harry F. Cunningham

Contact with State, ONI, etc., for military information.

DISSEMINATION SECTION

Colonel Fred J. deRohan

Boils down and reports into Tentative Lessons, Special Bulletins, etc., and distributes to service.

SOUTHERN EUROPEAN SECTION (Formerly Balkans & Near East Section)

Lt. Colonel Walton W. Cox

CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECTION

Colonel Hamilton E. Maguire

EASTERN EUROPEAN SECTION

Lt. Colonel G. B. Guenther

WESTERN EUROPEAN SECTION

Lt. Colonel Louis J. Fortier

LATIN AMERICAN SECTION

Colonel R. Townsend Reard

SUB-SECTION NO. 1

Caribbean

Colonel E. M. Benitez

SUB-SECTION NO. 2

Mexican

Lt. Colonel Harry M. Gwynn

SUB-SECTION NO. 3

Central American

Lt. Colonel Stuart R. Carswell

SUB-SECTION NO. 4

Lt. Colonel Stuart R. Carswell

SUB-SECTION NO. 5

West Coast S. America

1st Lt. T. H. Harrell

SUB-SECTION NO. 6

River Flats S. America

Major Wilson L. Townsend

SUB-SECTION NO. 7

Brazil

Lt. Colonel William Sackville

SUB-SECTION NO. 8

Special Section

Captain Bob A. Massengale

All Latin America

BRITISH EMPIRE SECTION

Lt. Colonel L. J. Compton

FAR EASTERN SECTION

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton

Japan Sub-section
Lt. Colonel Carlisle C. Dusenbury
Major Wallace M. Moore
2d Lt. J. Bayard Schindel

China Sub-section
Major Frank T. Roberts
1st Lt. Julean Arnold, Jr.
2d Lt. Dwight Edwards

Southeast Asia and Philippine Islands
Major Homer A. Stebbins
Major Philip M. Taylor

Pacific Islands and Alaska
Major John T. Coulter
1st Lt. John T. Broaddus

AIR SECTION

Lt. Colonel J. C. Hodgson

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Lt. Colonel John T. B. Bissell

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

Lt. Colonel W. A. Holbrook, Jr.

General administrative duties for this Branch. Supervision of all activities and policies of the Counterintelligence Branch.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE SECTION

Major David G. Erskine

Subversive groups and activities. Evaluation of domestic situation.

INVESTIGATING SECTION

Major Nicholas S. Beckett

Investigation, including personnel, disaffection, subversion and sabotage within the military establishment.

PLANT INTELLIGENCE SECTION

Major W. E. Crist

Securing, evaluating and disseminating intelligence information covering industrial plants, communications, transportation, power and other facilities vital to the national defense program, including labor situation and espionage. Sabotage, strikes, labor agitation. Recommend action on application of aliens for employment in Air Corps or classified contracts.

SAFEGUARDING MILITARY INFORMATION SECTION

Lt. Colonel Carter W. Clarke

Policies, regulations, and supervisory measures relative to S.M.I. Liaison with Public Relations Bureau on releases. Signal intelligence - Passport control. Supervision of Military Attache cryptographic security.

SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT SECTION

Captain Frank S. Nesterman

All activities not specifically assigned to other sections.

CORPS OF INTELLIGENCE POLICE SECTION

Captain Henry Gordon Sheen

Procurement and training CIP personnel and promulgation of regulations thereof.

PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH

Lt. Colonel Charles Y. Banfill

PLANS AND TRAINING SECTION

Major Walter A. Buck

Coordination and supervision of all military intelligence activities in the Army. Coordination of G-2 contributions to mobilization and war plans. Review of tables of organization, mobilization plans, war plans, defense projects for G-2. Review of all regulations and manuals having a bearing on military intelligence. Preparation of MI manuals and MID Army Extension Courses not assigned to another agency. Allocation of Reserve intelligence training funds.

GEOGRAPHIC SECTION

Lt. Colonel Patrick H. Timothy

Formulation of plans and policies governing the collection and compilation of domestic and foreign maps and of geographic information. Procurement, reproduction, and distribution of maps. Preparation of Geographic Chapters of Intelligence Surveys by the research office of the Geographic Section. Guidance in the selection and preparation of maps and charts to accompany Intelligence Surveys. Coordination of Engineer and Air Corps mapping activities. Review of regulations and manuals pertaining to maps, map reading, and map making. Liaison with Federal mapping agencies. Representation on the Federal Board of Surveys and Maps.

INCIDENTAL EXHIBITS

RE

PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

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4. Two letters re testimony of Gen. Miles and testimony of Gen. Miles before Grunert Board.
5. Copies of Messages.
6. Letter to A. C. of S., G–2 from Lt. Col. Fielder, Hawaii, 31 Dec. 1941.
7. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General, Dec. 28, 1940.
8. Letter to A. C. of S., G–2 from Col. Thurber, Dec. 18, 1941 re Report of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii.
9. Message, to Hawaii.
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14. Message from Short, Ft. Shafter, Nov. 29, 1941.
15. Memo for Adjutant General from Gen. Gerow, Nov. 27, 1941, sending messages to CG Hawaii and CG, Caribbean Defense Command, re negotiations terminated with Japan.
16. Cable to all Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command and Hawaii, by Miles, Nov. 27, 1941.
17. Paraphrase of cable to all Corps Areas (same as No. 16.).
18. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General re Jap troops evacuating.
19. Message to G–2, Hawaii from Miles, Nov. 12, 1941, re custodial detention list.
20. Message from Manila, P. I. Oct. 28 re Jap aircraft.
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22. Copies of Messages.
23. Index of Translations and Memoranda re Pearl Harbor.
24. Summary of Far Eastern Documents Relating to Japan's War Potential and Intentions.

EXHIBIT No. 1

Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2: Brigadier General Sherman Miles (Acting)
Executive Officer:
Lt. Col. R. C. Smith
Lt. Col. T. E. Roderick
Administrative Branch: Lt. Col. R. C. Smith
Intelligence Branch: Col. C. H. Mason
Balkans and Near East Section: Lt. Col. W. W. Cox
British Empire Section: Lt. Col. Homer Case
Central European Section: Lt. Col. H. E. Maguire
Eastern European Section: Lt. Col. G. B. Guenther
Far Eastern Section: Lt. Col. R. S. Bratton
Latin American Section: Lt. Col. R. T. Heard
Western European Section: Lt. Col. H. F. Cunningham
Aviation Section
Editorial Section
Collection Section

Liaison Branch: Lt. Col. A. R. Harris
Counterintelligence Branch: Lt. Col. J. A. Lester
Safeguarding Military Information: Maj. W. P. Corderman
Domestic Intelligence: Maj. W. A. Holbrook
Plant and Utilities Section: Maj. W. E. Crist
General
Plans and Training Branch: Lt. Col. V. W. Cooper
Plans and Training: Maj. H. V. Canan
Geographic: Lt. Col. C. Y. Banfill
Approved March 10, 1941.

EXHIBIT No. 2—See facing folder

EXHIBIT No. 3

[From the Times-Herald, Washington, D. C., Thursday, September 28, 1944]

THE TRUTH OF PEARL HARBOR

(AN EDITORIAL)

By Basil Brewer, Publisher, The New Bedford (Mass.) Standard-Times

Pearl Harbor is the saddest chapter in the history of America.

Here, in one hour, was destroyed the Pacific battle fleet, chief weapon to restrain Japan from war—chief weapon with which to win, if war came.

Here were wiped out 4,000 officers and men of the American Army and Navy.

Innocent of responsibility, they died in a classic funeral pyre, built for them by the criminal negligence of others.

Pearl Harbor, which, as the Japanese planned, made impossible relief of the Philippines, may have been responsible for that other great tragedy—Bataan and Corregidor.

Pearl Harbor marked the beginning of war with Japan.

It may well have finished any hope of an early successful ending of the Japanese war.

Certainly the victims there, those who paid the "last full measure of devotion," were not to blame for the disaster.

Who were to blame for Pearl Harbor?

Surely here, if ever, there was guilt and there were guilty.

Who were the guilty and why have they not been apprehended, tried, convicted and punished?

WHY?

The President had said Jan. 7, 1941, 11 months before Pearl Harbor:

"When the dictators are ready to make war upon us, they will not wait for an act of war on our part. *They, not we*, will choose the *time*, the *method* and the *place* of their attack."

Why, then, were we "surprised" at Pearl Harbor?

Why was the battle fleet there, each in its place, names and exact locations map-marked by the Japanese flyers to receive the torpedoes, made especially for this attack?

Why was the air arm of the Army there, herded together, unarmed, for the kill?

Should the Pacific battle fleet have been at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7?

And, if it should not, why was it there, and by whose orders?

INVESTIGATIONS

Four different "investigations" of Pearl Harbor have been conducted—all secret.

Only one "report" has been made, the report of the Roberts Commission, released a few weeks after Pearl Harbor.

Of the 127 witnesses who testified in the Roberts investigation, the testimony of none has been made public.

Of the hundreds of documents studied and put in the record in the Roberts investigation, none has been made public.


RESTRICTED
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Phone Nr. 5508-5509
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2 (Acting)
Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles
Room 3046 Phone Nr. 2966
EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Lt. Col. R.C. Smith
Room 3046 Phone Nr. 2966
Lt. Col. T.P. Roderick
Room 3046 Phone Nr. 4328
2nd Lt. W.S. Richards
2nd Lt. E.R.C. McCabe, Jr.
Room 3046 Phone Nr. 2966
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
Col. Hayes A. Kroner
Room 2745 Phone Nr. 5625
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH
Lt. Col. J.T.B. Bissell
Room 3550 Phone Nr. 2966
PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH
Lt. Col. G.V. Bonfil
Room 3501 Phone Nr. 2976
INFORMATION CONTROL BRANCH
STAFF
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION
SITUATION SUBSECTION
CONTACT SECTION
DISSEMINATION SECTION
AIR SECTION
FAR EAST SECTION
LATIN AMERICA SECTION
ADMINISTRATION SECTION
Major F. A. Holbrook Jr.
Room 3550 Phone Nr. 2468
1st Lt. M. Ogden
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STATISTICS BRANCH, G-2
October 10-20-41

Why have not these documents been made public?

The Roberts report blamed General Short, commanding general of the Army, and Admiral Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, for the disaster.

As a result of the findings of the Roberts Commission, both have been ordered tried by court-martial.

Kimmel and Short, members of Congress and many others repeatedly have demanded the trials be held.

Today, more than 2½ years after the report of the Roberts Commission, neither Short nor Kimmel has been brought to trial.

It was urged, shortly after Pearl Harbor, that trials would interfere with the war.

Certainly now, almost three years after the disaster, no such claim validly can be made.

More than a year ago the late Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote a letter saying public trials of Kimmel and Short could not affect the progress of the war.

Very recently a sub-committee of the House Military Affairs Committee stated public trials would not interfere with the war.

Why, in justice, have not these trials been publicly held, that those charged may be punished, if guilty, and, if innocent, freed?

Why have not the American people been told the truth about Pearl Harbor?

Truth, which they need in order properly to appraise their military and political leaders—and their policies.

Truth, which they need to appraise their own share, if any, in the guilt.

Truth, which they need to better guide themselves, as citizens—in the interest of the country in war.

The American people grew old overnight at Pearl Harbor.

Why are they being treated as children, who must not be told?

Pearl Harbor was the Gethsemane of the American people, as well as of the soldier dead.

Why not the truth, no matter how hard to take to cleanse the soul—perhaps to bring temporal, as well as spiritual, salvation?

* * *

Not even the truth, as to the Pearl Harbor dead, was known, until long afterwards.

The facts as to the destruction of the battle fleet were withheld for a year—and then released with news of successful salvage operations.

WAR

For a year or more prior to Pearl Harbor, it had been clear to official Washington only a miracle or American surrender could keep the United States out of the European war and war with Japan.

Japan had signed the Tripartite pact with Hitler, binding her to war with the U. S., if war with Hitler came.

Japan had notified Ambassador Grew, in the Spring of 1941, the pact meant what it said.

Grew had advised Washington.

Concurrently, Japan's course of conquest clearly pointed to the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, Burma, possibly India, if not the Philippines.

That Britain could successfully meet this attack, without help, was dubious indeed.

Lend-lease, convoyed supplies, loaned destroyers, etc., would not suffice if Japan attacked Britain.

Therefore, the President faced, early in '41, the two horns of dilemma.

He must decide whether to join Britain in stopping Japan—which meant war.

Or he must take the chance, which seemed a certainty, that without the U. S. actively fighting, the Triparite powers would defeat Britain, force Russia to peace—and attack the U. S.

That the President had determined on war seems indisputable.

On Jan. 21, 1941, he wrote Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that the maintenance of British supply lines from the Far East was vital.

On Feb. 14, 1941, Dooman, Counsel of the American Embassy in Tokyo, told the Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Okashi that, if the Japanese attacked Singapore, "the logic of the situation would inevitably raise the question" that this would mean war also with the U. S.

On Feb. 26, 1941, Ambassador Grew reported Dooman's conference to Washington, saying:

"I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka (Japanese foreign minister), with whom I have an appointment this morning that the statements made by Mr. Dooman to Mr. Okashi were made with my prior knowledge and have my full approval."

Washington did not disapprove nor disavow Dooman's and Grew's statements.

In April 1941, Naval authorities in Washington had written the commanders of the Asiatic and Pacific fleets that the question of U. S. entry into the war seemed a matter of—"not whether—but when."

By the time of the Atlantic Charter meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt, early in August '41, events in Asia were moving with tremendous and ominous speed.

Churchill, the Australians and the Dutch urged an immediate ultimatum—war—if Japan pursued her expected course.

Responding to the argument for an immediate ultimatum, the President only asked if "we would not be better off in three months?"

And then said, "Leave it to me. I think I can baby them (the Japs) along *for three months.*"

There was no disagreement between the President and Churchill as to Japanese plans—nor that Japan must be stopped.

Probably there was no disagreement that an ultimatum meant war.

It now is clear the President only was playing for time—time to be better prepared—

And—time for the American people to "catch up," mentally and morally, with commitments, made and to be made.

The Atlantic Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt settled the policy of a united front between the U. S. and England toward Japan.

That this was true seems implicit in the following from Churchill's address to Parliament on Jan. 28, 1942, about seven weeks after Pearl Harbor:

"It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be engaged. * * *

"On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic Conference, at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory assured, seemed to allay some of these anxieties, and that expectation has not been falsified by the events."

July 24, the United States had "frozen" Japanese funds.

Immediately after the Atlantic Conference, commercial embargoes, against oil, steel and gasoline were ordered which only could result in war.

This writer believes the President, in all these matters, made the correct decision—in the country's interests—that history shall so record.

With equal impartiality, history shall record that the President, out of his political genius, made one, perhaps two fatal errors, which may have brought on the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Certainly these contributed greatly to the disastrous success of the attack.

POLITICS

The working agreement with Churchill being what it was, the danger to the country being apprehended—the President failed to take the people into confidence.

This was the President's political bent.

A statesman long ago would have told the people the facts—and risen or fallen with the consequences.

Democracy rises or falls, lives or dies, based on how well this thesis is understood and followed.

But the President was not of that talent nor taste.

Far more than he trusted the people, he trusted his own facility of expression, his ability, not necessarily by the use of facts, to get the people to think as he wanted them to think.

Concurrently, this formula had seemed to the President not to have worked badly in eight years of the Presidency and three elections for President.

It was true, also, this was the only method the President knew.

Secretary Hull had said, when questioned about apparent inaction in Washington, "governments which get too far ahead of the people are apt to fall."

The President, in the grave war situation in the Fall of '41, had gotten far ahead of the people—far too far for the people ever to catch up by anything which he, by that time, could say.

Fortunately we can now depend on two of the President's friends and biographers for the facts at this stage of the crisis.

Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, friends of the President, had access, through the President, to confidential information, from which they produced early in 1942, "How War Came."

This is from page 305 under the title, "The Sands Run Out—Pearl Harbor":

"Few, if any, high officials believed, however, that the United States would, or could, stand aside for long if the Japanese struck at the East Indies or Malaya, or even thrust into Siam. For at stake were not only immediate interests vital to us, but resources and strategical positions affecting our long-term security as a nation.

"*The question perplexing many high officials was how, in the absence of a direct Japanese attack on the American flag, to summon the nation, divided as it then was on questions of foreign policy, to the strong action which they believed essential.*

"*There had been considerable discussion of possible methods* . . . It was commonly supposed that the Japanese were too smart to solve this problem for the President by a direct assault on the American flag—especially at Hawaii, which even the extreme isolationists recognize as a bastion of our security."

Surely this is plain enough.

"As the Sands Ran Out at Pearl Harbor," the Japanese "solved the problem for the President by a direct assault on the American flag."

The President, in the last weeks before Pearl Harbor, required an "incident" that would enable the people to catch up with him.

Pearl Harbor gave the President far more of an incident than he needed, expected—or wanted.

Born optimist, the incident the President expected was to be a glancing blow—but the blow came full and head-on at the whole body of the country.

Moreover, it was not *the kind* of an incident he had in mind, as shall be disclosed.

THE FLEET

Naval strategy opposed having the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor.

Three or more high admirals had opposed it, including Kimmel.

Admiral Richardson, immediate predecessor of Kimmel, was removed from command by the President because, among other things, he opposed basing the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

The fleet was at Pearl Harbor by orders of the President, though of course he ordered no such concentration as existed there on Dec. 7.

Reasons of diplomacy, and war strategy, as judged by the President, required a powerful fleet based at Hawaii, a threat and a warning to Japan, the only kind the Japanese could understand.

In no other way, the President judged, could the U. S. hope to keep open the British, and our own, supply lines from the Far East.

These supply lines, the President had told Grew, were vital.

These were the supply lines the President and Churchill had agreed to defend together at the Atlantic Conference.

The admirals were opposed to basing the main fleet at Hawaii, because they believed the fleet there was too confined, too exposed to possible attack.

Knowing the power of the Japanese fleet, high officers of the Navy had for years questioned its ability to meet the Japanese successfully in Far Eastern waters.

Defending the Philippines always had been considered difficult.

Certainly this thesis had not been changed by large increases in the Japanese Navy and by the fact the U. S. fleet in '41 was divided between the Pacific and the Atlantic.

Additionally, the admirals opposed using the fleet at Hawaii as a threat to Japan.

Such an approach, they considered, was apt to result in "backing into the war," instead of the more forthright and direct method, which they favored.

What the admirals didn't know was, we were, to all practical purposes, already in the war.

We were watchfully waiting for the "incident" which would make the war, already a foregone conclusion, "politically possible."

A plan of co-operation with the British Far Eastern fleet had been arranged, which required the U. S. fleet to be as near as practical to the Philippines.

The Japanese knew the full meaning of the U. S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Every war plan of the Japanese, including the latest by Kinoaki Matsuo, "The Three Power Alliance," published in 1940, plainly stated in war with U. S. Japan would be defeated—if the U. S. Pacific fleet were permitted to get to the Philippines.

We were, at the time of Pearl Harbor, waiting for an "incident" which would start war.

The Japanese, having in mind basic Japanese strategy, that the battle fleet of the U. S. must not get to Manila—for a long time had been *preparing the "incident."*

SABOTAGE

Having overruled his admirals in basing the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, it would be expected that the President, of all persons, would make most certain no disaster came from the fleet's being there.

Doubtless the President thought he had so arranged.

It is a fact, however, the President, by his own acts, unwittingly of course, contrived to bring about the success of the Japanese attack.

This was not in the manner that he has been commonly accused, running all the way from plotting the attack, to ordering the fleet unprotected to appease the Japanese—all of which are false.

The President's responsibility is nevertheless direct and definite.

Early in January, Secretary of Navy Knox had sent a warning to both Army and Navy chiefs at Pearl Harbor suggesting the danger of a surprise bombing attack by air against the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

It had been a foregone conclusion, if war with Japan came, it would begin by surprise attack, the Japanese way, as the President himself had said Jan. 6, 1941.

But, as the months went by between the first of the year and Dec. 7, 1941, as the plans of the Japanese to attack became matured, for some strange reason there was less and less emphasis on surprise attack on the fleet at Pearl Harbor by air, more and more on sabotage.

Of seven warning messages from Washington to Short and Kimmel, recorded in the Roberts report, in addition to the one in January from Secretary Knox, four referred to sabotage.

None, after the Knox warning, referred to the possibility of surprise attack by air on the fleet.

Twice, in acknowledging warnings and instructions from Washington, General Short reported to Washington he had taken all precautions *against sabotage.*

On Nov. 27, 10 days before Pearl Harbor, General Short advised Washington he had ordered Hawaii "alert No. 1" against sabotage, and gave details of what measures he had taken.

Washington knew of and did not disapprove these "defense steps," solely against sabotage.

Sabotage, third in the list of attacks most expected by Knox in January, had become No. 1 of those expected in Washington and Pearl Harbor as Dec. 7 approached.

It is not sabotage which competent military leaders, in Washington or Pearl Harbor, would normally most fear, as war with Japan approached.

As Dec. 7 approached, the "incident," which would bring war with Japan, was daily, almost hourly, expected in Washington.

Historically, the sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor on Feb. 15, 1898—an act of sabotage, had brought war with Spain.

By some strange twist, the President, and to some extent the military leaders in Washington, were in a "Battleship Maine" state of mind, when the attack occurred, or at least were up to the last hours before the attack.

This explains why the battle fleet was docked, each ship at its station, awnings up—why the planes were grounded wing to wing, unarmed, ammunition for guns and planes locked in magazines, when Japan struck Dec. 7.

The Army at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, interpreting its instructions from Washington, was "alerted" for sabotage only.

Had Hawaii "alert No. 3" been ordered, by General Short, the Japs might never have struck, certainly the damage would have been far less.

In far-away Aleutian Islands, at Dutch Harbor, where military orders only had to be followed, U. S. bombers were cruising with live bombs in racks, U. S. fighters, with live ammunition in guns, when the attack came to Pearl Harbor Dec. 7.

DISASTER

But it is not alone the "sabotage psychology" at Pearl Harbor for which the President must accept his share of responsibility.

There were blunders there, both of omission and commission, which he must shoulder.

The Commanders at Pearl Harbor had warnings of danger.

But with every warning, save one, came a "precaution," which tied their hands psychologically, if not actually.

As the danger became greater and Pearl Harbor closer, the "precautions" became more definite, more insistent, more urgent.

These precautions came direct from the White House.

The only warning message that Kimmel and Short received, which did not contain definite precautionary orders, was the one from Secretary of the Navy Knox in January '41.

This was 11 months before Pearl Harbor and long before the expected "incident," which would kick off hostilities, was expected.

Here are the precautions, which accompanied each "warning," as told in the Roberts report.

Oct. 16, as Kimmel and Short were warned of danger by Washington, they were ordered to do nothing which would "*constitute provocation as against Japan.*"

Nov. 24, 13 days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was enjoined to strictest secrecy, in any defense moves he made "*to prevent complication of tense existing situation.*"

Nov. 27, came the most serious warning yet, from the Chief of Staff to Short, but with it an order that under no circumstances was he to take any steps or make any moves *that would make it appear* the U. S. had committed "*the first overt act.*"

In the same message "reconnaissance" was ordered but only "*in such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.*"

Here a military authority must have thought of the possibility such an order might tie the hands of the commander, for there was inserted:

"He (General Short) was not to be restricted to any course, which would jeopardize his defense."

Nov. 28, nine days before Pearl Harbor, Short was cautioned again that any protective measures he took, "*must be confined to those essential to security*" and *he must avoid "unnecessary publicity and alarm.*"

It was the next day, Nov. 29, Secretary Hull stated, "The diplomatic part of our relations with Japan is virtually over and the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy."

Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was ordered to "*take no offensive action until Japan had committed the first overt act.*"

Nov. 30, seven days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel received the last warning message to reach Pearl Harbor before the attack.

It was a copy of a dispatch sent to Admiral Hart at Manila, ordering certain scouting, but again with the admonition, to "*avoid the appearance of attacking.*"

None of these precautionary orders came from military authorities in Washington, though all came through military channels.

None of these precautionary orders at Pearl Harbor ever was withdrawn.

One of the last warning messages sent to Pearl Harbor was changed by the President, personally, to insert the usual precaution.

The official explanation, of course, is that, if war came, the President wanted the record to show he had done all he could to prevent it.

But on Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, as stated, the Secretary of State had said "the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy."

The Roberts report, in No. 15 of its conclusions, quotes one of the many precautionary orders from Washington as a cause of the success of the Pearl Harbor attack though the report does not fix the responsibility.

The last full fatal week before Dec. 7, 1941, the Roberts report does not show a single message from Washington to Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor.

It now is known Washington had, during this week, information of greatest importance, which Short and Kimmel didn't receive until *after* the attack.

This is the real story of Pearl Harbor, seven warnings of danger to the commanders there, *six confusing and contradictory* "precautions," which tied their hands.

Word available the last fatal week—word most needed at Pearl Harbor—never was sent.

Obviously the President, "as the sands ran out" at Pearl Harbor, was definitely expecting a Japanese attack.

But the nearer it was expected the more careful he became that when the attack should come, it should be such as the isolationists could not tie onto himself.

The attack, which came at Pearl Harbor Dec. 7, was one which the "isolationists" could not tie onto the President.

But the success of the attack can in part, in all fairness, and in such measure as each citizen shall judge, be placed at the door of the Commander-in-Chief as commander and personally.

The President, and others, in Washington, first had lulled the commanders at Pearl Harbor into expecting only—sabotage.

The President then had given them such restraining precautions and orders they did not know what they could or dare do—in measures of protection and defense.

The Japanese, as Davis and Lindley had said, solved the problem of how to summon the nation against isolationism for the President at Pearl Harbor.

But in trying to keep "the record clear," the President unknowingly and unintentionally had contributed to the destruction of the Pacific battle fleet, had helped to bring about Bataan and Corregidor, had lengthened immeasurably the Japanese war.

WHY?

This of course explains many things.

It explains the long delay of the court-martial of General Short and Admiral Kimmel.

It explains why the President through members of Senate and House, stopped Congress from passing resolutions calling for trials.

It explains why the President still prevents the records of the Roberts Commission and the testimony of its 127 witnesses being made public.

It explains the Presidential order which forbade Admiral Hooper a year ago to testify about Pearl Harbor to a committee of Congress.

It explains why no information has been given out as to the investigation by Admiral Hart, at the suggestion of Secretary Knox.

It explains investigation number 4, now being held behind closed doors.

White House pressure succeeded in substituting secret hearing number 4, for a proposed resolution of Congress calling for immediate court-martial.

[EDITOR'S NOTE: *This editorial is republished and paid for by The New Bedford, Mass., Standard-Times, as a patriotic public service. No outside parties have contributed in any way toward the cost of publication. Republication permitted.*]

EXHIBIT NO. 4

10 AUGUST 1944.

Confidential

Colonel CHARLES W. WEST, JAGD,
Recorder, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Room 4741, Munitions Building,
Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL: General Miles has asked me to write to you requesting a copy of the transcript of his evidence before the Board. The General desires this copy of the transcript because he is concerned with the possibility of his evidence showing an inaccurate statement of fact.

General Miles would have written to you personally on this matter but he is now on an inspection trip and by long distance telephone he communicated with me today, asking me to make this request of you. The General will be at this headquarters on Tuesday, 15 August 1944, and I can assure you that he will examine and return the same immediately.

I trust everything is going well with you and that you are enjoying your assignment.

Sincerely,

DANIEL L. O'DONNELL,
Lt. Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Service Command Judge Advocate.

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,
Munitions Building, 12 August 1944.

Lt. Col. DANIEL L. O'DONNELL, J. A. G. D.
Hqs. First Service Command,
Boston 15, Massachusetts.

DEAR COLONEL O'DONNELL: Pursuant to your request of 10 August 1944, I am enclosing herewith a copy of the transcript of General Miles' testimony. Certain minor inaccuracies such as typographical errors, may appear therein which we haven't yet had an opportunity to correct but will do so at the earliest opportunity. May I suggest that the matter of any possibly "inaccurate statement of fact" be made the subject of a letter to General Grunert.

Please return the transcript when it has served its purpose. With kindest regards, I am.

Sincerely yours,

Charles W. West,
CHARLES W. WEST,
Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Recorder.

1 Incl: Transcript.

[*91*] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES, COMMANDING 1ST SERVICE COMMAND, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station?

General MILES. Sherman Miles, Major General, Commanding 1st Service Command, Boston, Massachusetts.

General GRUNERT. General Miles, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your assignment as A. C. of S. G–2, at that time, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass upon the objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase. So he will lead in propounding the questions and the other members will assist in developing them. So I will turn you over to the mercies of General Russell.

General RUSSELL. What was your assignment in the year 1941?

General MILES. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, War Department.

General RUSSELL. Can you remember approximately the date on which you entered upon that assignment?

General MILES. May 1, 1940.

General RUSSELL. When were you relieved or transferred from that assignment?

[*92*] General MILES. The end of January 1942.

General RUSSELL. During that period of time you were actually the head of what we know as G–2 which embraced the Military Intelligence Division. Was that the name of it?

General MILES. That was the official name—Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

General RUSSELL. Briefly stated, General Miles, what were the functions of the G–2 section, including this Military Intelligence Division?

General MILES. The Military Intelligence Division, General, was all-inclusive. It was the whole thing, not as it is now, broken and divided between G–2 and Military Intelligence Service. It was all one division, just as the Operations and Training Division, or the Personnel Division, War Plans Division, and so forth. I was head of the entire division, which, in turn, was divided into counter-intelligence, positive intelligence, and in turn that was divided geographically to cover the world, or as much as we could cover.

General RUSSELL. Definitely, General Miles, as to the operations of your department related to the Japanese Government during your period of service there, what were you attempting to learn about the Japanese Government?

General MILES. We were attempting to learn everything we could about the Japanese Government, and had been doing so, in fact, a great many yaers. It was only one of the nations which we were attempting to cover, to gather all possible information about. Our system was a running digest.

General GRUNERT. May I interrupt there? If anything which [93] you put into the record is of such a nature as might be of value to other nations now, I wish you would consider that and, if so, give us that information in closed session, so that it will not be disclosed to anybody who may be able to see this record. Do you see what I am getting at?

General MILES. Yes, sir; I understand.

This summary digest was maintained on the principal countries of the world. Such a system is no secret. It has been maintained by practically every government. It was a running digest covering the military side, the political side, the economic side, and the psychological side. All the information that ever came in from any country to G–2 was collated and put into this digest and sent out to the various military attaches and G–2s, all the corps areas and overseas departments who were interested in a particular country, in the form of corrected loose-leaf, so that you had a running build-up constantly. This had been going on, to my knowledge, for ~~thirty~~ twenty years. In addition to that, of course, we sent out bi-weekly, as I remember, military intelligence summaries, which were short documents of facts that we had gotten in in the last two or three days from all sorts of agencies that we had. I say all sorts, because we kept in very close touch with the State Department, the Department of Commerce, the Rockefeller people in South America, and, of course, our own military attaches and observers that we had throughout the world.

That, in general, was our system of getting information and disseminating it.

General RUSSELL. Did the G–2 section, as such, have [94] personnel available for investigations in foreign fields in the year 1941?

General MILES. A limited personnel, General. We were building up. When I took over Military Intelligence in May of 1940 I remember there were 36 officers in the entire division. We built up rapidly to something over 400, with an equal proportion of clerical personnel. We built up very rapidly, as the war came nearer and nearer, our agencies in the field, field observers, military attaches. Our personnel was always limited. We did not have unlimited money or unlimited selection, ~~of officers,~~ particularly of officers. That was a time when the Army was building very rapidly. The natural inclination of a soldier is to go with troops and remain with troops. The general officers, in the field of course wanted the best men, naturally, and should have had them. ~~and~~ We did not have a free field for the selection of personnel, and quite rightly. We did the best we could with the personnel and the funds we had available.

General RUSSELL. About when did this personnel reach its maximum development of 400?

General MILES. Well, it was increasing all the time I was there. I do not know. I imagine it continued to increase after I left. I am pretty sure it did, I cannot place any date on any maximum reached.

General RUSSELL. Can you approximate the number of people who were available to you for service in Washington and throughout the country and in foreign fields, in October and November of 1941?

[95] General MILES. General, I would not try to answer that question from my memory. The records are certainly available to you. I could not do it.

General RUSSELL. General, a moment ago you referred to monthly or bimonthly documents of some kind that were sent to the corps commanders and to the overseas departments. Did your office maintain copies of those reports?

General MILES. Oh, yes.

General RUSSELL. Are they in the files now?

General MILES. I imagine they are, sir. They are permanent records of the Military Intelligence Division.

General RUSSELL. There would be no reason to destroy them at all?

General MILES. Not that I know of.

General RUSSELL. I want at this point to say that I have asked for a search of the records over there and have looked at the records, but did not discover copies of such reports, although specifically I have asked for such reports. I am giving you that, because it may be necessary for us to conduct a further search to locate, if possible, these documents.

Now, to discuss for a moment the sources of information which you have divulged already and to limit it to Japanese information, what sources of information were there in Japan in the fall of 1941 on which you as G–2 could rely as to activities of the Japanese at home and in home waters?

General MILES. Within the United States?

General RUSSELL. No. I am now addressing myself to the situation in Japan and have asked what agencies or what sources existed in Japan upon which you could rely for information [96] about Japanese activities at home and in Hawaii.

General MILES. I would say that by far the most important source was our Embassy in Tokyo. We had a very excellent Ambassador who had been there a number of years with a staff that had been there a good deal longer than that. We had, of course, used the military attache and his assistants. The information which we could get on the military side from our military attache and his assistants was of course very limited; the Japanese being extremely close-mouthed. But the Embassy itself was constantly sending in dispatches to the State Department—Mr. Grew, particularly—on the state of mind of the Japanese people and the probability of what they were going to do next, and so forth. We also, of course, had direct access, through our very close connection with the State Department, to what was transpiring in the negotiations in the fall of 1941 here in Washington. Aside from that, I do not think there were any important sources of information in Japan. We were getting a good deal of information from what might be called the borders; in other words, China, and even the part of the Continent occupied by the Japanese. The Koreans would get out once in a while and we would get some information in that way. We exchanged information very freely with the British and, to a certain extent, with the Dutch. They were a little afraid to give us information, as I remember, but we were getting some.

General RUSSELL. Did the British have any organization within the homeland of Japan which was watching the movement of their Army and Navy in the fall of 1941?

General MILES. I believe that they had about the same as [97] we had. As to actually watching the movements of ships and troops, it was necessarily a system that worked sometimes and did not work at other times. You might see the ships move or the troops move, or you might not.

General RUSSELL. General Miles, is it true or not that from the State Department or from our Ambassador to Japan the information which we obtained related almost exclusively to the state of mind of the Japanese people toward the war and their enmity toward the United States?

General MILES. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir?

General RUSSELL. Yes. Is it true or not that that was the case?

General MILES. That was the Ambassador's principal concern, naturally. I would not say, from my memory of the information that we got from our Embassy, that that by any means covered the field.

General RUSSELL. Do you remember a message from our Ambassador along in the fall of 1941, in which he summed up the situation and told the State Department to what extent they could rely upon him for information of troop movements, movements of the Navy, and so forth?

General MILES. I do not recall that particular message, General.

General RUSSELL. Maybe I can refresh your memory. May I ask you this as a preliminary? Did you attend the conferences that were held by the Secretary of State, which he refers to as the War Councils, where he had ordinarily the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and some of our high-ranking military [98] and naval people in to discuss the Japanese situation?

General MILES. No, sir. I think only the Chief of Staff attended them.

General RUSSELL. I refer particularly to this message which is contained in the State Department's book that they call the White Paper, which is a report from our Ambassador to Japan on the 17th day of November, I believe, 1941 (handing a book to the witness).

General MILES. What is the question, now, sir?

General RUSSELL. When did you first know about that message?

General MILES. I don't remember, General; I can't answer that question.

General FRANK. Did you know about it at all?

General MILES. I am not sure that I did. I think I did, because we had very close liaison with the State Department. I feel sure that I did; but, frankly, it is so obvious a message that the impression it gives me today is

probably the same impression it gave me then: "Yes, of course I know we can't count on ~~it~~, the Embassy. How can we be sure that any group can tell us the movement of the Japanese fleet or army?" We knew we could not.

General RUSSELL. In other words, the information which you have testified that you had from Japan about what was going on over there was rather general and indefinite in its nature?

General GRUNERT. Unless we know about that message the record will not be intelligible. Is it going to be copied into the record?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Your information about the activities in Japan in the fall [99] of 1941 was very indefinite and general?

General MILES. Necessarily so.

General RUSSELL. The message from Ambassador Grew in Japan to the Secretary of State for purposes of the record will be identified as a paraphrase of a telegram dated November 17, 1941, and it may be copied from page 788 of this White Paper entitled "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941."

(Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 17, 1941, is as follows:)

"The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

"(Telegram: Paraphrase)

"TOKYO, *November 17, 1941—1 p. m.*

"Received November 17—2:09 p. m.)

"1814. Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p. m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese theater of operations. I take into account the probability of the Japanese exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative. Accordingly you are advised of not placing the major responsibility in giving prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included, since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and secondary military information. We would not expect to obtain any information in advance either from personal Japanese contacts or through the press; the observation of [100] military movements is not possible by the few Americans remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe); and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese troop concentrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria and Formosa, while troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization have, according to all other indications available, been made with a view to enabling the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice either in the Pacific southwest or in Siberia or in both.

"We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned above and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. The Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore, you are advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much as possible the likelihood of our abillty to give substantial warning.

"GREW"

General RUSSELL. General Miles, referring to the statement which is contained in Ambassador Grew's message: "and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the [101] ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions."

As a matter of information, do you know why at that particular time there was an absence of American and foreign shipping in Japanese waters?

General MILES. No, sir. I do not remember knowing of any particular absence of American shipping from Japanese waters at that time. Of course we had had information for a great many years which had been considered in all of our war plans in Hawaii that there was a certain part of the Pacific Ocean that we called the "Vacant Sea" in which there are practically no ships and in which large movement of ships could occur without anybody seeing them. It was that part of the ocean between the great southern routes that go from Hawaii to the coast of Japan and China, and the northern great circle routes that go near the Aleutians.

General RUSSELL. The term which you used intrigues me. What was it you called it?

General MILES. I used to call it the "Vacant Sea."

General RUSSELL. As applied to that part of the Pacific adjacent to the mandated islands, would you say that they were in the area of the "Vacant Sea" or not?

General MILES. No, sir. The southern trade routes, as I remember, from Hawaii to Yokohama, we will say, pass considerably north of most of the mandated islands, such as the Marianas. All the seas surrounding the mandated islands were, as you know, extremely difficult for us to penetrate and get any information on for other reasons.

General RUSSELL. Why?

[*102*] General MILES. Because the Japanese would not allow us in there. You might sail through, but you would not see very much. That had existed for many years.

General RUSSELL. Was there any restriction on Americans landing on those islands that were mandated to the Japanese?

General MILES. Absolutely, sir.

General RUSSELL. Were Americans prohibited from landing in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Well, they did not say "Americans are prohibited," but Americans did not land. That was well known for years. No American warship went in there.

General FRANK. Do you know of any American port or any point over which the United States had jurisdiction that excluded Jap vessels or Japanese nationals?

General MILES. No, sir.

General RUSSELL. Do you know where there is any documentary evidence of the exclusion of Americans from the Japanese mandated islands?

General MILES. General, I would not know exactly where to put my hand on documentary evidence. It was one of the things perfectly well known to all of us in the Intelligence. I should think probably the Navy Department could aid you in that respect. I am pretty sure that the Navy Department several times tried to get ships in there.

General GRUNERT. As far as the so-called mandated islands are concerned, they were sort of a blind spot for our Military Intelligence, were they?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

[*103*] General RUSSELL. That is exactly what I was trying to find out.

How far are the Marshall Islands from Honolulu?

General MILES. My recollection is, about 1,600 miles. I would not swear to it.

General RUSSELL. General, were you acquainted with the plans for the defense of Pearl Harbor and the estimates in connection with the Japanese situation as to the probabilities of attack? Were all those things known to you at G–2?

General MILES. Rather intimately. I was G–3 of the Hawaiian Department from 1929 to 1931. I rewrote the war plan. I wrote the general staff study and estimate of the situation, which was the "bible" at that time and for some years. Then from 1934 to 1938 I was here in War Plans Division and was particularly charged with the three overseas departments, their projects and their plans. So, up to 1938, at least, and between 1929 and 1938, I was intimately acquainted with it.

General RUSSELL. In our brief study of the plan generally and the evidence just given by you, there was considerable emphasis placed on a probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne aircraft. During the year 1941 you were, of course, familiar with the estimate and the probabilities?

General MILES. Yes, sir.

General RUSSELL. Did it occur to you as G–2 from what port or ports these carriers might depart on a mission of that sort?

General MILES. They might have departed on a mission from a great many ports. We did not know really what bases they had in the mandated islands, and obviously they could have departed [*104*] from almost any port in Japan, such as Kobe or Yokohama.

General RUSSELL. You stated that you did not know what bases they had in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Very little information on bases in the mandated islands.

General RUSSELL. As I recall, they acquired jurisdiction, such as they had over the mandated islands, as a result of the settlement at the end of the other war in 1918?

General MILES. That is correct.

General RUSSELL. And in 1941 they had had approximately twenty years to develop their bases in the mandated islands, their ports and so forth. Was

there any information in G–2 in preparing ports and bases in any of the mandated islands?

General MILES. Very little, and very general information. We knew that they were developing certain places, such as Palau and Truk particularly, and we suspected Saipan. We relied very largely on information ~~in military and~~ from Naval Intelligence. Taken together it could not have been called any detailed or complete information of possible bases in the mandated islands.

General FRANK. Did you have anything on the Island of Jaluit?

General MILES. I do not remember what we had on Jaluit, but it was one of the islands that we used to discuss and suspect that they were developing.

General RUSSELL. General Miles, in the fall of 1941 did you in G–2 have sufficient data on Japanese developments in the mandated islands to predicate an intelligent opinion as to the [*105*] possibilities of launching convoys from there which might have included aircraft carriers?

General MILES. I would say that positively we knew enough to form an estimate that such a thing was a strong possibility, not a probability; that they had the means. That they would do it is another matter. They had the means to do it. I would say that our estimate at the time was that it was very possible, if not probable, that they did have those means.

General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the data on these developments on the mandated islands is a matter of record any place in the G–2 files?

General MILES. Oh, yes; we had files on them. We had maps and whatever we could get. The Office of Naval Intelligence had even more.

General RUSSELL. Did those maps show the developments, or just show where the islands were?

General MILES. So far as possible we made charts of the islands from one source or another and plotted on those charts, both Naval Intelligence and ours, where we thought they were developing, from what information we could get from traveling natives or missionaries or what have you.

General RUSSELL. I was asking you some questions a moment ago about the inhibition as to our going on those mandated islands. Were the inhibitions against going into the mandated islands only those of force or semi-force by the Japanese people who were there?

General MILES. That is what kept us away, General.

General RUSSELL. They just would not let you go in?

[*106*] General MILES. They just would not let us go in. They had one excuse or another. I don't remember just exactly what they were; but the net result was that mighty few people got into the mandated islands.

General RUSSELL. Did you attempt to send people from G–2 into the mandated islands in 1941?

General MILES. No, sir. I do not think any attempt had been made by G–2 for ten years. We knew we could not do it and get them out.

General RUSSELL. Were there any restrictions imposed on G–2 from higher authority about attempting to get in there and develop that situation in the mandated islands?

General MILES. Not specifically the mandated islands; no, sir.

General RUSSELL. But you did regard the geographic location of these mandated islands with respect to our naval base at Pearl Harbor as being rather material?

General MILES. Yes, I did, General; but, on the other hand, we knew perfectly well that Japan could attack the Hawaiian Islands without the use of the mandates. I remember very well writing one plan in which we developed the other side, based on a surprise attack launched from the mainland of Japan, with fast cruisers and carriers, carrying troops on their most rapid liners. We worked it up, just how they would take those liners off their routes for one reason or another—this one to be repaired, and so forth—and suddenly launch ~~this~~ an attack from the "Vacant Sea," ~~and~~ suddenly arrive in Honolulu. So the mandates were always a black shadow, but they were not [*107*] the only means of attacking Hawaii, and we it as far back as the early 1930's.

General RUSSELL. In those studies which were made by you, and others with which you may be familiar, did you ever consider steps which might be taken to discover in advance the mission and dispatch of these convoys to carry out that type of attack?

General MILES. We considered it, General, but, as Ambassador Grew says in that ~~famous~~ dispatch, "Don't rely on us from that point of view." ~~It was much more an~~ we attacked the problem from the other side.

General FRANK. What do you mean by that?

General MILES. I mean, from the Hawaiian side, particularly air reconnaissance and submarine reconnaissance [handwritten: by our own people in Hawaii] to detect any force coming in before it could actually attack. I recall particularly during all of General Drum's command out there in the middle 1930's that he was very much interested ~~and~~ in it. He was constantly sending in papers to War Plans, and they were coming to my desk, involving the possibility of a screen of large bombers which would cover the entire enormous perimeter containe~~d~~ing the ~~in those~~ five big Hawaiian islands. That was a current matter almost. Then, of course, the submarine screen was another matter that was constantly discussed. We had about twenty submarines out there in the middle 1930's.

But, to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was beyond our ~~terms~~ dreams of efficiency.

[*108*] General RUSSELL. Or even the mandated islands?

General MILES. Rather less in the mandated islands.

General RUSSELL. You had less chance there?

General MILES. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Would such a force moving from one of the mandated islands indicate where it was going? Would there be a clear indication that it was bound for Hawaii or elsewhere?

General MILES. It would be no indication at all where it was going, General.

(There was informal discussion off the record.)

General RUSSELL. The G–2 people in their studies had to all intents and purposes eliminated investigations in Japan proper and other Japanese territory to determine probable action on the part of the Japanese Army and Navy?

General MILES. Oh, no, sir. We had not eliminated it. As Mr. Grew says, it was the principal task of the Embassy, particularly of the military and naval part of the Embassy. What I say is just what Mr. Grew says, that we never dreamed that we could rely on getting that information. It would have been almost a military intelligence miracle had we been able to spot a task force in forming and have known before it sailed where it was going.

General RUSSELL. Now, general, if that be true, then the conclusion has been reached, so far as discovering task forces of any sort moving to the Hawaiian Islands, that the chief if not the sole reliance would have to be placed on reconnaissance agencies based on the islands or on United States possessions contiguous thereto?

[*109*] General MILES. Yes, and at sea. I mean, by submarine and air power.

General RUSSELL. Do you recall when the last estimate of the situation was sent out to the Hawaiian Department from G–2?

General FRANK. Prior to December 7?

General RUSSELL. Yes; prior to December 7, 1941.

General MILES. General, I do not know that any estimate of the situation, if you are using that term strictly, was sent. What we sent were those corrected sheets of the digest on Japan from time to time, whenever we got the information, and copies of the bi-weekly summary. The estimate of the situation is for the information of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. G–2 is the G–2 of the General Staff. I am bringing up that point because I had to be very careful, and I think all G–2s of the General Staff have to be very careful. ~~Th t~~ the information you give your Chief is something which he must pass on from the command point of view. If that information is habitually sent out to the various overseas departments particularly, you run into the serious danger of telling the Lieutenant General commanding the Hawaiian Department, we will say, something that G–2 thinks which the Chief of Staff does not concur in, and forcing his hand or inducing him to take some action in which the Chief of Staff does not concur. In other words, you must be careful to keep out of the command channel. So you give your information, your summary, your estimate of the situation, to your Chief, and action must flow from the Chief through the command channels; and G–2 is not in the command channels.

[*110*] General GRUNERT. Insofar as action is concerned on the information that is passed to the subordinate command, is that action then passed back through G–2, or does G–2 prepare it for the Chief of Staff insofar as it pertains to information?

General MILES. I do not know that I have your question clearly.

General GRUNERT. You have gotten information from various sources which influenced you to make an estimate of the situation, which you passed to the Chief of Staff. Now, there are parts of that information, if true, that certain command channels in the Philippines or Hawaii should get. Who insures that they get that information?

General MILES. As a routine matter, G–2 insures it. In other words, all information that pertained directly to the Hawaiian Department or to the Philippine Department that G–2 received, it insured that G–2 in that Department got it. That is exclusive, however, of any deductions in a very broad sense that G–2 of the War Department might draw ~~which~~ would induce action. The latter, in other words, ~~is~~ a command proposition.

General GRUNERT. In other words, you give them the information, but you do not analyze it; or do you?

General MILES. Ordinarily you do not analyze it for them.

General FRANK. You gave information and interpretation only through command channels?

General MILES. Interpretation would certainly go only through command channels.

General GRUNERT. Any warning, then, should come from command channels rather than from G–2?

[*111*] General MILES. If it is warning that probably would result in action, yes, most definitely.

General RUSSELL. Your G–2 sent a message on November 27 out to G–2 of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. Yes; to all departments, as I remember.

General RUSSELL. Now, a few specific questions, General Miles, and I will be through:

On October 27, 1941, Brink reported to your office that there were two aircraft carriers that had been operating among the mandated islands, of which Kaga was one. Was Brink one of your operators?

General MILES. How is the name spelled?

General RUSSELL. B-r-i-n-k.

General GRUNERT. Was there not a Colonel Brink for a time in Singapore, and then he went to the Philippines?

General MILES. Yes; that was the man, I think.

General RUSSELL. This was sent from the Philippines?

General MILES. Yes.

General GRUNERT. He was one of the staff in the office of the A. C. of S., G–2, Philippine Department, and on my recommendation he was sent to Singapore to be directly under the War Department there. That is why I recall a man named Brink.

General RUSSELL. Do you have any recollection about that type of Japanese aircraft carrier being in the mandated islands? Do you have any independent recollection on that subject?

General MILES. I remember that the Japanese carriers were reported in the mandated islands, but I would not be able to [*112*] pin it down to any particular source.

General RUSSELL. Would it be about that time?

General MILES. It was about that time.

General RUSSELL. In the records some place we have discovered evidence of a photographic mission by aircraft down into the mandated islands in late November or early December of 1941. Do you have any independent recollection of that activity on our part?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not know we sent one.

General RUSSELL. You were in touch in a general way with the Navy at that time in obtaining information from them?

General MILES. I was intimately in touch with the Office of Naval Intelligence.

General RUSSELL. What did you know from the Navy about the location and disposition of the Japanese fleet in late November and early December? Do you remember?

General MILES. My recollection is that the Navy had information of carriers in the mandates, and definitely of a movement of naval vessels and transports, they thought, south through the China Sea in the direction of Indo China and Thailand.

General RUSSELL. What was your impression as to the knowledge which the Navy had generally during the last six months before the attack on Pearl

Harbor of the location of the Jap Navy and various types of craft that were in their Navy?

General MILES. Their information was very general and incomplete.

General RUSSELL. General, when in your opinion did it [113] become apparent that war with Japan was inevitable?

General MILES. On the 27th of November, when we learned that we had practically given what might be considered or probably would be considered by them an ultimatum from then on I considered war as very probable if not ultimately inevitable.

General RUSSELL. That was based almost exclusively on the negotiations between the Japanese who were in Washington negotiating with our State Department?

General MILES. Primarily on that. It was a build-up.

General RUSSELL. In the message of November 27, which I will not discuss with you in any great detail, there was a statemnt that negotiations had practically ended. I am not quoting, but it said substantially that—although there was a bare possibility that the Japanese might come back for further negotiations. Do you remember that?

General MILES. That was in General Marshall's dispatch?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

General MILES. I do not remember that; no.

General RUSSELL. Let us assume that they did come back after November 27 and continued negotiations: Would that have affected your conclusions about the inevitability of war?

General MILES. Oh, yes.

General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, they were back on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th of December, were they not?

General MILES. The Japanese reply was not back, sir.

General RUSSELL. I mean, the Japs came back and negotiated.

[114] General MILES. Oh, they continued to stay here and talk, but ~~that~~ it all hinged, to my mind, on the reply or the position taken by the Japanese Government as a result of ~~our~~ the U. S. paper on the 26th of November, I think it was, ~~it,~~ which was considered practically an ultimatum.

General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

General GRUNERT. I have a few questions.

General MILES. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer ~~there.~~ ~~I did~~ regarding inevitable war. I do not want to give the impression that I thought on November 27th that war was immediately inevitable. I thought that, very definitely, ~~an~~ some action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken almost at once; but that + need not necessarily ~~would~~ be an overt and open attack on the United States. I didn't feel at all sure that war with Japan was ~~practically~~ immediately inevitable any time. ~~But~~ There were a good many things Japan could have done, if she ~~did break those~~ broke her negotiations in Washington short of open war with the United States, and we were considering all of those ~~matters~~ possibilities.

General RUSSELL. That suggests one other question: Did you know that there had been established by reference to the degrees of latitude and longitude lines beyond which, if Japan went with armed force out in the Pacific, the British, Dutch, and Americans would regard that as an act of war?

General MILES. Yes.

General RUSSELL. Then you knew as G–2 that if certain things occurred, we, in association with those powers, might attack?

General MILES. Yes; certainly.

[115] General FRANK. You said you were not prevented specifically by higher authority from attempting to get information regarding the Japanese mandated islands. Was there any general prohibition in this regard? Was there a general attitude of "hands off"?

General MILES. Not specifically affecting the mandated islands. It was simply a question of whether you wanted to send a man to his almost certain death or not, and whether the information you expected to get out of it would be worth that risk. But there was no general or specific prohibition against my sending a man into the mandated islands if I could get him there. But I did not think I could get him in there and get him back alive, or get information from him while there.

General GRUNERT. Was there or was there not a fear on the part of all concerned that doing so and being picked up after having done so would offend the Japanese?

General MILES. Oh, it most certainly would. We would have had to disavow it and swear that we never sent him, and so forth. That is an old part of the game.

General FRANK. On November 27 there went out a message from G–2 of the War Department, which was your organization, saying:

"Advise only Commanding General and Chief of Staff that it appears that conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin."

Do you remember that message?

General MILES. Very well.

[*116*] General FRANK. You are familiar with the war plan as it applied to Honolulu, the Standing Operating Procedure?

General MILES. Yes; in a general way.

General FRANK. Did not the provisions of that war plan and the Standing Operating Procedure provide for this defense against sabotage?

General MILES. Yes; it provided against all forms of attack, including sabotage.

General FRANK. Why, then, was sabotage especially emphasized in that message?

General MILES. I will be very glad to answer that question, General, but my answer must be somewhat long.

In the summer of 1939 the President issued a directive to all bureaus and offices of the Government to keep out of antisabatoge and antiespionage work, except three that were to do it all, F. B. I., O. N. I. and M. I. D. After I took M. I. D. in May of 1940, I began to build up the counter-intelligence part of it. I drafted a written agreement with F. B. I. and O. N. I. delimiting our responsibilities under the President's directive. It was then countersigned by the three Cabinet Ministers concerned. Then I drew up a counter-subversive system for the Army, and later a counter-~~intelligence~~ fifth-column plan, the first one we ever had. I met certain opposition among my colleagues, the other Assistant Chiefs of Staff and I am relating this only to point out that by the summer of 1941 I had gotten myself in a position where it was definitely established that counter-subversive activity of all kinds was G–2's responsibility and solely G–2's responsibility. I shared the [*117*] responsibility for measures against an ~~effort~~ overt to attack by a possible enemy with Operations and with War Plans, because I was supposed to give the information on which their orders were based. But I shared with nobody the responsibility for counter-subversive measures, and therefore, when I found on the 27th of November that nothing was specifically said about sabotage in General Marshall's dispatch of that date, the war warning order, I felt it necessary to warn the G–2's, not only of the overseas departments ~~and later~~ but particularly those in this country. It was ~~but~~ sent it to all of the corps area G–2s, because we knew the build-up in this country very well. The F. B. I., the O. N. I., and my people were very worried about what could be done in this country, particularly to the Air Force. General Arnold was very much worried ~~and that~~ He broke loose the next day and occasioned the further dispatch of November 28.

So that was the reason for the emphasis. The policy had already been laid down by General Marshall's telegram of the 27th. So I was simply backing up the policy of the Chief of Staff and emphasizing the form of attack for which I was most directly responsible ~~at~~ as G–2, [handwritten:] and reiterating the possibility of open hostilities.

GENERAL FRANK. In the beginning of General Russell's questions you gave an answer to the effect that as a result of your background and experience you had felt a strong probability of an air raid or air attack on Honolulu. Is that correct?

General MILES. That was one of the methods of attack to which we were most vulnerable.

General FRANK. At this time, we will say, December 1, 1941, what was your attitude as to the probability of such an [*118*] air attack?

General MILES. If the Japs attack openly at all, and if their attack was made on Hawaii, I think I would have said on December 1, 1941, that an air attack on the Pearl Harbor installations and the fleet (although I did not actually know the ships were there in Pearl Harbor) was one of the most probable movements that the Japs would take.

General FRANK. Since you went out of your way to caution them about sabotage, why did you not likewise go out of your way to caution them about the probability of an air attack?

General MILES. Because, General, all that had been covered in General Marshall's dispatch in which he specifically ordered such necessary reconnaissances—I remember the use of that word—to protect the Hawaiian Department against attack. And that was the only way—that, and of course radar—that such an attack could have been countered. My message also warned of possibile hostilities.

General FRANK. You knew that the following day General Arnold sent a message with respect to sabotage?

General MILES. Yes, indeed.

General FRANK. Did the logic ever occur to you that as a result of emphasizing sabotage in a series of messages it might have the result of de-emphasizing something else?

General MILES. That had occurred to me. I very strongly objected to General Arnold's message on the basis, among other things, that I did not want to overemphasize sabotage and that I had already sent the day before a sufficient message to cover the question of sabotage.

General FRANK. As hindsight, of course, and considering [*119*] the fact that provisions for all of these defenses were covered in the war plans and other documents, would not the following message have sufficed:

"War imminent. Act accordingly."?

General MILES. For me to send?

General FRANK. No; for the War Department to have sent. That would not have emphasized nor de-emphasized anything, would it?

General MILES. I would prefer not to pass upon the Chief of Staff's wording in his message of November 27.

General FRANK. There were six messages sent between November 16th and 28th. Four of them cautioned against provoking the Japs; three of them emphasized sabotage. Now, with respect to caution against provoking the Japs: while we were leaning over backward as a result of these cautions, what was the attitude of the Japanese, relatively speaking?

General MILES. Their attitude where, General? Here in Washington, in the negotiations?

General FRANK. All over the world. Were they as particular about preventing any suspicion on our part as we were particular about trying to prevent any provocation on their part?

General MILES. Oh, no. They had been provocative for a great many years, particularly since they began their attack on China.

General FRANK. Will you develop that in just a few words?

General MILES. I should say that the Japanese attack in Manchuria and later in China, which, after all, was the basis [*120*] of our diplomatic negotiations here in Washington in 1941 ~~was~~ the basic cause of it, was the beginning of a very provocative attitude on the part of the Japanese.

General FRANK. What I am after is this: There was little or no attempt on the Japanese side to keep from provoking us, where as there was every effort on the part of the Americans to keep from provoking the Japanese; is that correct?

General MILES. I should say as a general statement that that is very accurate, sir.

General FRANK. I asked that of you because you should have information on that as the War Department G–2 at that time.

General MILES. Yes, sir; but I think it was very general information that at Shanghai and all through the Peiping episode, they had been very provocative, as we all knew; and it was the policy of our Government not to provoke war; to take a firm stand in a certain way, as you know, but not to provoke war with Japan. At least, so we read it.

General FRANK. Do you think that we were leaning over backwards in that attitude?

General MILES. That is a very difficult question to answer, General. I simply say that our policy was to avoid any unnecessary provocative action.

[*121*] General FRANK. You said you objected to General Arnold's message. To whom?

General MILES. To General Arnold, in the first place, and later, to General Scanlon. It was quite a long discussion, as I remember it.

General FRANK. What were the circumstances under which your objection was finally overcome and the message sent?

General MILES. It had to go to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden. General Marshall was away. General Bryden did not want to decide it, either, very much. I objected strongly and was backed up by General Gerow. ~~and~~ Our objections were on this line: (1) ~~this~~ an antisabotage message had gone out; (2) ~~that a~~ the proposed message should not go to the air forces alone, but if sent at all, should go to the Commanding Generals for their air forces and for everybody else; and (3) ~~that~~ the message as originally drawn was very drastic. As you know very well, at that time, the Air Force had a lot of young men in command of fields and so forth, and a very drastic order, from General Arnold, particularly, to ~~cargo~~ protect planes and so forth, might very well have resulted in somebody's being shot.

I would also like to say, here, that General Arnold's message was primarily addressed to the continental United States; he was thinking about that. What started him was the fact about seven planes arrived at one of your western fields—I think at Salt Lake—all with the same trouble, and from different depots, and he thought there was some real sabotage going on in this country. But, to go on with the story, we finally had to take it to the Deputy Chief of Staff, late that afternoon of the 28th. I don't think it was decided until [*122*] about six o'clock. General Scanlon was present, presenting the Air side, and I think, General Gerow and General Gullion, Provost Marshal General and General Bryden finally decided that it would be sent in modified form; that is, not directing such drastic action ~~to be taken~~ against anybody who might climb over a fence; and that it would be sent to the Commanding Generals, and that the Air Corps might also, if they desired, send it direct under General Arnold's name to the Air Force, to the Air Commanders concerned: ~~and~~ that was the final decision.

General FRANK. Now, another question that I am asking because G–2 might have drawn a conclusion on it: What was the attitude of the public toward the possibility of war at that time? Can you answer that?

General MILES. I can only give you my impression, that they were not nearly as much worried about it as they should have been. After all, it was only a few months ~~past~~ since we had saved the Army by one vote in the House of Representatives. You remember, I think it was in October 1941 that that vote was taken, and we just barely saved the Army at that time.

General FRANK. What do you mean, "saved the Army"?

General MILES. Well, you remember there was a bill, sir, to send back all the men that had been drafted, put them back on the reserve, or something like that.

General RUSSELL. A bill to demobilize the National Guard.

General MILES. To demobilize the National Guard and send the draftees back. The War Department was extremely worried about it.

General FRANK. Aside from the people "top side" in the Army, can you give me an expression of what the attitude in the [*123*] Army was with respect to the possibility of war?

General MILES. Not accurately. I attended the North Carolina maneuvers, ~~that November, preceding November,~~ early preceding November, and I don't remember to have heard the matter discussed. The Army in those days, as you well remember, we all remember, was intensely busy in building itself and training and maneuvering and so forth. I would not say the Army as a whole were much concerned as to where war was going to break if they could get their troops ready before the break.

General FRANK. Do you think they felt that war was on the horizon?

General MILES. The Army?

General FRANK. Yes.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

General FRANK. All right.

General MILES. Not necessarily with Japan, but war was on the horizon.

General FRANK. Did you know that there was a Japanese striking force consisting of several carriers and a couple of battleships and a submarine force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, about the 1st of December?

General MILES. I knew that such a force had been reported about there, and about that time.

General FRANK. Was that information given to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. I don't know, sir. I do not remember.

General FRANK. Have you any way of determining that?

General MILES. The records of the Military Intelligence Department undoubtedly will disclose it.

[*124*] General FRANK. If it were given?

General MILES. Yes, if it were given. I feel very sure that in one form or another he was informed of that report. I say "in one form or another" because one form might very well have been through Navy and Fleet.

General FRANK. Information on the situation surrounding the Hawaiian Islands, you stated some time back, information as to the presence of hostile activity in the waters, would mainly be obtained through submarine reconnaissance and air reconnaissance?

General MILES. That is correct—and radar.

General FRANK. And radar? Since the Navy is the only Department that has submarines, and since also in the plan for air reconnaissance at Honolulu they were responsible for distant reconnaissance, it would appear then that it was the responsibility of the Navy to keep both the Army and the Navy in Honolulu advised and to provide protection against any kind of attack so far as reconnaissance could provide that, is that correct?

General MILES. So far as distance reconnaissance is concerned, they alone had the means of carrying it out.

General FRANK. That is all I have.

General GRUNERT. I want you to explain once more so I can get it clear in mind about the dissemination of information gathered by G-2, of the War Department, so I will put it in various questions. You get information from the State Department, ONI, your own sources, and whatever other sources might become available to you. Now, when you get this information, who judges whether or not particular parts of that information [*125*] are of value and should be transmitted, for instance, to the Commanding General of Hawaii?

General MILES. The first people who pass on it are the members of the section, the Geographical Section, which includes the country about which we have that information—the Japanese, we will say. Information would pass first through the Far Eastern Section, I think it was called at that time, under Colonel Bratton, of the Intelligence Subdivision of the Military Intelligence. ~~That~~ It would then go to the Intelligence Division, itself, which collated all positive intelligence, dealt with all positive intelligence as distinguished from counter-intelligence, the negative side, and would then be sent out.

If it was simply routine, the Chief in the Military Intelligence Division, G–2, would simply see it passing over his desk. If there were any question about it, it would be brought up through normal channels to the executive officer, who, if he did not feel competent to decide it, would take it up with G–2 ~~men and~~ himself. That was the method.

General GRUNERT. If you were disseminating it, then, to the various commands, or any particular command, would it then pass directly from G–2 to such Commander, and in what form?

General MILES. The normal form would be these semiweekly summaries. ~~I mean~~ That would be the routine. ~~Then any~~ Any particular information of particular importance would be telegraphed out to those agencies concerned with that particular bit of information; in the case of Japan, to (certainly) the Philippines, to Hawaii, to Panama, to the West Coast, possibly and so forth right to our military attache ~~at~~ in China and to the G–2 of the ~~foriegn departments, or the~~ corps areas.

[*126*] General GRUNERT. But when you make an estimate of the situation, that then goes to be processed through War Plans Division, to the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. Yes.

General GRUNERT. Now, if there is any information to be passed out on that estimate, it then must be authorized for you to pass it out, or for them to pass it out directly to those concerned, is that right?

General MILES. Yes. It becomes more than information, then; it becomes an opinion of the War Department, a communication of the Chief of Staff.

General GRUNERT. All right. Now, the next question I have is one on which we will have to go back to the sabotage message. Was that sabotage message of November 27 O. K.'d by WPD, or the Chief of Staff, or whom? Or was it necessary to have that O. K.'d? Did you send it out directly to the G–2?

General MILES. It was not necessary for the Chief of Staff or his office to pass on it, since it simply carried out a policy already established by the previous

messages of the same date from General Marshall. I do remember, however, consulting, as I almost always did, War Plans, as they consulted me on messages, and I think it was General Gerow who suggested that I add to the message that the G–2s were ~~was~~ to inform their Commanding Generals and the Chiefs of Staff only.

General GRUNERT. Did G–2 do its utmost to inform, by contact with the various agencies made available, so as to best advise the Chief of Staff and keep subordinate commands informed, and so that they could carry out their mission?

General MILES. I did not hear the first of your question, [127] relative to the G–2.

General GRUNERT. Did G–2 do its utmost, so far as you could judge, to carry out its mission, in informing the Chief of Staff of everything they had got, making estimates, and passing down information they thought was pertinent?

General MILES. The answer to that is Yes.

General GRUNERT. Naturally. I wanted to put it in the record.

General MILES. I might add, if I may, that we wrote so much that we got certain complaints—complaints that nobody could read all the stuff we turned out. We certainly tried to do whatever we could.

General GRUNERT. Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or "fed up"?

General MILES. That could have been, sir.

General GRUNERT. Do you think that the G–2 message—we call it "the G–2 message," of November 27—and the sabotage message—we call that the "Arnold message," of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's signature—did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the Command "down below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of November 27?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message of November 27 was a war-warning message, in my mind, all inclusive so far as different forms of attack or dangers [128] might be considered, and my message of the same date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G–2, who was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department, to that particular form of danger.

General GRUNERT. There was no report from the recipients required?

General MILES. There were no report required.

General GRUNERT. That is, to your message.

General MILES. No answer to my message, of the 27th.

General GRUNERT. No answer? But there was a report required by the Chief of Staff's message of November 27?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

General GRUNERT. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department made his report to the Chief of Staff, presumably on the Chief of Staff's message of November 27. Therein, he reported just the measures taken as to sabotage. Did you see that report?

General MILES. I did not see that message—that answer—until after Pearl Harbor.

General GRUNERT. I do not think of anything else. Does anybody else think of anything else?

General FRANK. When General Grunert just asked you about the possibility of confusing those messages on sabotage, you replied from the point of view of the man at this end. Now, consider yourself for a moment as the man at the receiving end of those messages, not knowing who prepared them, nor anything about their source, but from the point of view of their coming from the War Department, and considering that as a single source: under those conditions, might it or might it not have been a [129] little confusing?

General MILES. It might have been, but I think the first message was signed "Marshall."

General FRANK. That is right.

General MILES. That would be my answer.

General FRANK. Now, the next question is: I asked you, in my questions a few minutes ago, as to whether or not you had sent any message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with respect to the presence in the Marshall Islands of this Japanese force. We have, we think, all the communications that went from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department,

from the 16th of November until December 7. This Japanese force was not in the vicinity of Jaluit until about the 25th. In view of the critical stage of the situation, it would seem that that information was rather vital, as there is no record of its having been communicated. Is there any explanation of that?

General MILES. I wouldn't know what the explanation was, if it wasn't communicated. If we had known at the time, as we probably did, that that information, coming from Navy, was being transmitted to the Fleet in Hawaii, to all of their naval vessels, it might very well have been that we considered that as sufficient, knowing that the two Intelligence branches, Army and Navy, were working in very close cooperation, we thought, everywhere—in Hawaii and the West Coast and in the Philippines, and so forth.

I am a little worried about that message, because I was told, this morning, by Military Intelligence, that there are numbered gaps in their files today, and they do not know where [*130*] those messages are. We hope you have them, but they do not know.

General RUSSELL. We didn't get them from G–2.

General MILES. How?

General RUSSELL. We haven't gotten anything from G–2.

General FRANK. In the Roberts Commission interrogation of Colonel Fielder, who was G–2 in the Hawaiian Department——

General MILES. Yes, G–2.

General FRANK. He discloses that he was not, prior to December 7, getting this information from the Navy, in Honolulu. He was not getting it.

General MILES. He should have, of course.

General FRANK. That is all.

General GRUNERT. One final question. In your experience as Staff Officer and as a Commander in the field, outside the War Department, would a message signed by Marshall carry more weight with you than one signed by the Adjutant General, or one signed by a Staff Officer?

General MILES. Very much more weight, General, particularly when it begins with some such phrase as "This is a war-warning message."

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?

General RUSSELL. What message did he ever send, beginning that way, General Miles?

General MILES. My impressions of the message of November 27, but I haven't it before me.

General GRUNERT. There was one starting out that way, but it happened to be a Navy message. This particular message from the Chief of Staff did not start out that way, [*131*] according to the record.

General RUSSELL. Who was Creswell?

General MILES. Creswell? He was Military Attache in Japan.

General RUSSELL. I want to go back to my Mandated Islands for a minute, General, because you have excited me a little bit. I want to get some description of those islands. Referring to the Marshall Islands, where these carriers are supposed to have assembled, that attacked, is there anybody on those islands except Japanese?

General MILES. Some natives there, I believe—a few, there.

General RUSSELL. Are there towns and roads and those sorts of things there?

General MILES. The only so-called "civilized people" are the Japanese, there, and the others are natives of the Islands. They don't live in towns, very much, I imagine. My information about the Mandated Islands is very slim, now, particularly now——

General RUSSELL. There is no secret at all about the questions that I am asking, and what I am attempting to develop for my own satisfaction, in arriving at what happened at Pearl Harbor. They had everything on us, yet they sailed up and attacked us, and apparently today G–2 doesn't know where they came from, or how many there were, or where they went to. We have not been able so far to get any very intelligent information on what these convoys were like, if there were more than one. Do you have any ideas about that, the size of the attacking forces?

General MILES. Prior to the attack?

General RUSSELL. No, since the attack. Have you gotten [*132*] informamation that led you to know how strong these convoys were that came in there, launching this attack?

General MILES. We have only general information, largely from Naval Intelligence. The ships supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those two very large carriers of theirs, supported by probably some of their older battleships of the KONGO class—their four old battle cruisers; but I have no definite information.

General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

General GRUNERT. Thank you, very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.)

EXHIBIT No. 5

CONFIDENTIAL

[Exact Copy Action Copy Radiogram]

EHB/bjs-1712
SEPTEMBER 29, 1941.

AG 383.4 (9-29-41) MC
From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General.

* * * * * * *

No. 420. September 29th.

For G-2. Reurad 114 tenth September Nineteen Forty One Re Natzi agents aboard army transports. Investigation revealed that subject Wilhelm Brandeis was not a member of the crew of USAT President Coolidge nor was Joseph Ryan aboard USAT President Cleveland.

SHORT.

[Radiogram]

SEPT. 23, 1941.
704 a. m.

105 WTJ
DJ
FLD 1205P 22nd
From: Ft. Shafter T. H.
To: G Two

No. 379 September 22nd.

Request authority to reproduce and distribute to certain G two and S two officers in this department confidential document subject protection electric utility property issued by the Federal Power Commission Washington January twentieth nineteen forty one received as inclosure to your letter G two dash ten three thirteen dash one six three March twentieth. Fielder

SHORT.

CI/G2
CWC

MID 350.05 Safeguarding

SEPTEMBER 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Subject: Security of information pertaining to movements of ships and aircraft.

The Secretary of War Directs:

1. That a Confidential radiogram substantially as follows be sent to the Commanding Generals of all Departments and Defense Commands:

Effective immediately all radio or cable traffic pertaining to movement of vessels and aircraft to or from the overseas bases comma department or defense commands will be classified as confidential.

2. That notification to this effect, for information and compliance, be given general distribution, including General Headquarters, the Chief of the Army Air Force, and the commanding officers of outlying bases.

SHERMAN MILES.

Memorandum for record: Certain overseas bases have made inquiries by radio of cable messages sent in the clear about personnel, material and docking time of transports, and the Navy has protested this.

Drafting Section: C. I. P.
Drafting Officer: Hugh D. Wise, Jr.
G-2 File Number:

Paraphrase of an outgoing
X Radiogram
Cablegram

Secret
X Confidential
Restricted

No. 128 Sent 9-13-41 LW
Date: September 13, 1941.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Present strength of Corps of Intelligence Police in your department is requested by radio.
Mailed G/2 W. D. G. S. Sep. 13, 1941.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (G-2) GENERAL STAFF

9-13-41

From: To:
The A. C. of S., G-2
Executive Officer, G-2
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
Finance Section
Personnel Section
Chief Clerk
Record Section
Translation Section
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
LIAISON BRANCH
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH
C. I. P.
PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-1
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-3
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-4
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WPD
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH, DCofS
BUDGET & LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER
W. D. MAP COLLECTION
For:
Necessary action
Preparation of reply
Recommendation or remark
As a matter of primary interest
Previous correspondence
Note and return
Information
Mail
File
Noted

G2/CI
WAT

Sent #114, 9/10/41
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.
Following men reported to be crew members of Army transports and Nazi agents Joseph Ryan present Cleveland due Honolulu September twenty first and Wilhelm Brandeis President Coolidge due Honolulu September thirteenth.
MILES.

Drafting Section: Administrative
G2/I
Drafting Officer: MWP
MWP
G-2 File number:

Paraphrase of an outgoing

Secret xx
Radiogram xx
Confidential
Cablegram
Restricted

No. 75-Sent Aug. 29-41
Date: August 29, 1941.

To: G-2 Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory Hawaii.

Colonel Field of the British Army will pass through Honolulu aboard the Klip Fontein about September fifth. Desire you meet him personally and hold full and free discussion on all intelligence matters.

Record Section copy

AUGUST 18, 1941.

Memorandum for The Adjutant General:
Subject: Radiogram

The Secretary of War directs that a radiogram, substantially as follows, be sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

Reurad fifteenth requesting War Department Maps Eastern Europe comma these maps not produced and are sending you mail necessary sheets International Map of World together with other miscellaneous map coverage period

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Received Aug. 19, 1941. Miscl. Div. A. G. O.
Action taken: Radio to CG Haw Dept. 8-19-41. GHB

[Exact copy—action copy—radiogram]

AG 336.3 Japan (7-9-41) MC Received at the War Department
74 WTJ AE 124P
July 10, 1941 7:34 A. M.
From: Manila
To: TAG

No. 1337, July 9th.

Further remarks for G-2 reference our radio one three zero one are that Mexico Maru small Philippine-Japan run freighter due Manila July 25th has been cancelled and commandeered. Kokkai Maru ten thousand ton on New York-Philippine run due Manila about August first has also been cancelled and commandeered. Ganges Maru now enroute to Manila not yet affected. Signed O'Rear

GRUNERT.

[Paraphrase]

AG 600.12 (7-1-41) MC-D EHB/sm—1712
To: CG, Hawaiian Dept.
From: TAG
JULY 9, 1941

Consideration being given projects for Wheeler Field, Hickam Field, and Hawaiian Air Depot from FY 1942 funds by Chief of Air Corps. The Quartermaster General has been directed to expend $104,202 from available funds for anti-sabotage protection. Correspondence now en route advising you of action. Above Reurad thirty one seventy three.

Copy For: Chief of the Air Corps
The Quartermaster General
A. C. of S., G-2
Chief of Engineers

[Radiogram]

74WTJ AE

JULY 30, 1941
3:44 AM

From: Hawaii
To: War Department
No. 3419, July 29th.

For A C of S G–2 reliable information concerning Japanese forces in Manchuria as follows. Ten divisions of a total strength of two hundred forty two thousand men. These are the eight divisions which are given in latest British military intelligence order of battle; with the twelfth and twenty fifth repeat twelfth and twenty fifth in addition. Eight Frontier Garrison units of a total strength about twenty two thousand six hundred. Six independent garrisons units of total strength about thirty eight thousand. Total strength approximately three hundred thousand repeat three hundred thousand. The weapon equipment of Four Regiment Divisions is given as seven thousand six hundred eighty six rifles, five hundred seventy six trench mortars and infantry support guns. Three hundred ninety six heavy and light machine guns. Ninety two field guns and howitzers. Same source reports that German accounts in South America steadily being transferred to Japanese custody. It is freely predicted Germany will ask Japan to blockade Vladivostok to prevent essential supplies reaching Russia.

SHORT.

[Cablegram]

LAS
WUWA 3

July 29, 1941.
8:33AM

From: Tokyo
To: MILID
No. 508, July 29th.

After period during which no reservations from Japan in any direction procurable NYK today confirmed reservation *Nitta* sailing August 7th arriving Honolulu about August 15th. Since restriction travel south and west may be unduly prolonged strongly recommend Pape avail himself this opportunity and that clipper reservation Honolulu Singapore be arranged. Request prompt reply as reservations in great demand.

CRESWELL.

[Exact copy—action copy—radiogram]

AG 380.3 (6–26–41) MC
159 WTJ
AE
616P

Received at the War Department June 28, 1941, 2:00 PM.

From: Manila.
To: TAG.
No. 1236, June 26th.

Twenty five thousand Japanese Troops received parachute training in China and Japan of this number fifteen hundred in Canton Army according to British report evaluation questionable. Three Japanese convoys last reported headed south believed to have gone to Pescazores and Formosa. Typhoon reported east Manila lends credibility to above. For G–2. Signed OREAR.

GRUNERT.

[Exact copy—action copy—radiogram]

AG 380.3 (6-25-41) MC
21 WTJ
AE
620P
Received at the War Department, June 26, 1941, 8:00 AM.
From: Manila
To: TAG
No. 1225, June 25th.

Following is paraphrase of cable from Brink. For G-2. On 19th and 20th of June British Commander in Chief Far East and the Director of Operations of Chinese Air Force (General Mow) discussed plans for cooperation in the event of Japanese operations against the British. British plan to use following Chinese airfields as bases from which to attack Japanese sea communications, land troops, and Japanese bases on Hainan Island and in French Indo China in the event of Japanese attack against Malaya or Hongkong: Nanning 23 degrees zero minutes north 108 degrees 30 minutes east: Liuchow 24 degrees 20 minutes north 109 degrees 20 minutes east: Kweilin 25 degrees 20 minutes north 110 degrees 10 minutes east: Chihkiang 27 degrees 30 minutes north 109 degrees 40 minutes east: Hemagyang 27 degrees zero minutes north 112 degrees 30 minutes east. Chinese agree to stock these airfields now with gasoline and bombs. Chinese suggest that the British use airfields in the following area from which to make direct raids on Formosa and the Japanese mainland: Wenchow-Chuchowfu-Kienowhs.

British intend to encourage Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the following general areas: Ichang-Kingchow-Hanlu; Siagtanhs-Changsha-Yowchow; Nanchang-Haohcow-Kiukiang; Soochow-Changshow-Taiping; Canton-Kongmoon-China Sea-Shamchung. Agreements for mutual cooperation will be arranged the 1st week in July at a meeting between British and Chinese staffs in Burma. Signed Orear.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

2WVY
519P
BVC

JUNE 6, 1941.
1030Z
From: Tokyo.
To: The Adjutant General.
No. 482, June 6, 1941.

Investigations among Japanese Russian and others nationals fails to reveal any information either positive or negative regarding your number 492. Efforts will be continued.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

(JTP)
152WTJ

MAY 3, 1941.
9:22AM

From: Tokyo.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Tokyo No. 467, May 2, 1941.

Under the provisions of Article 20 Tripartite pact military missions known to have left Japan for Germany and Italy though no first hand information this office relative arrival Japan similar missions from those countries. At present no move discernible which might be considered preparatory to military action as provided by Article three although frequent rumors refer Japanese strength Formosa Hainan Indo-China greater than normal under China war conditions and held in readiness move against Dutch East Indies Singapore. Increase of Japanese Naval and Air force Saigon likewise rumored. This office not in position to confirm or refute such reports. No unusual mission movements observed

Japan distinguishable from normal movements connected operations China although such moves would be carefully hidden and difficult to follow after leaving Japan. Attention is invited to recent State Department dispatch concerning transit

(Sheet Two Tokyo, No. 467, May 2, 1941)

of German aircraft, artillery and other military supplies via Trans-Siberian railway to Japan.

Instead of daily report required by your No. 505 suggest immediate report any information obtained since without change present international political and military situation many such reports will be negative.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

14 WTJ ae

MAY 3, 1941.
9:22 AM

From: Manila.
To: Asst. Chief of Staff.
No. 915, May 3, 1941.

Telegraphic summary of report of Singapore conference sent by radio to British Ambassador Washington by conference chairman. If urgent suggest you consult that summary. Copy of report with my comments going forward by clipper naval courier to Washington scheduled to leave May eighth.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

LW
104 WTJ

APRIL 26, 1941.
7:11 AM

From: Manila.
To: The Adjutant General.
Manila No. 881. April 26th.

Reliably informed German Ambassador to Japan has requested that Japanese shipping lines facilitate the evacuation of German Nationals from Philippines. For G–2. And that Kokusai Kisen Kaisha office in Manila has been so advised. Signed O'Rear.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

(RRR)
53–WVY

MARCH 21, 1941.
6:06 PM

From: Manila, P. I.
To: The Adjutant General.
No. 662 March 21st.
For G–2

Exaggerated account of visit of Japanese fishing boat to Itbayat Island on March 12 apparently has been given press distribution. Actually fishing boat *Dichi Maru* anchored at Mauyen Itbayat Island took on supplies of cocoanuts and fruit and some stores and departed. Carried Japanese flag engraved on both sides and was equipped with radio apparatus, fishing nets, and one life boat. This incident is normal and is without importance. Signed O'Rear.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

BFS
22 WVY

MARCH 13, 1941.
3:42 PM

From: Tokyo via Manila
To: MILID
Number 459. March 13th.

Japanese in position to know definitely states parachute training of infantry and engineers taking place for the past year. No information as to number and location.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

(MWW)
63-WTJ
From: Tokyo, Japan
To: MILID, Washington, D. C.
Number 457, March 7th. Files 425 PM.

MARCH 8, 1941.
10:07 PM

Colonel Takeo Iwakuro who sailed on S. S. *Tatsuta Maru* for the United States March 6th is adviser to Admiral Nomura and liaison between Admiral Nomura and Army. As such will occupy important position Japanese Embassy. Suggest Martin meet him San Francisco. See Embassy Number 330 February 27.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

BFS
3WVY
From: Tokyo
To: MILID
Number 453, February 25th.

FEBRUARY 24, 1941.
9:59 AM

Reference your 496 the three Japanese translators and one Formosan messenger employed by this office are doing translation that can not be done adequately by American personnel. Although we known they report to police when*hostile* affairs of office so organized that they can report nothing of any consequence. Miss Ishigami an American citizen handles routine reports and correspondence only with Miss McMahon writing all confidential matters.

Recommend that present setup remain unchanged.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

WE
72 WTJ
338
From: Manila.
To: G-2.
Number 512, February 13th.

FEBRUARY 14, 1941.
6:04 AM

Netherlands Consul reports concerning two vessels Java China Japan line as follows: For G dash two signed Orear. The *Tjitjalenka* sailed from Manila zero seven zero zero February thirteen but was ordered to return to Manila shortly thereafter; the *Tjibesar* now enroute from Japan has been ordered to put into Manila for further instructions. No explanation available as yet.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

WE
89 WTJ
213 PH
From Manila
To: MILID
Number 41, February 5th.

FEBRUARY 5, 1941.
7:04 AM

British consular source reports Governor East Java intercepted telephone conversation between two important Japanese at Sourabaya and Lawang discussing news that Japanese attack is scheduled for February, tenth repeat tenth. Both Japanese arrested and both denied conversation. This message for G dash two signed Orear. Governor comments very few Japanese believed to be armed and no difficulty is anticipated in taking all Japanese into custody when desired. Evaluation of data low.

GRUNERT.

[Radiogram]

(MWW)
44-WTJ

JANUARY 5, 1941.
8:05 PM

From: Fort Shafter, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General.
Number 2041, January 4th. Filed 2:47 PM.

ATTENTION G-2. Following information was given out by official British sources and was obtained from Captain Thomas V. Hill, Master ARMS AORANGI. Description of three raiders operating in Pacific is as follows:

TOKYO MARU EX KULMERLAND, Japanese markings, 7300 tons, 20 passenger, one straight funnel amidships, two masts, three single Samson posts one between bridge and foremast one directly abaft passenger accommodation one abaft the mainmast, crows next extreme head foremast, slightly raked stem, cruiser stern, one seaplane carried.

MANYO MARU, Japanese marking, 5000 tons, 20 passenger, one straight funnel amidships very close to bridge, two masts with foremast abaft well deck with seaplane derrick one set of Samson posts immediately before bridge, Maier form bow, cruiser stern, one seaplane.

Probably MARVIK, Norwegian MARKINGS, 6000 tons, one large funnel amidships close to bridge, narrow bridge to heavy mast, foremast well aft and single Samson post forward of foremast, one Samson post abaft mainmast, black hull,

(Sheet 2, No. 2041 from Ft. Shafter, T. H.)

white band, straight stem, counter stern, raised forecastle, high after deck house, one seaplane.

In almost every attack of U boats on shipping a night it has subsequently transpired that light were being shown, it is believed darkening of merchant ships is improving but it is reported that light torches are sometimes used on upper decks.

HERRON.

[Radiogram]

(RRR)
31-WTJ

JANUARY 4TH 1941.
354 AM

From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.
To: G-2.
No. 2039, Jany 3rd.

Reurad 584 second January. *Sagami Maru* arrived Honolulu 21st December departed for Hilo 23rd December enroute to Lima Peru. 490 cases small arms ammunition, one pounder ammunition and fuses all destined for Peru. Now shown on manifest and discovered by U. S. customs. Next boat *Nita Maru* due fourth January. This steamer and future ships will be watched report being made any further shipments this nature. Signed Marston.

HERRON.

EXHIBIT No. 6

CONFIDENTIAL

[1] Rec'd—G–2 Jan 29, 1942

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 Dec. 1941.

In reply refer to: 350.05 (G–2)
Subject: Report on Internal Subversive Activities for the Month of December 1941
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, War Department General Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference paragraph 6*a*, CONFIDENTIAL letter, AG 350.05 (8–5–40), M–B–M, dated 17 August 1940, the following items are submitted:

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING AIL POSTS, FIELDS, AND DISTRICTS

Period: 15 November 1941 to 15 December 1941

Individual and special cases

The abnormal conditions which have prevailed in this Department since 7 December 1941 have made inadvisable, for the time being, continuing investigation of minor routine cases, other more pressing matters having been given priority. Only cases of more active character, such as have been listed in previous reports with an asterisk to denote their importance continue under active investigation at present. It is anticipated, however, that the summary for next month, January 1942, will be in its usual complete form.

Situation summary

PROPAGANDA: Japanese radio broadcasts, presumably originating in Japan, give highly exaggerated accounts of Japanese success, together with violent anti-American propaganda. No local stations are permitted to broadcast in Japanese (or in any other foreign language). Except for these broadcasts there has been no attempt at enemy propaganda. Gossip and loose talk among local residents of all nationalities, both service personnel and civilian, were common immediately after the raid of 7 December, but have subsided to a reasonable volume and are decreasing. No instance has been verified of deliberate spreading of rumors as enemy propaganda.

SUSPICIOUS CASES almost without number have been reported and investigated, with results largely negative. Among service personnel, the unanimous report of all S–2's has been that even those individuals in the past most suspected of subversive tendencies have proved intensely loyal when put to the test of actual war conditions.

Estimate of the situation

[2] No attmept can be made in this summary to cover other than the internal situation, as only preliminary investigations have been made of most of the aliens in detention, and the labor of checking reports of alleged subversive actions continues, with little positive result, on a 24 hour daily basis. In general it may be said, however, that the morale of the civilian populace is very high, and that labor disputes and other disturbing factors have disappeared in the general effort to effect a united front.

Within the various Army establishments morale is at the highest level. However, in anticipation of the probable "let-down" incident to the lessening of the initial excitement, the C. S. System is being completely reorganized and enlarged so as to cover effectively all of the newly arriving units as well as those already established in the Department.

Kendall J. Fielder
KENDALL J. FIELDER
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G–2

EXHIBIT NO. 7

CONFIDENTIAL

EXACT COPY

ACTION COPY

AG 380.3 (12-28-40) M
From: Grunert, Manila, P. I. DECEMBER 28, 1940.
To: TAG
Prority For G-2

Netherlands Consul sources: Japan attacks January 15 against Netherlands Indies with light Naval force and transports against New Guinea simultaneously with Naval force and transports against Java. Evaluation of plan high. Evaluation of date doubtful.

United Press sources: Two German vessels have been outfitted Shanghai with Japan guns as raiders, three German vessels being outfitted at Tsingtao and two at Canton. All German vessels in Japan controlled ports are to be outfitted as raiders before January 15. Signed, O'Rear.

EXHIBIT NO. 8

[1] RSU/tes

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS AREA
UNITED STATES ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G-2
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, PUBLIC RELATIONS, CIVIL DEFENSE
SEVENTH FLOOR, STANDARD OIL BUILDING
Baltimore, Maryland, December 18, 1941

In reply refer to File: III-7764

SECRET

Subject: Reports of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii.
[Stamped:] Secret. Date 12/18/41. HQ. 3RD C. A. Initial, PLT.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Attention Lt. Col. W. A. Holbrook, Jr.

1. This office is in receipt of a report, information of undetermined reliability, source usually reliable, which is quoted as follows:

"Three weeks ago SENATOR GILLETT at Washington warned officials what was going to happen. Stated that Japan would declare war on United States Dec. 19. Also told of an attack on Hawaii. No attention paid to assertions and Dec. 9 held conference with some of the leading officials of New York City, State of New Jersey, Jersey City and two congressmen from Washington who flew back for this conference. Conference was for purpose of possibly setting up an individual Intelligence Unit because they are disgusted with the actions of G-2 in some cases and as far as O. N. I. is concerned they are so disgusted against this group that they do not know what to do about it. At Washington Dec. 9, one of the highest officials of the British Government got in communication with the same country's officials at New York and in substance here is the story—the Japanese Business Group at Honolulu had invited practically all the officers at Pearl Harbor to a big celebration and dinner on Saturday evening. A vast number of the Naval officers were reported to have been so drunk that they had to be taken to their quarters. He also stated that the damages suffered by the United States Government at Honolulu and on the sea were far greater than the total damages that England suffered the first year of the war on the sea. Am positive that SENATOR GILLETT has received a lot of his information from WYTHE WILLIAMS, who has retired from the air and is now preparing several books. Remember that WILLIAMS is a pal and confident of ATTORNEY GENERAL BIDDLE and still the F. B. I. is reported to be afraid of WILLIAMS and the material that he sends out. WILLIAMS is smart. He has a staff here in New York that

includes the ex-Chief of Police of Berlin (Note, G–2 III C. A.: Believed to be one GRZYSINSKI, who has lectured against Nazism in New York) and other good men." Destroyed by 84 Dec. 29, 1941.

2. However much or little truth there may be in this report, the possibility is not overlooked by this office that there may be an attempt to make political capital at the expense of military and naval morale.

3. No other distribution of this report whatsoever has been or will be made from this office. No action is contemplated except at the request of the War Department.

4. The original report, quoted above, was dated December 10th. The capitalization of names of persons was done by this office. The source was a Pittsburgh source which has been discussed with General Miles.

Philip L. Thurber,
PHILIP L. THURBER,
Colonel G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G–2.

EXHIBIT No. 9

SECRET

This message was addressed to CG., Hawaii, and relayed to War Dept. by signals Hawaii with request for decipherment and repeat to them. This message also contained a request that Honolulu repeat it to War Dept. CS WDMC Will paraphrase and repeat back to Honolulu

/S/ B. F. SMITH
Code Section WDMC

12–8–41

EXHIBIT No. 10

SECRET

0–4–C

Exact copy of radiogram received at the War Department Message Center, Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 7, 1S4L.
7:5S P. M.

P 23 WT J

From: Melbourne, Australia, via Honolulu,
To: War Department & C. G. Hawaiian Department

NUMBER 24. DECEMBER 6th.

Based on Dutch intelligence report unconfirmed here of Naval movements from Pelau objective Manado and or Ambon, Dutch ordered execution plan A–2 and suggested RAAF reciprocal movement be directed Laha Ambon and Keopang. So ordered pm yesterday including flight Catalina to Rabaul task reconnaissance Buka and northwest passage Australian army reiuforcements Ambon Keopang subject to request Dutch East Indies. This message held 17 hours by . . . . government eight am Dutch reported advancing planes to be on Keopang not now considered necessary. Eleven am chief of air corps desired proceed with all aircraft forward movements Manilla informed.

MERLESMITH.

EXHIBIT No. 11

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G–2

Washington, December 6, 1941.
G–2/CI
JFP

Memorandum for Colonel Holbrook:

Word has just been received from O. N. I. by telephone to the effect that the Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D. C., was reliably reported to have burned its Code Book and Ciphers last night.

James F. Perry,
JAMES F. PERRY,
1st Lt., Military Intelligence,
Evaluation Subsection.

ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

FIELD DIVISION

National Defense Operations Section

~~From:~~ To: G. E. Sterling, Chief. Date: 12/4

[Hand written:] Major Guest foned 12/4 that Msg from Carter should go to ~~Bratton~~ Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury, Phone War Dept. 2054. Home Tel. Glebe 1129. D. C. & Laurel advised.

Route in Order Indicated:

Chief Engineer	☐	Mr. Webster	☐
Mr. Terrell	☐	Mr. Cruse	☐
Secretary	☐	Mr. Turner	☐
Mr. Reynolds	☐	Mr. Mason	☐
Mr. Cureton	☐	Mr. Loucks	☐
Mr. Ring	☐	Miss Wiltshire	☐
----------	☐	----------	☐

Remarks:

[Hand written:] Until Saturday night.

~~Give one copy of the following to~~ For Carter ~~and destroy all papers and forget colon~~

Group one is east wi|nd rain group two is north wind "X" clou|dy and group three is west|wind. clear stop groups ~~will be~~ repe|at|ed twice in middle and at end|of|broadcast.

EXHIBIT No. 12

DEC. 4, 1941.

MR. STERLING: Received following from Carter at 8.12 p. m.:

Remarks: First type of program received since Nov. 28th, 4–5 hours spent monitoring. Sounds like regular weather reports.

About 2200GMT 12/4/41 JVW3:

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow slightly cloudy and fine weather.

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds.

Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean surface calm.

(End of program followed by music)

DE

DEC. 5, 1941.

Mr. STERLING: At 7.45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the following information:

JVW3 2130G

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow north wind and later from south.

(The above was repeated three times)

JWV3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then;

I will now give you the weather report (nothing further, carrier on but no modulation—evidently cutoff in Tokyo)

Remarks by Carter:

They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five percent.

FINI

Foned Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7.50 p. m.

Remarks by Col. Bratton:

Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked Col Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland—concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenburg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.

FINI

DE

[Exact copy—action copy—radiogram]

AG 580.81 (12-1-41) MC EHB/sm—1712

15 WTJ 0-4-C
1/1130P

Received at the War Department Message Center, Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C., December 4, 1941, 411 p. m.

From: Manila, P. I.

To: Adjutant General

No. 1046 First

Replying your radio of November twenty eight and your radio six four seven on same subject all practical steps within the limits of the facilities of this command are being taken to protect all air and ground installations.

MACARTHUR.

[Copy]

Batavia
Dated December 4, 1941
Rec'd 9:19 a. m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

220, December 4, 10 a. m.

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo:

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers."

Same re following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:

"When threat of crisis exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita North Russia, three Nichi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies."

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

FOOTE.

~~Give one copy of the following to~~ For Carter ~~and destroy all pages and forge colon~~

Groups one is east rain group two is north wind wi|nd clou|dy and group x three is west|wind clear stop groups ~~will be~~ repe|at|ed twice in' middle and at end of broadcast.

ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

FIELD DIVISION

National Defense Operations Section

To: G. E. Sterling, Chief. Date: 6/12/4

[Hand written:] Major quest foned 12/4 that Msg from Carter should do tonight ~~Bratton~~ Lt Col. C. C. Dusenbury Phone War Dept 2054 Home Tel Glebe 1129 DE & Laurel advised .

Route in Order Indicated:

Chief Engineer	☐	Mr. Webster	☐
Mr. Terrell	☐	Mr. Cruse	☐
Secretary	☐	Mr. Turner	☐
Mr. Reynolds	☐	Mr. Mason	☐
Mr. Cureton	☐	Mr. Loucks	☐
Mr. Ring	☐	Miss Wiltshire	☐
----------	☐	----------	☐

Remarks:

[Hand written:] Until Saturday night

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(End of program followed by music.) DE

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FINI

DE

For action OPNAV RRRRR

From ALUSNA Batavia
Date: 5 DEC 1941
Decoded by Kalaidjian
Paraphrased by Purdy

Ø31Ø3Ø CRØ222

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code intercept: Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States; north wind cloudy Russia; west wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.
Distribution:
War Dept._____ACTION. FILES: CNO_____2ØOP_____2ØA_____
Record Copy:_____2ØG_____X Show OPDO_____

EXHIBIT NO. 13

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

I. B. 159

BRIEF PERIODIC ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, DECEMBER 1, 1941—MARCH 31, 1942

Record Section

G2/1
TJB

[1] I. B. 159 NOVEMBER 29, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation, December 1, 1941—March 31, 1942.

I. *General.*

1. This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military possibilities and probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942.

2. *a.* During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia, will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic offensives. Her success in Russia and the advent of winter make disposable a larger portion of German land and air power than at any time since the beginning of the Russo-German war. On the other hand, the price she has had to pay for her Russian success and the width of the wasted zone behind her Eastern Front indicate that

a considerable period of time would be required for the reorganization and redisposition of her major forces. The German conduct of war, so far, has been characterized by a thoroughness and deliberation in this regard. Between the end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been considerable periods of time. In the present case, if Germany should decide to shift the theater of war, all indications point to an even greater necessity for a considerable time lag than has so far existed between her successive campaigns. Large scale German strategic offensives are therefore not to be expected outside of the Russian theater within the period under consideration. It is much more probable that Germany will continue her attack on Russia, particularly in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and Caspian Seas during the winter and early spring.

[2] *b.* Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited degree than is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has a multiplicity of strategic objectives; but for a variety of reasons, she cannot concentrate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale and with assurance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement lies in the contingency of a serious depletion of Russian forces in eastern Siberia. But even in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic offensive against Siberia during the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the light of present politico-military situation and of the rigorous winter climate in that region.

c. Great Britain is pressing a limited strategic offensive in Libya and has taken the aerial offensive over Western Europe. She, too, is extended militarily and more extensive ground and aerial action is beyond her means.

d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered incapable of large scale strategic offensives during the period in question. The United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, is an increasingly important element in the situation. Our influence is exerted in naval and aerial participation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material and technical assistance to the four land theaters and in psychological, economic and political action against the Axis throughout the world. But all this does not sum up to a large scale strategical offensive. We have only a means of strategical maneuver—our ability to make available more or less material and technical facilities and in their allocation to those theaters where they will be most advantageously employed.

e. Neither the economic nor the psychologic situation in Germany indicates any possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent during the period in question.

f. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question:

(1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision.

(2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important theaters of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long range strategy for the defeat of the Nazis.

[3] II. *Brief Estimate on the Theaters of War.*

1. *The British Isles.* This theater is the citadel of the Anti-Axis Powers. Its security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The ground, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being materially strengthened.

For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a position to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question. It is probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-summer of 1942. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As for the present, after a short delay of reorganization and transfer, Germany can launch large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she is willing to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of improved British defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force, however, it is estimated that in the period in question such attacks cannot reach the intensities of those of the winter of 1940–41.

From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories will continue; but that this action will be indecisive.

Material aid from the United States has been an essential element in the resistance and survival of the British Isles. Continuance of this aid is still essential. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to aid.

2. *The Atlantic.* The Battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the sealanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending against Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction in Britain and the United States is increasing. It is now probable that replacements have overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during 1941 are as follows:

	Losses (British, Allied, and Neutral)			
	Total		Monthly Average	
	Ships	Tonnage	Ships	Tonnage
January 1 to June 30 (6 months)	628	2,755,242	105	459,207
June 30 to Nov. 15 (4½ months)	285	1,000,990	63	222,442

[4] During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imported into the United Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approximately 2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States Navy began convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be assured.

Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and submarines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected that she will continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of operations elsewhere.

The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle of the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels. Continuance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany.

3. *Eastern Theater.* By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupied vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and has inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great losses in men and material, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. While Germany could transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is estimated that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russia. Specifically she will:

Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies.
Continue the siege of Leningrad.
Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk.
Seek to seize the general line of the Volga.
Attempt to overrun the Caucasus, thus obtaining oil and securing a jump-off position for an eventual advance into the Middle East.

The most serious German threat is southeastwards to the Caucasus, and her goal is oil. Axis forces are extending eastward north of Rostov toward the Don. They may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga south to its mouth at Astrakhan. Russian defense of the North Caucasus will probably eventually fail, after substantially delaying the Axis advance. With sufficiently determined and prompt allied aid, the Germans may be kept from occupation of the Trans-Caucasus and control of the Baku oil fields.

[5] The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset of hostilities. Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while depleted, have not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the following: The extreme cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and Russian training and technique in severe winter weather is considered better than that of the invaders. While the Soviet situation is critical, ready availability of manpower resources is in Russian favor. Defense industry is in operation at approximately 60% of pre-war volume. British and American material assistance is being received; increased and continuing allied assistance is urgently required.

The following considerations are unfavorable to the U. S. S. R.: The uncertainty of the Far Eastern situation causes concentration of efficient Soviet troops along the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the western theater. The Soviet Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably in all ammunition. The shortage in tanks is especially serious; that in small arms and small arms ammunition is less marked than in other weapons. The means of supply from the outside world are difficult and precarious. To date no British operation elsewhere

has been sufficiently strong to cause any withdrawal of German troops from Russia.

Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of action is to resist stubbornly in the hope that attrition, climate and lengthened communications will eventually bring her assailants to a standstill. By the spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted Russian armies will stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as Moscow. It is also probable that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus mountains and Trans-Caucasia.

With her industry dislocated, Russia is in extreme need of material assistance from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions. Unfortunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and very awkwardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total import capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this figure will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United States and Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of the Russo-German war appears to be the total material means available to the Democracies to influence the struggle within this theater.

4. *Middle Eastern Theater.* In this theater, extending from Libya to the Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt. Farther to the east, Syria, Iraq and Iran are shielded from the war for the time being by neutral Turkey and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus.

[6] Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic difficulties, there is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater, from the north, before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their current Libyan operations would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as to free Alexandria and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A British victory in Libya would probably force German entry into Tunisia and their occupation of Algiers and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more apt to delay than to hasten an all-out German offensive, from the west and the north, against the Middle East Theater.

Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that the British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a considerable delay for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the British point of view this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a minimum of several months available for the completion of its organization.

In the eastern sector of this theater (the Levant, Iraq and Iran), the British are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three Australian divisions with other troops, and General Wavell told our Military Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern Iraq by March of 1942.

The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the Middle East, and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate supply. Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of the important active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though long, are the least vulnerable.

We are building up an influence on British military policy in the Middle East. Further American commitments, including probably the eventual employment of our armed forces, will be necessary in this region.

5. *The Far Eastern Theater.* Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of her military overextension. She has the following lines of action open to her:

a. Attack Siberia.

b. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an early end to the war with China.

[7] *c.* Occupy Thailand.

d. Through Thailand, attack

(1) Burma and the Burma Road,

(2) Malaya.

e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies.

f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and

(1) Attack Singapore

(a) directly, by sea;

(b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand and Malaya.

(2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies.

g. Bide her time, wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor.

h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an understanding with the United States and Great Britain as to political and economic penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific.

i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.

(*h*) and (*i*) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing forces.

The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.

The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the United States are in consultative association for the defense of Malaysia. To date this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetration to the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions. The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced her Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this effort.

China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan and will containue to contain important [8] Japanese forces. The effective use of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends entirely on the extent to which she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery and aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The stronger the Chinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down in China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler.

Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period ending March 31, 1942.

The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by additional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of these localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese attack.

The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941—said delivery having been on an old contract still in force.

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.

Our influence in the Fast Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not be decisive within [9] a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

[10] III. *Morale.*

The outstanding feature of the war in 1941 has been the rise in anti-Axis and the decline in Axis morale.

The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the Failure of the German air attack on Britain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on Germany of the Russian Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all,

by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in the war.

Even more notable has been the decline in Axis morale. In Italy and Japan the reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically distressed. But Germany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had unprecedented success in war—and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm prevails, only the desire to see it all end.

In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three military situations. To each of these situations there should be a corresponding moral reaction. These situations and reactions are:

Military Situation	*Moral Reaction*
1. Superiority of strength. Possession of intiative. Unbroken success.	1. The elan of victory—fighting with confidence of success.
2. Approximate equality in strength. Initiative doubtful. Ultimate success still in balance.	2. The grim struggle—fighting to gain success.
3. Inferiority in strength. Strategic initiative lost. Ultimate success doubtful.	3. Their "back to the wall"—fighting prevent defeat.

Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Germany is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the moral reaction of her people is, and has been for some time rather lower than number 2.

The morale factor in the war will be affected by the out [*11*] come, probably within the next month, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by Japan's decision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in German morale will be reversed or even materially reduced in the period under discussion.

In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2.

Distribution:
The President
Secretary of War
Secretary of State
Undersecretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
The Chief of Staff
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1
Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G–4
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
G. H. Q.
Chief of the Air Corps
Director of Naval Intelligence
Coordinator of Information
General Embick.
Record Section
I. B. File
dya

[Hand written:] Copies checked in red delivered by an officer—other copies sent out by Miss Finch & Miss Carrick.

EXHIBIT No. 14

SECRET

[Paraphrase of a SECRET RADIOGRAM]

G2/CI
FMH

Received at the War Department, November 29, 1941.
From: Fort Shafter, November 29, 1941. No. 986.
To: TAG

With reference to protection of vital installations outside of Military reservations such as highway bridges, telephone exchanges, and power plants this headquarters by confidential letter of 19 June, 1941 asked the Governor of the territory to use the authority given him by the Organic Act Section 67 which provides that the Governor may call upon the Naval and Military Force Commanders of the United States in the Hawaiian Territory to suppress or prevent invasion, lawless violence, insurrection, etc. In accordance with the above stated Authority on 20 June 1941 the Governor made a confidential formal demand in writing on this headquarters to supply and to keep on furnishing such suitable protection as may be required in order to prevent sabotage, and violence of a lawless nature in connection therewith, being done in the territory against vital structures and installations. Suitable military protection in accordance with the above request is now being given important civilian installations and structures. Upon the suggestion of this headquarters, in connection with the above, the county and city of Honolulu enacted, an ordnance on 20 June 1941 permitting the Hawaiian Dept. Commanding General to restrict the use of and travel upon or to close within the county or city of Honolulu any road whenever such action is necessary in the interest of National Defense. No exercise of the authority thus given has yet been necessary. Cordial relations exist and have meen maintained and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters which involve the FBI and all other Federal and Territorial Officials.

In regard to the secret radiogram of your office numbered 482 dated November 28, 1941, within the scope of investigative responsibility of the War Department (Paragraph No. 3 MID SC 30–45) and Military establishments which include equipment and personnel, full precautions against activities of a subversive nature are being taken.

SHORT.

EXHIBIT No. 15

SECRET

(Copy)

WPD 4544–13 NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

Memorandum for The Adjutant General (through secretary, General Staff):
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first priority, message be dispatched by cable, radio or telegraph (whichever method is the most secure from the viewpoint of secrecy) to each of the following:

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain

to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

EXHIBIT No. 16

PRIORITY—
From: War Department,
Bureau: G–2 sm/mis

T. E. Roderick,
T. E. RODERICK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
Asst. Executive Officer, G–2

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

All Corps Areas
Carribean Defense Command
Hawaiian Department

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may ensue stop Subversive activities may be expected stop Inform commanding general and chief of staff only end

MILES.

Sent no. 473 to Hawaii, 11/27
Sent no. 562 to Panama, 11/27
Sent no. 66 to 1st. CA, 11/27

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service.

T. E. Roderick,
T. E. RODERICK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
Asst. Executive Officer, G–2.

Sent no. 191 to 2nd CA, 11/27
Sent no. 48 to 3rd CA, 11/27
Sent no. 72 to 4th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 49 to 5th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 54 to 6th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 45 to 7th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 75 to 8th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 367 to 9th CA, 11/27

RALPH C. SMITH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Executive Officer, G–2.

Cable recorded in M. L. D.
Exact Copy made for Gen. Miles 1–28–42. 380.

EXHIBIT No. 17

[Paraphrase]

G–2
SM/td
NOVEMBER 27, 1941.

G–2's All Corps Areas
Caribbean Defense Command
Hawaiian Department.

Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may begin stop ~~This message to be deciphered only by G–2.~~

MILES

[PRIORITY—SECRET]

Drafting Section: G–2
Drafting Officer: SM
G–2 File Number:

[Paraphrase of an outgoing Secret Cablegram]

#66 Sent out Nov. 27, 1941.
Date: November 27, 1941.

To: All Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command, and Hawaiian Department, First Corps Area

Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may begin stop

MILES.

#66 to 1st CA
191 to 2nd CA
48 to 3rd CA
72 to 4th CA
49 to 5th CA
54 to 6th CA
45 to 7th CA
75 to 8th CA
367 to 9th CA
#473 to Hawaii
562 to Panama

EXHIBIT No. 18

SECRET

[Radiogram]

(RRR)
56-WTJ

NOVEMBER 14, 1940.
312 AM

From: Manila, P. I.
To: The Adjustment General.
November 14th.
For G–2

Following received reliable sources "Reliably reported Japanese evactuating troops and air forces middle Yantze including Hangkow. Washington report states concentration transports Haiphong Taipong and Formosa." Taiping referred to probably on Pearl River. Informant believes this presages initiation new plans and not result Chinese pressure. Signed O'Rear.

GRUNERT.

EXHIBIT No. 19

CONFIDENTIAL

CIB
Maj. David G. Erskin

No. 381 sent Nov. 12, 1941.
To: G–2, Hawaiian Department.

Requests you be prepared to check with FBI and render them every assistance. FBI field office Honolulu is being advised to check with MID and ONI concerning custodial detention list in order to ascertain that all points are covered.

MILES.

EXHIBIT No. 20

SECRET

83 WTJ
616-P

0-4-C

[RADIOGRAM]

OCTOBER 29, 1941.
731 AM

From: Manila, P. I.
To: MILID
No. 700, October 28th.

Three Japanese aircraft carriers including one latest type comma two armed merchant vessels of unknown size suitable for transports and one aircraft tender are now at Takao Formosa. Commander in chief combined naval and air forces has been ordered to Takao G-2. Comment report concerning commander in chief may signify beginning of assembling of an expeditionary force.

EVANS.

EXHIBIT No. 21

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2,
Washington, October 28, 1941.

INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE ORIENT

Dated August 26, 1941.

1. "Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) "to complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the Pacific. All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November."

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would best begin in December or in February."

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days."

S. C.

[Handwritten:]
Summary of Inf. 11/3/41
Distribution:
All C. A.'s F. B. I.
All Dept.'s O. N. I.
Alaska State
File
P. M. S.

EXHIBIT No. 22

SECRET

[Radio]

R. A. Oct. 27, 1941
4 WTJ
4 WTJ

OCT. 27, 1941.
1055 PM

From: Manila, Philippine Islands.
To: Milid, Washington.
54 Twenty Seventh.

General southward movement of Japanese shipping in western Pacific is reported by British sources two aircraft carriers have been operating among

mandated islands, of which Kaga repeat Kaga still present following planes reported based there: Palau repeat Palau, eight flying boats, Saipan repeat Saipan, eight fighters, six heavy bombers; Truk repeat Truk, six fighters, six heavy bombers; Jalu repeat Jalu, eight flying boats, twelve flight planes; Wotje repeat Wotje, eight flying boats.

BRINK.

CONFIDENTIAL

[Radiogram]

LAS
3 WTJ
518P

JULY 28, 1941.
10:36 PM

From: Manila
To: Milid
No. 1485, July 26th.

British intelligence Singapore reports existence in Middle East of enemy connected organization there for supply of semiannual passports to so called refugees paren potential fifth columnists paren enroute from Middle East to South American stop One identified member of this organization Schwarzstein reported now enroute Far East stop Information suggests all passports for South and Central American countries issued nationals of occupied territories be regarded with suspicion stop Uncertain extent South and Central American governments may be involved.

O'REAR.

CONFIDENTIAL

[Radiogram]

LAS
30 WTJ
715P

JULY 27, 1941.
6:20 AM

From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 505, July 26th.

Mobilization mentioned in my radio 498 and 500 still going on under conditions expreme secrecy involving restrictions all kinds on movements additional foreigners to the Continent also foreigners restricted as far south as Formosa and as far north as Korea and Manchukuo. Size of mobilization cannot be estimated but it is one of the largest single drafts since initial mobilization for China war. Some reports of troop movements away from Japan but nothing available to number preponderance moving in any single direction.

CRESWELL.

SECRET

[Radiogram]

LAS
29 WTJ
8P

JULY 27, 1941.
6:20 AM

From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 507, July 26th.

On basis of statements made by heretofore reliable contact, it is thought likely, should Japanese occupation French Indo China be extended, occupying forces will include one specially selected pursuit wing of approximately 80 to 90 planes now being organized Formosa.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

LAS
82 WTJ
248P

JULY 23, 1941.
3:21 PM

From: Manila.
To: Milid.
No. 1456 July 22nd.

United Press states Lomei news Tokyo claims following from reliable French source quote as result of secret agreement between British, Chinese and De Gualliets the Chingking forces are massing for attack on northern Indo China stop Simultaneously the British will attack south Indo China using natives stop Whether Indo China govt will participate is not known unquote stop This office estimates above as build up for Japanese movement into Indo China stop We are of opinion that new Japanese cabinet is war minded and capable of action.

O'REAR.

[Radiogram]

LAS
150 WTJ
1210P

JULY 23, 1941.
11:32 PM

From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 504, July 21st.

Recently imposed restrictions of indefinite duration on land, water, and air travel in Japan reduces available services southward to NYK Transpacific liner. Application has been made for reservations through to Manila on first possibility namely Yawata sailing Yokohama August 14th Shanghai August 19 arriving Manila August 21 without touching Hongkong. Company states that reservations cannot be confirmed for several days. If it is desired that Pape carry digest on Japanese vessel he requests specific authority therefor. It not, suggest that assistant naval attaché in Shanghai be requested to forward digest to Manila by first available safe hand and if it does not arrive before Pape leaves he be authorized to pick up Manila copy of digest. Only other alternative is for Pape to go to Shanghai first available transportation and to proceed thence by whatever combination of clippers and non Japanese shipping will put him soonest in Singapore. Schedule of British and Dutch lines are not available to their agents in Japan. Assist naval attaché in Shanghai has been requested to secure and forward pertinent information if possible. No detailed schedule can be reported until transportation to Shanghai is secured and possibly until after arrival there.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

AEL
8 WVY
743P

JULY 14, 1941.
1:36 PM

From: Tokyo
To: Assis Chief of Staff G-2
No 500, July 14.

Now evident that mobilization mentioned our number 498 taking place on considerable scale and under unusual conditions as to secrecy. It has been determined that some of the newly mobilized men are being sent to Manchuria, but as yet unable to determine how many or whether any are being sent southern destination. Although Tokyo is alive with rumors as to purpose this mobilization there is no conclusive indication so far available.

CRESWELL.

[Radiogram]

67–WTJ

July 12, 1941,
1032AM

From: Tokyo.
To: MILID.
No. 498, July 12th.

Considerable talk and some evidence of unusual recruiting extent and purpose not clearly determined but thought to be precautionary as for the time being governments attitude not considered as one tending towards positive commitments.

CRESWELL.

WPD 4544 July 7, 1941.

Memorandum for the Adjutant General:
Subject: Secret Radiogram

1. The Secretary of War directs that a secret radiogram, as follows be sent to the:

Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command
Commanding General, Philippine Department
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
Commanding General, Fourth Army

For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and miiltary groups stop This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval comma army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August stop Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned end

II. That a copy of the above radiogram be furnished to the Chief of the Army Air Force.

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

ks
COPY/ml
(Original paper filed under ~~Caribbean~~ ~~Defense~~ Panama Command.

[Radiogram]

AEL
85 WTJ
451

JUNE 29, 1941.
7:43 AM

From: Tokyo.
To: The Assis Chief of Staff G–2.
No. 493, June 27

War Office states that cannot grant attachment regiment Japan proper Dickey Verback present time but may be able to arrange in future. At same time mentioned possibility arrange those officers Korea provided suitable exchange in one of our possessions no specific possession requested but Philippines mentioned as examples. Request statement policy regarding arrange our possessions in general and reciprocity for Korea in particular. In my opinion under present conditions Korea is not adequate trade any of our possessions and arrange in any other Japanese possessions would be severely circumscribed. Suggest I continue efforts obtain arrange Japan proper. See my letter June 9 to Harris, Chief Liaison Section in June 13 pouch.

CRESWELL.

G–2(WEC)
Ralph G. Smith

Sent to all listed destination * * * WE
May 29, 1941 * * *

MAY 28, 1941.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G–2, First Corps Area, Third Corps area, Fourth Corps Area, Fifth Corps area, Sixth Corps area, Seventh Corps Area, Eighth Corps area, Ninth Corps Area, Panama Canal Department, Puerto Rican Department, Hawaiian Department, Philippine Department and Alakan Department.

Communist Party order recently issued directs all Communist Party members of National Maritime Union to remain on board ship until further notice period Highly reliable British source reports nation-wide sabotage may be expected comma especially on Pacific Coast comma over may thirtieth weekend on all defense projects including shipping facilities period

MILES.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
AG 220.482(4–3–41)E *April 3, 1941.*

COMMANDING GENERAL
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, TH.

Issue orders detailing on temporary duty the necessary number of armed noncommissioned officers of the Air Corps but not less than 6 for the purpose of providing adequate and continuous guard from Hawaiian Department to destination for airplanes and parts being shipped on the *Steel Mariner* scheduled to sail to Philippine Department from Hawaiian Department April 5, 1941, and directing that upon completion of such duty soldiers return to proper stations in Hawaiian Department on first available army transport payment of monetary allowances * * * authorized while traveling on SS *Steel Mariner* a chartered vessel * * *

ADAMS.

Copy for A. C. of S., G–2. In connection with your disposition form dated April 3, 1941.

AGO 004.5 (5–13–41)MB–G
The AGO
AGMX–G
EAH

COMMANDING GENERAL, MAY 13, 1941.
Schofield Barracks, TH.

In reply city AGMX period. War Department authority granted you to permit representative of Pan Pacific Press Association to make photographs of unrestricted training activities and general views of post at your station for forthcoming articles Colliers Magazine period. All photographs to be made under your supervision and to be reviewed by War Department prior to publication.

ADAMS.

Copy for: Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 (Major Corderman).

G–2
Lt. Col. R. C. Smith

G–2/272–82
No. 740 Sent April 18, 1941

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G–2,
Hawaiian Dept., Fort Shafter, T. H.

Naval Intelligence on March 21 received from unknown source partially illegible copy combat estimate of Fiji Islands dated December 1940 signed by Captain John W. Coulter present address University of Hawaii period. Investigate authenticity and why G–2 did not receive copy this valuable report.

MILES.

[Radiogram]

MARCH 29, 1941.
8:32 AM

(JTP)
39WTJ

From: Ft. Shafter.
To: The Adjutant General.

FORT SHAFTER, No. 2492, *March 28, 1941.*

For G–2. Colonel Hideo Iwakuru, Ija passed through Honolulu 15th aboard *Tatsuta Maru* enroute Washington, D. C. Nippu Jiji of Honolulu reported, "Colonel Iwakuro was formerly head of military affairs section of Military Affairs Bureau which is probably the most important office in the army. He is so influential that there is no one in army circles who does not know him. We do not know what mission this colonel is on but in view of the times the visit of so important an army personage is worth our attention."

SHORT.

EXHIBIT No. 23

[Hand written:] Copy of Capt. Safford's digest, with missing numbers supplied:
1 copy to Safford.
1 copy to Corderman.

[1] *Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor*

MARCH 1941

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
#Mar. 13	A -----	15306	Hsinking #58	Foreign Propaganda Conference.
#Mar. 13	N 1472	15351	Tokyo 216	Japanese-Russian Cooperation.
#Mar. 13	A 1479	15330	Tokyo 222	Get the Russians to accept the Ribbentrop proposal.
Mar. 14	A -----	15341 15342	Hsinking #59	Propaganda towards the South Seas.
Mar. 18	A 1540	15425	Tokyo 126	Put Terazaki in charge of information and propaganda.
#Mar. 18	A -----	15421	Tokyo 276	Southern Advance.
#Mar. 19	A 1572	15455	Moscow #5	German-Soviet Relations: change in.
*Mar. 21	A -----	15550 to 15555	Tokyo #10	Trade-agreement between Japan and USSR.
**Mar. 22	A -----	-----	-----	SIS Memorandum predicting German attack on Russia. (Memo not available.) Given to State Dept.
#Mar. 22	A 1654	15621	Tokyo #81	Secure intelligences by bribe.
#Mar. 25	N 1662	15656	Tokyo 286	Dinner with Admiral Raeder.
*Mar. 29	A 1748	15749	Berlin 308	Germany plans to attack Russia. It is necessary for Japan to attack Singapore.

APRIL 1941

#Apr. 3	A 1806	15900	Berlin #56	German preparations for war with Russia.
#Apr. 4	A 1826	15936		
#Apr. 3	N 1829	15945	Batavia 142	Military campaign in the lowlands.
Apr. 5	N 1842	15976	Honolulu #43	Typical Honolulu Spy Report.
*Apr. 18	N 2066	16109	Wash. 230	"As a result of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact, Japan is at last free to use force in this area (Southwest Pacific)."
#Apr. 19	N 2099	16455	Tokyo 171	"Our Southward Move would be halted."
#Apr. 29	A 2251	16711	Wash. 253	"It is truly a marvelous thing that—our relations with Moscow have been adjusted."
*Apr. 30	N -----	-----	GZ–32	Early intentions of Germany to attack Russia.

***Most important.
**Very important.
*Important.
Unmarked—Normal.
#Supplementary.

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor—Continued

[2]

MAY 1941

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
#May 9	N 2452	17089	Tokyo 202	"I am most anxious to see the United States discontinue its policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek."
#May 13	A 2509	17161	Tokyo 396	"Advise the President to counsel Chiang Kai-shek to respond to Japanese peace overtures."
#May 13	N 2513	17263	Tokyo 216	Transmit #217 to the Secretary of State without delay. (Precedent for Tokyo #901 & 902, 6 Dec. 1941.)
#May 13	NQ2514	17264	Tokyo 217	The U. S. Govt. agree to advise Chiang Kai-shek to enter into direct negotiations with Japan.
#May 15	N 2549	17272	Wash. 299	Japan has absolutely no aggressive ambitions in the southern area.(!).
#May 16	N 2562	17305	Tokyo 230	Our request that the United States stay out of the war.
#May 21	N 2619	17423	Wash. 320	Japanese southward expansion.
**May 22	N 2643	17473	Berlin 569	"Our dreams of southward expansion . . ." "To further bolster the spirit of the Tripartite Pact."
May 26	A 2675	17536	Tokyo 440	Wire *real* intentions of the German Govt.

JUNE 1941

#June 3	A 2791	17741	Rome	The German Govt. has recently completed all preparations for attacking Soviet Russia.
#June 14	N ----	-----	GZ-1	German Plans to attack Russia.
#June 16	N ----	-----	GZ-9	Crisis in German-Soviet relations.
#June 16	N ----	-----	GZ-10	Japanese-United States negotiations.
#June 17	N ----	-----	GZ-15	German-Soviet crisis. Prediction of surprise German attack.
#June 27	N ----	-----	GZ-26	Japanese attitude toward Soviet-German crisis. "It will be well for the Imperial Govt. to assume a very prudent attitude in respect to this German-Soviet war."

[3]

JULY 1941

#July 7	A ----	-----	I. B. 1-155	"The Jap Govt.—do not at present feel compelled to modify their policy towards the USSR." (JD 3161)
#July 9	A ----	19126 19127 19128	I. B. 1-157	Plans for utilizing American negroes for espionage and sabotage. (JD 3490)
#July 9	N 3515	19197	Wash. 463	"If we are definitely determined to make a military stroke southward."
#July 10	A ----	-----	I. B. 1-158	Comments and paraphrase of JD 3515. [Note: MID missed the point completely.]
*July 24	N ----	-----	-----	Memo to Naval Aide to the President re withdrawal of Jap merchant vessels from the Atlantic Ocean.

AUGUST 1941

*Aug. 4	N ----	-----	GZ-1	Jap Decisions at Imperial Conference, July 2, 1941—to break British-American encirclement and arm for all-out war.
#Aug. 9	N ----	-----	GZ-4	Preparations for the southward advance shall be reenforced.
#Aug. 10	N ----	-----	GZ-5	The belief of Ambassador Oshima is discounted by the Tokyo Government belief that the war will continue into next year, with the Russians holding in Siberia.
#Aug. 16	N ----	-----	GZ-9	Nomura's estimate of U. S. Policy. (U. S. is determined to take drastic action to counter further attempts at Japanese expansion.)
*Aug. 28	N 4814	21575	Berlin 1066	The German-Soviet war as described by Marshal Keitel (Germany conquering Russia).

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[4] SEPTEMBER 1941

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
#Sept. 4	A 4929	21784 21785	Rome 556	Essential to carry out boldly at this time our policy of southward advance.
#Sept. 4	A 4940	21790	Tokyo 528	U. S.-Japan Negotiations—See JD; 4941.
*Sept. 4	A 4941	21786 to 21788	Tokyo 529	Japanese Draft Proposal of Sept. 6, 1941. (Japan demands conditions that the U. S. cannot possibly agree to.)
#Sept. 19	N 5234	22377	Shanghai 808	"Japan's war preparations against the Soviet."
*Sept. 22	A 5360	22550	Tokyo 590	Basic terms of peace between Japan and China. (Jap troops in China & Recognition of Manchukuo.)
#Sept. 23	A 5381	22588	Berlin 1161	I repeatedly requested—our Government's real national policy.
**Sept. 26	N 5438	22748	Tokyo 595	Japanese Proposal of Sept. 25, 1941 (submitted to State Dept. on Sept. 27, 1941). (Amplifies the Note of Sept. 6th (JD 4941) and attempts to force the U. S. to relinquish its position. It is apparent that the negotiations are getting nowhere and that the Japanese believe that the U. S. will back down or resort to appeasement if they put up a determined front.)
#Sept. 26	A 5441	22753	Tokyo 597	Nomura is bawled-out.
#Sept. 27	A 5464	22787	Wash. 852	Nomura apologizes.
Sept. 30	A 5510	22870	Tokyo 614	This whole matter concerns the China Incident and the South Seas Question.

[5] OCTOBER 1941

*Oct. 2	A 5598	22987	Wash. 881	Interview with Adm. Stark. "The Admiral stated that if the United States fights a two-ocean war she will have to defend herself in the Pacific."
#Oct. 3	N 5593	23034	Wash. 869	Relations of Terasaki (First Sec'y) and Schmitt (spy).
#Oct. 6	A 5640	23114	Wash. 901	Nomura sounds a warning against further aggression.
#Oct. 7	N 5650	23162	Wash. 880	Nomura advises caution: "After Japan has had time to evaluate the results let her determine her course."
#Oct. 7	N 5661	23166	Wash. 894	Nomura submits his humble opinion: "The only remaining problem is that concerning the evacuating of our troops (from China)."
#Oct. 8	A 5693	23220	Tokyo 647	The internal situation here—would not permit further delay.
Oct. 9	A 5696	23260	Tokyo #83	Area designations in Pearl Harbor (for spy reports).
Oct. 10	N 5730	23312	Honolulu #41	Dock & Mooring designations in Pearl Harbor (for spy reports).
#Oct. 10	N 5738	23318	Harbin 129	Promise of American aid to Russia.
#Oct. 13	N 5779	23421	Tokyo 658	"The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis."
#Oct. 13	N ----	-------	GZ-9	Crisis in Japan (see JD 5779).
*Oct. 15	N 5838	23513	Berlin 1237	Ambassador Oshima urges Japan attack Russia—"at the time of the fall of Moscow"—and adds "It is absolutely essential for us to make sure of the resources and markets of the south."
*Oct. 16	N ----	-------	GZ-10	Kramer's Memo to CNO with paraphrase of JD #5838.
#Oct. 16	A 5854	23570	Wash. 943	Interview with Adm. Turner. (Withdrawal of Jap troops from China.
#Oct. 15	A 5854	23516		
#Oct. 16	N 5888	23622	Berlin 1236	Protest on Domei editorial.
Oct. 17	N 5898	23629	Rome 661	Evacuation of Japanese merchants from Europe.
#Oct. 17	A 5901	23631	Tokyo 671	German pressure on Japan.
#Oct. 18	N 5919	23677	Rome 664	"My (Paulucci's) personal opinion is that Japan should strike at the Soviet Union immediately."
Oct. 18	N 5923	23677	Tokyo 682	Resignation of Jap cabinet.
Oct. 20	A 5941	23715	Wash. 959	Conversation between Terazaki and Adm. Turner.
Oct. 23	A 6017	23859	Wash.	Nomura submits his resignation. "I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence deceiving [6] other people . . . As a man of honor this is the only way open to me." (This is why Kurusu was sent.)
Oct. 27	A 6084	23996	Wash. 989	"The Chief of Staff has sent the Military Attache some secret advice. Is this the future policy of the Government."
Oct. 28	A 6116	24046	Shanghai 361	"At the time of a Japanese advance to the North."
Oct. 26	N 6118	24070	Mex. City 422	Sec'y Knox's statement that there would be imminent action in the Far East.
*Oct. 28	N 6138	24125	Tokyo 674	Japanese nationals evacuating the N. E. I.
Oct. 30	6175	24192	Wash. 1004	Talk with Adm. Pratt—"Stark cannot be said to be a 'strong' individual, Admiral Pratt said."

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[7] NOVEMBER 1941

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
Nov. 1	N 6204	24249	Hsinking 697	Border clash. "Let the matter be forgotten.
Nov. 4	N 6238	24322	Tokyo 343	Japanese nationals evacuating the Philippine.
*Nov. 4	A 6248	24330	Tokyo 725	Counter proposals will be given in #726 & 727. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible. This is our last effort. The success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan.
*Nov. 4	A 6249	24334 to 24337	Tokyo 726	Proposal "A"—Submitted in Part to State Dept. on Nov. 7, 1941. "How hard have we fought in China for four years What tremendous sacrifices have we made They must know this . . . In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise."
Nov. 4	A 6250	24338	Tokyo 727	Proposal "B"—Never submitted. "A last effort to prevent something happening."
#Nov. 4	A 6251	24339	Tokyo 730	"Ambassador Kurusu is leaving by clipper on the the 7th. He is carrying no additional instructions (!)"
**Nov. 5	N 6254	24373	Tokyo 736	It is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. (Of utmost secrecy.)
#Nov. 5	N 6275	24386	Tokyo 734	Ambassador Kurusu left the 5th for (Shanghai(?)).
#Nov. 6	A 6302	24439	Tokyo 739	We are sending Ambassador Kurusu to show our Empire's *sincerety. . . To make it sound good* we are telling the public. . . Both the Army and the Navy are pleased. (Note: See JD #6017.)
Nov. 7	N 6320	24479	Wash. 1040	There is danger that America will see through our condition. If we have made up our minds to a final course of action it would be the part of wisdom to keep still about it.
Nov. 8	N 6335	24533	Manila 722	Spy report on U. S. aircraft in the Philippines and analysis. (Note: This is why we did not worry too much over Japanese espionage.)
[8]				
Nov. 12	N	------	------	"Dissemination to White House." (This memorandum in Kramer's handwriting records reasons for giving original translations to Pres. Roosevelt (& Sec'y Hull) after Nov. 12, 1941. Prior to that time Memoranda forwarding Paraphrases of important messages had been furnished.)
*Nov. 12	N 6415	24373	Tokyo 762	The United States is still not full aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The date set in message #736 is a definite deadline. The situation is nearing a climax . . . time is indeed becoming short.
#Nov. 12	N 6416	24654	Tokyo 763	Germany putting pressure on Japan to get tough with the U. S.
Nov. 17	A 6540	24853	Hsinking #1	Umetsu to Kurusu (Nov. 6, 1941).
*Nov. 17	A 6541	24854	Hsinking #2 (Appended to #1).	Manchukuo-Soviet Relations. (It would be imposs sible for us to fight the Soviet Union unless something unforeseen happens. The Kwantung military command is restraining the forces there from any rash action. The Soviet is also endeavoring not to antagonize our country.
*Nov. 17	A 6542	24856	Hsinking #3 (Appended to #1).	Estimate of the Russo-German War. (The foundations of the Stalin regime are very firmly fixed. The outlook for any early close to hostilities in Europe is fading.)
**Nov. 17 & 22.	A 6553	24877 24857 & 25139	Wash. 1090	Nomura's swan song (Nov. 14, 1941). (The policy of the American Govt. in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part, either southward or northward. They are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare. It is not their intention to repeat the Munich Conference. The apex of German victories has been passed. The United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China: This war will be long, and whoever can hold out till the end will be the victors. I would like to caution patience for one or two months to get a clear view of the world situation. This would be the best plan.
[9]				
Nov. 17	A 6638	24878	Tokyo	Reply to Nomura. (The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days. I set the deadline. There will be no change.)

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NOVEMBER 1941—Continued

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
*Nov. 22	A 6710	25138	Tokyo 812	There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if the signing can be completed by *the 29th, we have decided to wait until that date.* This time we mean it that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. *After that things are automatically going to happen.*
Nov. 24	N 6731	25171	Tokyo 969	We would welcome peace between Germany and the Soviet Union.
#Nov. 24	A 6737	25174	Wash. 1148	Continue your efforts in guiding newspaper opinion.
*Nov. 24	A 6744	25178	Tokyo 823	The time limit set in my #812 is in Tokyo time. (See JD #6710.)
Nov. 26	A 6801	25322	Tokyo 2319	Should negotiations collapse . . . we will completely destroy British and American power in China. Keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions. (Circular to China Net—Nov. 14, 1941.)
#Nov. 26	A 6841	25344	Tokyo 836	Telephone Code (see JD 6890).
Nov. 26	N 6850	25392	Tokyo 2354	Winds Code—Morse (Nov. 19, 1941-J19).
*Nov. 28	N 6875	25432	Tokyo 2353	Winds Code—Voice (Nov. 19, 1941-J19).
			Appended to JD 6875	(Singapore version of the Winds Code. (N. E. I. (Thorpe) version of the Winds Code. (N. E. I. (Foote) version of the Winds Code. Japan-U. S.=East Wind Rain. Japan-U. S. S. R.=North Wind Cloudy. Japan-British=West Wind Clear (including N. E. I.).
Nov. 28	N 6890	25443		Washington-Tokyo Telephone Conversation Nov. 27, 1941 (2327-2334 E. S. T.)—The south, southward matter. A crisis does appear imminent. Regarding negotiations—do not break them off. We have a crisis on hand and the Army is champing at the bit. [Note: This was the only telephone conversation of any importance.] (See JD 6841.)
#Nov. 26	A 6891	25435	Wash. 1180	Our failure and humiliation are complete.
	6896	25436		
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#Nov. 28	A 6892	25437	Wash 1181	It is better to wire urgent news than to phone it.
*Nov. 28	A 6898	25445	Tokyo 844	The United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal (of Nov. 26th). Negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.
Nov. 28	N 6899	25446	Tokyo 843	Tokyo Broadcast Schedule.
#Nov. 29	N 6908	25476	Wash 1197	Ref. Tokyo 843, recommends change in Broadcast Schedule—Nov. 27, 1941. (See JD 6899.)
Nov. 30	N 6921	25496	Tokyo 857	Make one more attempt. Please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.
[11]			DECEMBER 1941	
#Dec. 1	N 6939	25545	Tokyo 2436	Destroying codes with chemicals.
*Dec. 1	N 6942	25556	Berlin 1393	Ribbentrop said, "It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity." "Should Japan become engaged in a war against the U. S. Germany, of course, would join the war immediately." Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret.
**Dec. 1	A 6943	25552	Tokyo 985	The conversations between Tokyo and Washington now stand ruptured—broken. Say *very secretly* to Hitler and Ribbentrop that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan, and this war may come quicker than anyone dreams. Will not relax our pressure on the Soviet, but for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the *north. Impress on the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.* (Nov. 30, 1941.) [Note: Coded message forwarded by Com 16 as GYROF 010091, 01091t, or 010927. Also forwarded from London as Admiralty #104 and #105. Admiralty 011530 advised "Tokyo to Berlin #985 of immediate interest to].
		25553		

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DECEMBER 1941—Continued

DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
*Dec. 1	A 6944	25554 25555	Tokyo 986	The Imperial Govt. can no longer continue negotiations with the U. S. The proposal presented by the U. S. on the 26th contains one insulting clause. It is clearly a trick. *The U. S. has decided to regard Japan as an enemy.* (Nov 30, 1941.) [Forwarded by Com 16 as CYROF ø1ø0ø1, ø1ø0ø14, or ø1ø0ø29.]
Dec. 2	A 6974	25572	Hsinking 781	In the event that war breaks out with England and the U. S.—Persons to be interned: (a) British nationals, 339; (b) American citizens, 81; (d) Nationals of the Soviet observed to be obnoxious characters with pro-British and American leanings are to be suitably taken care of.
#Dec. 2	N 6981	25604	Rome 768	Japanese language broadcasts to Europe. (Nov. 29, 1941.)
#Dec. 2	A 6982	25571	Rio 482	At present we can hear only the 6:30 p. m. JVJ transmission to the U. S. (Nov. 30, 1941.)
*Dec. 1	N 6983	25605	Tokyo 865	To prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that the negotiations are continuing. The above is for only your information. (GY Log #6428.)
**Dec. 1	N 6984	25606	Tokyo 2444	The four offices in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. (GY Log #6432.)
*Dec. 2	N 6985	25609	Tokyo 2409	Hidden Word Code (Nov. 27, 1941–J19). For later additions see:

JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	
7122	25830	Tokyo 2432. Tokyo 2433.	(?)
7214	25943	Tokyo 2450.	
7360		Tokyo 2431.	

Dec. 3	N 6991	25644	Tokyo 111	Make your "ships in harbor" report irregular but twice a week. (Nov. 15, 1941–J19.)
**Dec. 4	N 7001			JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to be the (missing) translation of the Winds Message.
#Dec. 3	N 7012	25656	Berlin 1396	Note from German Ambassador concerning what is to be done in the event of an Anglo-Japanese and an American-Japanese war. (Dec. 1, 1941.)
*Dec. 3	A 7017	25640	Tokyo 867	Washington burn all codes except one copy of "Oite" (Pa–K2) and "L" (LA). Stop using the code machine and destroy it completely. When you have finished this, wire back "HARUNA." Destroy all messages files and other secret documents. (Dec. 2, 1941.)
#Dec. 4	A 7029	25694	Tokyo 114 or 111.	Investigate fleet bases in Hawaii reservation. (Nov. 20, 1941—J19.)
#Dec. 5	A 7063	25773	Tokyo 113	Report ships in Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941—J–19.)
#Dec. 5	A 7064	25772	Honolulu 224	Unimportant spy report. (Nov. 18, 1941—I.
[13]				
#Dec. 5	N 7080	25781	Tokyo 842	The United States might make a protective occupation of the Dutch East Indies. (Nov. 27, 1941.)
*Dec. 5	N 7086	25823	Tokyo 122	In the future report even when there are no (ship) movements. (Nov. 29, 1941—J19.)
#Dec. 5	N 7091	25787	Tokyo 2443	London discontinue use of code machine and dispose of it immediately. Wire "SETUJU." (Dec. 1, 1941.)
**Dec. 4	N 7092	25783	Tokyo 893	Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia. (Dec. 1st.) [Note: Intercepted by Army at Fort Shafter, T. H. Received by Navy in late afternoon of Dec. 3, 1941, LCT. (GY Log #6498.)]

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DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
#Dec. 6	A 7111	25817	Honolulu 222	Spy report on Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor. (Nov. 18, 1941—J19.)
#Dec. 5	N 7122	25830	Rio 329	Tokyo Circular 2432—Additions to Hidden Word Code. (Dec. 2, 1941—J19.) (See JD #6985.)
Dec. 6	A 7125	25837	Bern	Tokyo Circular #2447. Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America and the South Seas, and to all our officials in British and Netherlands territory to burn all telegraphic codes except one copy of "Oite" and "L". (Dec. 2—J19.)
Dec. 6	N 7136	25836	Wash. 1268	We have completed destruction of codes but since negotiations are still continuing I request to delay the destruction of one code machine. (Dec. 5th.)
Dec. 6	A 7142	25835	Tokyo 897	Destroy one "B" code machine and use the other for the time being. [Note: #897 was the first Tokyo to Washington serial sent on Dec. 6, 1941. We intercepted #897–912 solid.]
			Tokyo 898	See JD #7199.
			Tokyo 899	See JD #7170.
#Dec. 6	A		Tokyo 900	Doemi praises KATO for good reporting.
[14]				
**Dec. 6	A		Tokyo 901	See JD #7149.
**Dec. 6 (1–13)	N 7143	25843	Tokyo 902	Japanese Declaration of War. (Parts 1–13.) (See GY Log #6619, 66 20, etc.)
**Dec. 7 (14)	N 7143	25843	Tokyo 902	Japanese Declaration of War. (Part 14.) (Very important.) (See GY Log #6649.)
*Dec. 6	A 7144	25844	Tokyo 904	Re my #902—Be most cautious in preserving secrecy. [Note: This was received before #902—See GY Log #6618.]
**Dec. 7	A 7145	25850	Tokyo 907	Re my #902—Submit our reply to the U. S. Govt. at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th *your time*. (Urgent—Very important.) (See GY Log #6648.)
#Dec. 7	A 7146	25853	Tokyo 908	Deepest thanks to both you ambassadors. (Urgent.)
*Dec. 7	A 7147	25854	Tokyo 910	After deciphering Part 14 of my 902 and also 907, 908, and 909, destroy at once the remaining cipher machine. (Extremely Urgent)
**Dec. 7	N 7148	25856	Tokyo 2494	Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations. (In Hidden Word Code.) (See JD #6985.)
**Dec. 6	A 7149	25838	Tokyo 901	Re my 844 (JD 6898). The Govt. has deliberated on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the U. S. contained in my separate message *#902, in English*. This message is very long—in 14 parts. Keep it secret for the time being. I will wire you in a separate message the time of presenting this memorandum to the U. S. Present it to the Americans *just as soon* as you receive instructions. [Note: #901 was intercepted before #904 and #902 See GY Log #6612.]
#Dec. 7	A 7150	25857	Tokyo 905	According to AP & UP reports the President has wired a personal message to His Majesty the Emperor. Please wire me the facts. (Urgent.)
#Dec. 7	A 7151	25858	Tokyo 909	I heartily thank IGUCHI and YUKI. (*Urgent.*)
[15]				
Dec. 9	A 7214	25943	Tokyo 2450	Supplement to Hidden Word Code (Dec. 2—J19). [Note: Com 16's 051402 advised "Singapore attaches *great importance* to Tokyo Circulars 2433 and 2450." Circular 2450 was requested by OpNav 061605 and was forwarded by Com 16 GY-ROF 070339, 070415, & 071257 (?). See GY Log #6665–6669.]
#Dec. 8	A 7257	25998	Tokyo/Extra	PAK2 message dated Dec. 6th. Of no importance, except to show *solid interception* of Tokyo-Washington messages on Dec. 6 & 7, 1941.
#Dec. 9	N		Tokyo 912	Same as #911 but in PAK2 (Dec. 7th) [Note: #912 was the last Tokyo-Washington serial sent. Our file of Tokyo-Washington serials sent on Dec. 6 & 7, 1941, is *complete*.]
*Dec. 10	N 7280	26029	Honolulu 252	The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the fifth: 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16 destroyers. Four ships of the Honolulu class were in dock. (Dec. 5th—PAK2.) [Note: Army intercept forwarded (by mail?) from San Francisco.]

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DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
*Dec. 10	N 7294	26053	Honolulu 241	The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleships is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. (Dec. 1—J19.) [Note: Army intercept forwarded (by mail?) from San Francisco.]
#Dec. 11	N 7299	26047	Wash. 1278	Re your #910 we will commence the demolition (of the code machine) and destruction by fire. [Note: Last Purple message sent by Washington (Dec. 7th).]
#Dec. 12	A 7330	26103	Cant. 512	The Army has completed all preparations to move immediately on Thai. (Dec. 2—J19.) [Note: Place of interception not known.]
Dec. 11	N 7335	26108	Pek. 625	Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America (*Dec. 5th*). [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. H. Received Dec. 10, 1941—see GY Log #6749.]
[16]				
----	----	----	903	See entry after JD #7205.
----	----	----	906	See JD #7183.
----	----	----	911	See JD #7205.
----	----	----	912	See Entry after JD #7257.
#Dec. 7	A 7157	25859	Tokyo 118	Honolulu retain codes so long as the local situation permits. (Nov. 28—J19.)
#Dec. 8	A 7158	25880	Tokyo 119	Report entrance and departure of capital ships. (Nov. 28—J19.)
#Dec. 8	A 7164	25879	Tokyo 2445	Burn all codes with exception of one copy of "Oite" and "L". Wire "HARUNA." Burn all secret documents. Be especially careful not to arouse suspicion. (To Habana.) (Dec. 2—J19.)
#Dec. 7	A 7170	25868	Tokyo 899	Anti-U. S. Propaganda.
#Dec. 7	A 7171	25851	Tokyo/Extra	Correction to #902.
#Dec. 7	A 7175	25845	Wash/Extra	Requests correction to #902. [Note: This is why Nomura was late.]
#Dec. 7	A 7176	25846	Wash. 1272	Japanese attempts to influence the American Govt. (Dec. 6th.)
*Dec. 8	A 7178	25877	Honolulu 253	There is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a *surprise* attack against these places. (Dec. 6th—PAK2.) [Army intercept forwarded by teletype from San Francisco.]
*Dec. 8	A 7179	25874	Honolulu 254	It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm. (Dec. 6th—PAK2.) [Army intercept forwarded by teletype from San Francisco.]
#Dec. 7	A 7183	25852	Tokyo 906	Minister SAKAMOTO return to his post at once. (*Urgent.*)
**Dec. 7	A 7184	25866	Budapest 104	On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th. (LA).
#Dec. 8	A 7199	25896	Tokyo 898	Send Terasaki to his post immediately. (Urgent. (Dec. 6th.)
#Dec. 8	N 7205	25923	Tokyo 911	Minor correction to #902. (Dec. 7th.)
#Dec. 8	A	----	Tokyo 903	Washington send #1286 to Brazil. (LA)
#Dec. 8	A 7212	25928	Honolulu 238	Honolulu spy report. (Nov. 28—J19.)
[17]				
#Dec. 11	N 7338	26109	Wash. 1276	Please wire the December operating expenses for all offices today. (Dec. 7—LA)
#Dec. 11	N 7360	26144	Rio. 328	Tokyo Circular #2431—Nov 29th. Additions to Hidden Word Code. (Dec. 2—J19) (See JD #6985) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Hunt, Va.]
#Dec. 12	A 7369	26214 27136	Hsinking	Prospective use of the Kwantung Army and recommendation against attacking Russia. (Dec. 4th) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. H.]
*Dec. 11	N 7370	26145	Hono. 245	Spy method of communication by signals: KGMB Want Ads. (Dec. 3—PAK2). [Note: Intercepted at Fort Hunt, Va. Translated in the rough by Mrs. Edgers, 1:00 p. m. on Dec. 6, 1941. Seen by Lt. Cdr. Kramer about 3:00 p. m. Typed smooth and distributed on Dec. 11th.]
#Dec. 11	A 7377	26142	Tokyo 909	When the Japanese Empire commences hostilities Manchukuo will not participate. (Dec. 4th) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, TH]
*Dec. 12	A 7381	26158	Tokyo 128	Honolulu wire immediately movements of the fleet subsequent to the 4th. (Dec. 6—PAK2) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. H.]

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DATE	JD#	SIS#	OTHER#	BRIEF
**Dec. 15	N 7469	26308	Tokyo 2556	Explanation of circumstances attending Nomura's presentation of Japanese Declaration of War to the U. S. Govt: "We really supposed that the negotiations had been broken off first, and the shooting had taken place after this. . . . The President's speech was trying to hide the fact that the United States had been taken by surprise and failed in the first step." (Dec. 11—J19) [Forwarded from Bainbridge Island by teletype.]
#Dec. 14	A 7479	26294	Rio 379	Tokyo Circular #2570:—The Imperial Naval Air Force damaged three battleships and sank three in the Battle of Hawaii. Those sunk were the Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Arizona. (Dec. 14—Plan Language.)
#Dec. 16	A 7511	26351 26352	Hono. 234	Spy report on maneuvers of U. S. Pacific Fleet. (Nov. 24—J19) [Note: Intercepted by Army at San Francisco.]
[18]				
#Dec. 19	A 7590	26479	Tokyo #4	War News Circular #4. The following report based on what the attacking forces witnessed during the battle as well as photographic observations after the battle, show that we had completely destroyed the United States Pacific Fleet and the American Air Forces in the Hawaiian region. (Detailed losses reported were very accurate.) (Dec. 18—Plain Language)
#Dec. 26	N 7848	26881	Pek. 616	If this war does start, this will be a war which will decide the rise or fall of the Japanese Empire. . . . It can be imagined that the next war is to be a longer one than the China Incident (Dated Dec. 3, 1941.) [Note: Intercepted at Corregidor, Dec. 7, 1941. Forwarded by Com 16 GYROF # -?- and received Dec. 8, 1941. GY Log #6707.]
**Dec. 30	A 8007	27065	Tokyo 123	To Honolulu: In view of the present situation, *the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance.* Let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor. Also whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets. (Dec. 2—J19) [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter, T. H. Reason for long delay not known, but apparently some one fumbled the ball. Note on translation says: "This message was received here Dec. 23."]

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EXHIBIT No. 24

SECRET

[1] SUMMARY OF FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS RELATING TO JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS

Explanatory Notes.

The summaries which follow are based solely on information relating to Japan's war potential and intentions included in reports from U. S. Military Attachés and Military Observers during the period beginning 1 January 1937 and ending 7 December 1941. These intelligence documents, a descriptive catalogue of which follows the yearly summaries, are reproduced in Far Eastern Documents, Volumes I–XV. In most cases marginal lines have been added to the documents to indicate sections pertinent to the subject.

Marginal references in the yearly summaries indicate the documents from which the information is extracted. For instance, "FE 1" refers to the first Far Eastern document. Where several sources contain essentially the same information, they are indicated in the margins but not always referred to

specifically in the text of the summaries. When the source of any statement is desired, the marginal references should be compared with the annexed table of contents of the documentary file.

The following abbreviations have been used:

MA Military Attaché or Assistant Military Attaché
MO Military Observer

Expressions such as "Tokyo reported" or "Singapore reported" refer to reports from War Department intelligence personnel stationed at those places. Reports are included from Military Attachés or Assistant Military Attachés on duty at embassies or legations in Japan, China, Thailand, Australia, Portugal, Great Britain, and Mexico, and from Military Observers in India, Malaya, and Netherlands Indies, where no diplomatic representation was maintained.

[2] *Japan's War Potential and Intentions*

1937

FE 1 During the first half of 1937, the military leaders of Japan were building up a war psychology. One of the most formidable instru-
FE 3 ments used as an army propaganda agency was the Imperial Reservsists Association, with a large and well disciplined membership scattered throughout Japan. The Army was engaged in a six-year
FE 4 expansion program providing for (a) increase of the Air Corps and antiaircraft defenses; (b) increase of the military force in Manchoukuo; (c) improvement of military training facilities; (d) replenishment of war materials; and (e) organization of industry in the interest of national defense.

FE 4 In the budget debate in the Diet during the early months of the year, references were made to the so-called "Continentatl Policy" and "Southward Expansion". While most of the pronouncements on
FE 2 expansion came from army leaders, there was indication of concurrence by the Navy when Rear Admiral Sekine, addressing a private gathering, said: "Even with no naval treaty, we need not worry. Our duty is clearly to go ahead with our preparations for overseas development."

FE 16 In early July the so-called China Incident began, and what at
FE 18 first appeared to be a local incident in North China developed into
FE 22 a major conflict engulfing a large portion of the Chinese Republic.
FE 24 Following the outbreak of hostilities, Japan began mobilizing the
FE 26 Army, and the movement eventually took on the proportions of a general mobilization. Four divisions were added to the active army
FE 29 by reconstituting similar units disbanded in 1925.
FE 31 The Japanese War Office extended the terms of service for members of mobilized units and units in China until ordered transferred to the reserves, except such privates as might be ordered discharged. Special volunteer officers and reservists of all ranks and grades called into active service were to serve until relieved from active service. For members of non-mobilized units at home stations, including conscript reserve privates, where the term would normally expire in 1938, the term was extended to 1939.

FE 30 The Japanese War Office, as of 30 September, estimated that there were available 4,750,000 trained and partly trained reservists meeting physical requirements. The MA in Tokyo estimated Japan had
FE 36 950,000 troops under arms as of 29 October. The Imperial Headquar-
FE 40 ters was established in the Imperial Palace on 20 November. Only on two previous occasions had this headquarters been established: in 1894, just prior to the Sino-Japanese War; and [3] in 1904, following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.

FE 23 Appropriations for the Army during 1937–38 totalled Yen 2,464,078,-117, including supplementary appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777, or 45 per cent of the expenditures voted for the year, which amounted to Yen 5,483,364,279.

FE 20 Few thoroughly modern army airplanes were in use in 1937, but prospects of improvement were excellent with an ambitious building program for 1937–38. The new 97 (1937) type planes compared favor-

ably with service models of foreign nations. Contracts were let for 500 new 97 (1937) type planes for delivery by 1 July 1938. Compared with the previous year, squadron strength increased from 53 to 59. Trained pilots numbered about 1400, with 288 trained during the year. The number of obsolete planes decreased, so that the number of available planes on 1 July (1223 of all types) represented an
FE 13 increase of only 34 planes. Several new airplane companies were formed, and plans were made for increasing production facilities.

FE 17 Legislation of a wartime character enacted at special sessions of the Diet included the "Military Secrets Protection Law," passed on 7
FE 25 August, and the "Munitions Industry Mobilization Law," passed on 9 September. The Cabinet Planning Board was reorganized to plan
FE 38 for complete control of industry, finance and labor, in accordance with the need of the national defense program.

FE 22 An unfriendly attitude toward foreign powers was manifested on several occasions during military operations in China. It was clearly
FE 26 stated on 17 September by the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister that peaceful commerce with China would not be interfered with, but if a situation like that in Spain should develop, Japan might change her policy. Nevertheless, there were several incidents involving British
FE 22 and American nationals. The attitude toward Great Britain was
FE 34 decidedly unfriendly, although Russia was constantly referred to as the immediate and potential enemy.

FE 32 The reaction to President Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech of 5 October was one of shocked disappointment without any demonstration of enmity. Likewise, the sinking of the American gunboat
FE 41 "Panay" brought an official expression of regret with offer of restitition. The public and the press expressed hope that the United States would be magnanimous in its judgment of the incident.

JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS

[4]

1938

FE 42 The MA in Tokyo reported on 6 January that the amicable settlement of the Panay Case should not obscure the fact that nationalistic groups in Japan harbor "considerable irritation and ill-feeling" toward the United States because of our "interference in the affairs of the Far East."

FE 56 The Japanese often reiterated that the United States "does not
FE 57 understand Japan" or "fully recognize the justice of Japan's stand,"
FE 58 and in so doing they made it evident that "understanding Japan" really meant giving her a free hand in East Asia.

FE 57 The Japanese Foreign Minister stated in March that "Japan desires stabilization in the Far East, with herself as the central figure," and that "there will be no conflict between Japan and the United States as long as they understand each other."

FE 58 Tokyo reported on 18 March that the Shiunso Society, a Japanese nationalistic group, stated in newspaper advertisements addressed to the American people that the way for the United States to get "peace in the Orient" was to stop oppressing Japan; "respect the position of Japan, the greatest power in the Orient; . . . make absolutely no political activity or economic operations having political significance without the understanding of Japan; . . . guide other Powers to take the same attitude."

FE 62 The enactment of the General Mobilization Law on 24 March
FE 65 laid the foundation for totalitarian control and for complete war-
FE 66 time mobilization of Japan's economy and manpower. This law,
FE 68 which was originally passed with the specific assurance that it
FE 69 would not be invoked for the "China Incident," virtually suspended
FE 78 the constitution and enabled the Government, through the issuance
FE 87 of Imperial Ordinances, to mobilize and regulate the human and material resources of the Empire exclusively for war. The Min-
FE 62 ister of War told the Japanese Army Division Commanders in April that there must be a mobilization of the entire Japanese strength "because the end of the China incident was remote and

the changes in the international situation were difficult to predict." Tokyo reported on 12 May that the Japanese War Ministry
FE 66 planned to issue a pamphlet which emphasized that "Japan is facing a crisis in which the fortune of the nation is at stake" and that "only by strengthening this general mobilization system can the ambitions of a third power be restrained." On 15 November the
FE 86 MA in Tokyo outlined the process by which the [5] General Mobilization Law was gradually being put into full effect through the piecemeal application of the various provisions at times when propaganda or military successes made conditions favorable.

FE 59 With the extension of military operations in China during 1938 the mobilized strength of the Japanese Army steadily increased. On 26 March the MA in China reported that a total of 1,200,000 Japanese troops were under arms. Various measures to strengthen
FE 44 the military conscription system, to increase the efficiency of mili-
FE 78 tary training, and to begin to utilize the manpower of Japan's
FE 60 colonies for military purposes were reported during 1938. The MA in Tokyo reported on 18 January that the new law to require two
FE 44 years of military service by all conscripts in the Japanese Infantry, regardless of preconscription training, was necessary because of the need for "further training of soldiers in the varied weapons now in
FE 60 use." An Imperial Ordinance, effective 3 April, provided that all Japanese subjects, including Koreans, Formosans, Ainu, and South Sea Islanders, above the age of 17, might volunteer for the Army, subject to selection and physical examination. Under this new program 400 Koreans were selected for training in 1938. Under the
FE 45 leadership of General Araki, Minister of Education, the Japanese
FE 78 educational system put increased emphasis on Japanese nationalism and military training.

FE 61 In commenting on the continued strengthening of Japanese home air defenses, the MA in Tokyo reported on 11 April that the Japanese were not greatly worried over the prospects of air raids by Chinese but that they were "drawing plans to combat potential danger from any source" and were "taking advantage of the present emergency to organize and train personnel on a nation-wide basis for coordination with military preparations." On 14 May the MA in Tokyo
FE 67 reported Japanese plans for the construction of 28 new airdromes near large cities and of double purpose parks-emergency landing fields in Japanese villages.

FE 63 Tokyo reported on 19 April that appropriations for the Army
FE 64 during 1938–39 totalled Yen 3,823,594,189 (compared with Yen
FE 23 2,464,078,117 for the fiscal year 1937–38) of which Yen 2,259,000,000 represented appropriations for the "China Incident" (against supplemental appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777 during 1937–38).

FE 67 In the spring of 1938 the Japanese Government launched a vigorous "spiritual mobilization" program to secure on the home [6] front the fullest possible support of the war in China. The MA in Tokyo reported on 14 May: "The response of the people appears to be all that could be desired. . . . With stoic determination the people
FE 75 have set to fight a serious war." Tokyo reported "as significant" that General Araki, Minister of Education, stated in a speech on 2 July that Japan possessed the perfect social system and therefore had become the center of the world. General Araki emphasized Japan's "mission" to unite the cultures of the Orient and the Occident in accordance with the "Imperial Principle."

FE 74 Tokyo reported on 1 July that the Japanese Army Air Corps was undergoing a "most widespread modernization program." On 1 July the number of Army planes was estimated to be 1,455 with 305 additional planes ordered but not delivered. The increase in first-line army planes from 782 to 1,093 and the decrease in obsolescent planes from 435 to 359 during the preceding 12 months was "due largely to the tremendous Army production program which commenced during the spring of 1937 and continues at present." Japanese aircraft production facilities were unable to meet the increased demands of the Army and Navy, however, and the Army bought 80 Fiat bombers abroad. During the preceding year Japanese army squadron

strength increased from 59 to 80, and on 1 July army pilots numbered 1,600, with 350 trained during the preceding 12 months.

FE 67 FE 71 FE 72 FE 73 FE 76 FE 77 FE 84 FE 85 FE 76 Increasing Japanese irritation over the foreign aid rendered the Chinese Government by foreign powers was reflected in numerous reports from the Far East during 1938. France was especially singled out for allowing the use of French Indo-China railways in transporting material to the Chinese and for objecting to Japan's apparent intention of occupying Hainan Island.

The MA in China on 15 July quoted Prince Konoe as saying that "foreign aid alone is prolonging the life of the Chiang Kai-shek regime" and that "Japan would take both economic and diplomatic measures to dissuade the foreign powers from aiding Chiang Kai-shek."

FE 67 FE 71 FE 84 FE 67 FE 71 FE 76 While the Japanese were using discriminatory measures and other pressure against French, English, and American interests in Japanese-occupied territories in the hope of stopping foreign aid to China, Germany tried to strengthen its ties with Japan by such acts as the recognition of Manchoukuo on 12 May, the ban on German exports of arms to China in June, and the withdrawal of German military advisers from China in July.

[7]

FE 72 FE 77 FE 78 FE 81 Russo-Japanese relations remained strained as a result of continued delay in renewal of the fishing agreement and of recurrent border incidents, especially the fighting at Changkufeng during July and August.

FE 79 FE 80 During the European crisis over Czechoslovakia in September, the MA in China reported by radio that a Japanese-controlled newspaper in Tientsin and a Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai indicated that Japan was prepared to support Germany and Italy even to the point of war.

FE 84 After the League of Nations authorized the imposition of economic sanctions upon Japan, but left it up to the individual nations to take action as they saw fit, the MA in China commented on 12 October that such decisions mean nothing unless strong nations "are willing to go to war to back them up." Japan answered this action

FE 85 of the League of Nations by severing all relations with that organization on 2 November, but the Japanese retained their Mandated Islands.

FE 86 Tokyo reported that the United States note of 6 October relating to the Nine Power Treaty brought Japanese newspaper comments, probably government-inspired, to the effect that this treaty was "out-moded" and could not "be made a cloak for political interference with Japan's aims."

FE 59 FE 76 FE 85 FE 58 FE 71 FE 75 FE 72 The Japanese Army continued its advance in China, having overrun over 500,000 square miles of territory in China by the end of 1938. Japan began to consolidate her military and economic gains in North and Central China. In order to strengthen the Japanese military machine, the semi-official North China Development Company and Central China Development Company placed their main emphasis upon the expansion of communication and transportation facilities and the production of iron, steel, coal, and synthetic oil.

[8]

1939

FE 91 The occupation of Hainan Island early in 1939, Tokyo reported on 13 February, gave Japan the following advantages: (1) it provided an air base close to Burma and French Indo-China; (2) it made possible a naval blockade of South China; (3) it brought French and British holdings in South China under Japanese guns; (4) it threatened Manila with encirclement; and (5) it added a second "Formosa" to Japan's island possessions. On 28 February Tokyo interpreted the

FE 93 significance of recent Japanese pressure upon French Indo-China and related to this aggression the strategical implications involved: "The occupation of Hainan is so obvious a form of pressure on the French that it is universally assigned a political motive of retaliation, in spite

of official denials. Occupation of the island not only gives Japan a potential naval base right in the front-yard of Indo-China, but it also provides a close-in base for immediate air operations to cut the supply routes leading into China from French territory." Concurrently, the MA evaluated the reaction of the Japanese press to "recent manifestations of U. S. foreign policy": "These developments [i. e., United States sale of war planes to France and proposed fortification of Guam], along with the parallel diplomatic action by the United States, England and France concerning Hainan and previous issues, are widely interpreted as indications of abandonment by the U. S. administration of the isolationist tradition of U. S. foreign policy, and of an alignment of the democratic powers against the authoritarian states including Japan." Subsequently, on 7 March, the MA in China

FE 95 reported the Japanese occupation of Hainan as a strategic move directed toward French Indo-China, Hongkong, Singapore, and the Philippines rather than a military expedient for current operations in China.

FE 96 On 8 March Tokyo forwarded further evidence of Japanese legislative measures designed to bring the nation closer to a war footing. Of particular significance was the proposal of a new "Law for the Protection of Secrets Concerning Military Resources," supplementing the provisions of the Military Secrets Protection Law of October 1937.

FE 99 On 23 March the MA in Tokyo reported that Japan was preparing a three-year plan for expansion of production of strategic materials and products in Japan, China and Manchoukuo in order to attain self-sufficiency. The MA stated that the government intended to spend 13 billion yen on the project and that in his opinion the degree of dependence on foreign sources in wartime would as a result be considerably reduced.

[9]

FE 102 On 1 April the MA in Tokyo commented on and forwarded to the War Department a tactical study made by an Army officer under his command. The study reviewed tactical doctrines of the Japanese Army, as modified by the new combat regulations of 1939 and by observation of current military operations in China. The report stated that the Japanese were making great efforts to modernize the Army, were spending large sums on aviation, motorization, and mechanization, and were increasing the strength of the division artillery. They were at the same time endeavoring to increase the efficiency of their military organization and tactical operation.

In the light of these improvements, the report concluded:

"The division which started the China Incident will not be the division of a future war. Increased material means will facilitate the task of Japanese tactics. Tactics are without meaning unless studied in relation to the human agent who will apply them in battle. This study has avoided excursions into the field of Japanese military psychology and national characteristics; however, it should be read with a constant eye to the nature of the Japanese Army for which these tactics are designed. It is an army easily misjudged by the foreign officer who sees first of all its straggling columns, slovenly dress and unmilitary bearing. Just as there is no glitter to its accoutrements, there is little theoretical excellence to recommend its tactics. But it is an army which excels in durability and performance. In the same way that its infantry "straggles" thirty miles a day and arrives at the destination on time and with surprisingly few casualties, its command and staff can be counted on to evolve plans and orders which, without being brilliant tactical combinations, are practical and workable schemes for getting a maximum performance from the Japanese soldier. Furthermore, the Japanese Army which fought with bows and arrows seventy years ago is thoroughly capable of learning from its mistakes and advancing with the new developments of warfare. While its swaggering self-confidence may receive some rude jolts in a major war, it is a rugged army fired with a devotion to duty and a narrow patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on a field of its own choosing."

FE 103 The rapid expansion of Japanese armaments was reflected in the 1939–40 budget passed by the Diet. On 10 April Tokyo reported that the sum for defense amounted to Yen 6,432,155,345, which was 68.35 per cent of the total budget. Both the Army and the Navy were being improved and modernized, and large sums were allocated to artillery, aviation, motorization, and new ships.

FE 104 Tokyo reported on 12 April further legislation enacted to establish the nation upon a more secure war footing. Articles 2 [*10*] and 6 of the National General Mobilization Law were invoked to provide (1) governmental limitation of dividends, and (2) governmental regulation of a maximum working day of 12 hours and of wages in factories employing more than 50 workers.

FE 105 In April, the MA in Japan, reviewing the trend of military aviation toward expansion, stated that since the beginning of the war
FE 106 in China, the personnel and aircraft strength of the Army Air Corps had increased 60 per cent, production had increased 125 per cent, and new construction of plants had enlarged production facilities by 40 per cent.

FE 110 Tokyo on 7 June reported a revision of the Military Service Law which extended the term of service in the Conscript Reserve from 12 years 4 months to 17 years 4 months and the training period of reservists to include the Second Conscript Reserve.

FE 111 On 9 June the MA in Tokyo reported on the series of disputes occurring toward the end of May and early in June between the Japanese and British over control of the British and French Concessions at Tientsin and the International Settlement at Shanghai. Ill feeling between the Japanese and the British was described as acute, particularly in Tientsin.

FE 113 On 1 July, Tokyo reported that the Army Air Corps, during the
FE 74 preceding year, had increased to 106 squadrons from 80; planes to 1961 from 1093; and pilot strength to 2900 from 1600.

FE 115 The MA in China, reporting on 13 July with reference to the anti-British campaign of the Japanese, pointed out that "the Japanese credo is to drive out all western influence from China"; that the time for an anti-American compaign would come; and that Japanese extremists and conservatives were agreed on the necessity for Japanese dominance in Asia.

FE 116 The MA in China, in a report dated 14 July, estimated the strength of the Japanese Army in China to be 840,000 men, and 240,000 additional men in Manchoukuo.

FE 120 The MA in Tokyo reported on 15 August that as a result of changes in conscription regulations, the estimated strength of the standing army will be 800,000 men, with an annual enrollment of 400,000 men.

FE 122 Tokyo reported on 12 September that the Japanese were taken aback by the announcement on 26 July of the American abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. The press claimed that the [*11*] United States Government was abandoning the isolationist tradition of foreign policy and was entering the alignment of democratic powers against the authoritarian states, including Japan. The government had adopted a "wait-and-see" course, being deterred, according to the MA. from exploiting an opportunity to push the hardpressed British only because of apprehension of Russia.

On the same date the MA in Japan estimated the future course of Japanese foreign policy, particularly with reference to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, as follows: "Under present conditions, it can safely be said that Japanese foreign policy will be directed toward a settlement of the China incident as rapidly as possible, and an avoidance, if possible, of any entanglements of any sort until a settlement of the China war shall have been realized."

FE 124 Tokyo reported on 20 September that the Japanese government was concerned over possible loss of exports as a result of the China war and was taking steps toward reducing electric consumption on non-essential lines. The MA stated that the power shortage touched many points in the national economy and was a vital matter, although Japan, in his opinion, could fill the military need of manpower through the use of female labor or other devices to maintain electric power at a necessary level.

FE 129 The MA in Shanghai dispatched on 1 October to the War Department a memorandum containing estimates of Japanese imperialistic designs in relation to the European war: "In the realm of foreign affairs Japan's immediate policy will be directed toward placating the United States and toward taking advantage of the present European embroglio to secure as many plums as possible. . . . Japan is reported to be watching carefully . . . the Dutch East Indies. It is rumored that Japan is waiting for the propitious moment to take advantage of British and French preoccupation to make a swoop in that direction. . . . Leap frogging Hongkong, French Indo-China and Singapore, the Japanese Navy could bring an irresistible force to bear and easily lop off this rich prize."

FE 132 On 1 November the same source defined the probability of an impending Japanese-American conflict and reported: "[The] Japanese realize that the United States is the greatest potential threat to the attainment of their 'Manifest Destiny' . . . Regardless of the final outcome, we may expect early retaliation for any decisive action we may take against Japan."

FE 133 Tokyo reported on 6 November (subsequent to the speech of Ambassador Grew of 19 October expressing unfavorable American opinion toward Japanese aspirations and activities in China, that [*12*] attempts on the part of the United States to apply economic pressure upon Japan would result in "a refusal to accept such pressure supinely and a turning toward such more sympathetic nations as may be available." The imminence of Japanese realignment incidental to such economic pressure was thus estimated: "Should the European struggle develop into a world war through participation by the United States, the grouping of Germany, Japan, and possibly Russia and Italy is a combination which under some circumstances could be very embarrassing to the United States as a belligerent in a world war."

FE 134 An impending crisis in Japanese-American relations was reported on 20 November by the MA in Japan. Included among citations of threatening Japanese policy were the Japanese War Minister's assertions that the Army intended to press the China Incident to a successful conclusion "without over-much regard for public opinion" and that, although abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty would undeniably affect Japan's material mobilization plans, "this situation can be met and our policy toward the United States should be a strong one."

FE 138 The year closed with the Japanese opening the lower Yangtze River. With reference to this move, the MA in Japan, in his report of 22 December, estimated that such conciliatory policies might temporarily ease relations but had little long-run significance in view of the ambitious continental policy of the Japanese, from which they were "not likely to be diverted except by force of arms or circumstances."

[*13*]

1940

FE 140 Reporting on 11 January that the imminent fall of the Abe Cabinet was due in part to Japanese concern over the approaching non-treaty status with the United States, the MA in China stated that Japanese political and military leaders "are anxious to appease us only until their 'immutable policy' of a Far Eastern hegemony is well on the road to accomplishment. Thereafter they feel they can disregard American opinion and pressure with impunity."

FE 141 Following the expiration of the Japanese-American trade treaty
FE 142 on 26 January, the Japanese felt that relations with the United States were in a "state of delicate balance." Tokyo reported that Japanese abrogation of the trade treaty with the Dutch might be the first step toward an eventual attempt at economic domination of the Netherlands Indies.

FE 144 The Japanese interpreted the new twenty-million-dollar American loan made to the Chinese Government in March as further evidence of American determination to try to thwart Japan's China program. The Japanese were pushing plans for setting up the Wang Ching-wei regime in Occupied China.

FE 146 The American non-recognition policy toward the Wang Ching-wei regime was interpreted by the Japanese as additional proof of our determination to try to check the Japanese in China, but Tokyo reported on 10 April that the Japanese were hopeful of making a deal with England and France whereby those nations would not oppose Japan's China policy in return for assurances of Japan's neutrality in the European war.

FE 147 Tokyo reported on 24 April that rumors of an imminent German attack on Holland were current in Japan, and that the Japanese demand for the maintenance of the *status quo* of the Netherlands Indies "was so presented as to invite the conclusion that it was intended to pave the way for intervention by the Japanese themselves."

FE 149 The increase in the Japanese Army budget for 1940–41 was accounted for by plans to reorganize the Army Air Corps and to replenish and improve armaments, Tokyo reported on 16 May. A chart of continuing expenditures for the years following 1940 indicated efforts to bring the equipment of the Japanese Army up-to-date as quickly as possible, but the decrease in the "China Incident" budget showed that new large-scale campaigns were not expected in China.

[*14*]

FE 148 After the German invasion of Holland, Tokyo reported increasing Japanese concern over the status of the Netherlands Indies. Concen-
FE 150 trations of Japanese troops on the islands of Formosa and Hainan
FE 151 were reported on 7 June from Tokyo, while a report dated 10 June stated that the impending American embargo on the export of machine tools had created "quite a furore" in Japan and that agitation for "positive action" against the Netherlands Indies was increasing.

FE 152 The MA in China reported large Japanese military, naval, and air force concentrations on Hainan Island. The present goal is apparently French Indo-China, this report of 12 June added, but the "ultimate objective is of course complete domination of the East Asian seaboard."

FE 153 The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July a minimum of 4040 Army and Navy airplanes of all types, with 1510 additional planes contracted for and not delivered; a total of 4565 officers, 1350 cadets, and 63,045 enlisted men in the Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service, including 5950 pilots; and a total of 238 air combat squadrons, composed of 114 in the Army Air Corps and 124 in the Naval Air
FE 156 Services. Further improvement in military aviation was expected with the establishment of the Hokota Army Air School for training in light bombing, as this would release the facilities at the Hamamatsu Army Air School for more extensive training in heavy bombardment and would be conducive to more efficient training in both light and heavy bombardment.

FE 154 On 11 July Tokyo reported that within Japan "the situation is at present sharply drawn between those who favor a closer tie-up with Germany and prompt action against Allied possessions in the Far East, and those who, distrusting Germany or feeling that immediate action is not necessary or desirable, would continue to concentrate on accomplishment of the China venture." Pending a decision, the Japanese Army concentrated troops, ready for action, opposite both Hongkong and the French Indo-China border.

FE 155 Tokyo reported that Army Districts in Japan were being reorganized, effective 1 August, to increase the efficiency of the Japanese Army for national defense, training, and administration.

FE 158 In the opinion of the MA in Tokyo the shakeup in the Japanese foreign service probably indicated an effort to remove men who were pro-American or pro-Allied. He reported on 4 September that the number of Japanese advocating an alignment with the Rome-Berlin Axis was increasing and that from a military standpoint the Japanese Army would not find it difficult "to take over the northern part of Indo-China."

[*15*]

FE 159 On 19 September Tokyo reported that the Japanese Army continued to avoid further commitments in China in order to be ready for action

if and when a favorable opportunity presented itself for a new venture elsewhere. If the European war seemed to point to a long-drawn-out struggle, the Japanese would eventually decide to seize the desired territories, counting on having time to organize their conquests for defense against the final European victor. The Japanese felt that the United States was certain to object to this expansion, was likely to retaliate by economic means, and might possibly oppose aggression with armed force. The Japanese believed that time would be on their side, however, as they felt it would be years before America's naval and military strength could be built up sufficiently for major operations in the Far East as long as the German menace still existed. The most radical immediate action, however, would probably be a move across French Indo-China, with or without acquiescence, to hasten the conclusion of the China War.

FE 160 Tokyo reported on 5 October that the Tripartite Pact had been signed after Japan realized that the United States was irreconcilably opposed to Japanese expansion in Asia. Japan had decided to change her traditional policy of "at least quiet relations" with the United States and to pursue a course to satisfy her national ambitions. The statement of Prince Konoe, in which he flatly declared that the question of peace or war in the Pacific "will be decided by whether Japan and the United States respect and understand the stand of each other" expressed the determination of the Japanese not to be dissuaded from their present
FE 161 ambitions by any half-way measures. Other reports from Japan and
FE 162 China during October emphasized the tense state of Japanese-American
FE 163 relations and the probability of continued Japanese aggression.

FE 164 On 31 October the MA in China reported that if a nonaggression pact could be signed with Russia, Japan would probably continue her southern expansion regardless of its effect on Japanese-American relations.

FE 165 Details of a new "Ten-Year-Plan" to weld Japan, China, and Manchoukuo into a close-knit economic unit were transmitted by the MA in Tokyo on 18 November, with comment on the great potential strength of Japan's economic position if such plans were to succeed.

FE 166 The MA in London forwarded on 20 November a report on the Japanese Army which stated, among other things, that the Japanese were probably ahead of most Western nations in landing and [16] combined operations. Special mention was made of the emphasis which the Japanese put on outflanking and enveloping movements in attacking and on morale and endurance in training army personnel. Japan was estimated to have had 1,350,000 men under arms, of whom 1,000,000 had had active service experience, as of December, 1939. This report concluded that "the Japanese army is a formidable fighting machine but has not yet reached the standard of efficiency of Western armies. It is, however, trained for and will probably only required to fight in Eastern Asia where it will have inherent advantages over an opponent."

FE 167. Reports from both China and Japan discussed the Japanese Army's
FE 168 evacuation of Kwangsi Province in November, and indicated that Japan's next move might be into southern French Indo-China.

FE 168 The MA in China, in commenting on Japan's plane with regard to the troops being assembled on the islands of Formosa and Hainan, observed that "some even presume an attack on the Philippines via Lingayen Gulf."

FE 169 Tokyo reported on 12 December that Ambassador Nomura's mission to try to improve Japanese-American relations was probably "doomed from the start" because the Japanese Government was "completely in the hands of the more chauvinistic elements" and was not prepared to make concessions in the Japanese program for East Asia which would be acceptable to American opinion.

[17] *1941*

FE 170 In forwarding the English text of the Japan-Thailand Treaty of Amity, the Tokyo MA on 11 January called attention to the progress of Japanese designs on French Indo-China and on bases for operations against Malaya and Singapore.

FE 174 In February Tokyo reported on the extreme character of the National Defense Security Act and said that its immediate effect would be closure of many sources of information. The MA in
FE 172 China reported that Japan was promoting border trouble in order to profit as a mediator "preserving the peace" between Thailand and French Indo-China. He also commented on Japan's warnings to the
FE 173 United States that she would tolerate no interference in developing the East Asia economic bloc, on her inclusion of the Netherlands Indies in this bloc, and on the reports that many Japanese divisions were being trained on Formosa and Hainan, all of which indicated plans to move southward. He believed that under certain conditions Japan would move directly on the Netherlands Indies.

FE 175 On 1 March Chungking reported that foreigners generally believed Japan's move on Singapore and the Netherlands Indies depended upon the outcome of Germany's offensive against England.
FE 177 The Military Observer at Singapore on 22 March reviewed the
FE 178 disposition of British forces in Malaya with approval, but predicted difficulties in meeting flank attacks and in maintaining signal communications. He also reported that the Japanese were reconnoitering the northern border of Malaya.

FE 179 On 18 April Tokyo pointed out that although the newly-concluded Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact obviously freed Japan on one front and enabled her to prepare for issues elsewhere, it removed none of the basic differences of opinion between the two countries.

FE 180 Tokyo reported the establishment of an Army Mechanization Headquarters charged with research into, and supervision of, training in the use of mechanized equipment.

FE 181 Meanwhile on 2 May Tokyo cabled a warning that the reported increases of Japanese strength in Formosa, Hainan, and French Indo-China were greater than normal for the China Incident and that these forces "may be there in readiness for a move against Singapore or East Indies." A report on field operations from Tokyo,
FE 184 21 May, warned that the Japanese would probably attempt [18] an all-out drive to conclude the China Incident in order to have a free hand for southward expansion if the United States should be-
FE 182 come involved in the war in Europe. In transmitting the Japanese Army Budget for the fiscal year 1941–42, the Tokyo MA contrasted it with the budget for the preceding year and pointed out that the China Incident expenditures alone could not explain its expansion.

FE 185 On 29 May Cungking forwarded Chinese estimates that Japan had 2000 Navy planes and 2500 Army planes.

FE 186 On 3 June Tokyo wrote: "* * * two new Inspectorates have been established, the Chemical Warfare Inspectorate and the Communications Inspectorate, thus considerably raising these two forms of military activity above the places which they have heretofore
FE 187 occupied in the Japanese services." Tokyo also reported on the
FE 188 yellow fever inoculations given in May to certain officers attached to northern units, on the training for transport of troops and supplies by air, and on parachute troop training. The Japanese Gov-
FE 194 ernment at this time was said to be facing great difficulty in preserving restraint vis-a-vis internal public pressure for strong, direct action toward the Netherlands Indies after the failure of the trade negotiations at Batavia.

FE 189 The Singapore MO believed that the Japanese would not move without a 50–50 chance for success. He expressed the opinion on 5 June that the Japanese were forcing economic penetration of Thailand and Indo-China, to be followed by military occupation in readiness for any advantage to be had from weakened British or American positions in that area. "With regards to defense of Malaya," he continued, "it is believed that the present forces of approximately 60,000 Army and 5,000 Royal Air Force personnel can contain for six months or more the force of six divisions and 1,000 planes which it is estimated Japan can now send against them."

FE 190 Hongkong reported that on 14 June 27 Japanese transports con-
FE 192 voyed by 21 destroyers were off the China coast travelling southward, and were expected to be off Hongkong on 17 June. On 25 June Hongkong further reported that three convoys, totalling about 50 trans-

ports, had been seen during the preceding fortnight and were believed to have gone to the Pescadores or Formosa. The MA in
FE 191 Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.

[19]

FE 193 Chungking believed that the sudden German offensive against Russia had caused a temporary lull in the threatening attitude toward
FE 195 the United States, and on 27 June cabled the opinion that the Japanese would be reluctant to make a major move until results of border incidents revealed the potential strength of the Russians.
FE 197 On 12 July Tokyo cabled: "Considerable scale of mobilization
FE 196 and unusual secrecy attending it now beyond question." Tokyo believed the Government, however, was still seeking to avoid positive
FE 199 commitments. Two days later Tokyo cabled that it was "now evident that large scale mobilization under way covered by unusual secrecy. Some newly mobilized men being sent to Manchoukuo but unable to determine number or whether any being sent south."
FE 200 Hongkong reported that 19 Japanese transports were moving southward from Formosa on 12 July.
FE 201 Chinese Military Intelligence was reported on 15 July to anticipate an early invasion of French Indo-China and to believe that areas newly ceded to Thailand were to be used as air bases.
FE 203 On 21 July Singapore reported that the Japanese had delivered a virtual ultimatum, with a 20 July deadline, in which they demanded the use of naval bases in southern French Indo-China. "If the French refuse, regardless of British or United States interference, the bases will be taken forcibly."
FE 204 London on 22 July reported belief that the Japanese had completed all preparations for taking over French Indo-China bases.
FE 206 On 26 July Tokyo cabled: "Largest single draft since initial mobilization for China War now under way under conditions extreme secrecy involving restrictions on movements foreigners in all direc-
FE 207 tions." Some Japanese in Tokyo interpreted the 26 July freezing of Japanese credits by the United States as the first step toward a final break with America.
FE 208 Singapore on 29 July estimated that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was approaching 40,000 men and believed there would be forcible seizure of additional bases.
FE 209 Japan demanded the right to occupy Thai naval and air bases, and on 31 July Bangkok commented: "An immediate Nipponese move is anticipated due to Thai indecision."

[20]

FE 211 Estimates were forwarded from London on 3 August that more
FE 220 than 500,000 Japanese were mobilizied during June and July, and further British estimates, forwarded from Chungking, 20 August, placed Japanese strength at 49 divisions, with 54 available by the end of August when mobilization would be complete.
FE 212 The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July 3200 Army
(FE 153) airplanes (1940 estimate was 2010); a total of 3600 officers, 1600 cadets and 34,800 enlisted men (1940 estimate was 2900 officers, 1350 cadets and 28,700 enlisted men) in the Army Air corps, including 3900 pilots (1940—3100 pilots); and 136 air combat squadrons in the Army Air Corps (1940—114 combat air squadrons).
FE 213 Tokyo estimated on 5 August that the aircraft industry, working at maximum wartime capacity, could produce annually the equivalent of 4,500 two-place, single-engine military airplanes. Actual production for the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 was estimated to be 2,730 combat aircraft. It was concluded that since the end of 1939 the aircraft industry had increased production by about one-half and capacity by about two-thirds, while completion of construction then in

sight would give a capacity double that of 1939. The number of employees engaged in the manufacture of airplanes had increased 55 per cent, and employees in engine manufacturing plants had increased in number 57 per cent from 1938–39 to 1940–41.

FE 218 Chungking reported 15 August Japanese plans to take over international concessions and to capture American marines in Shanghai by surprise.

FE 219 Chungking on 19 August forwarded British estimates that Japanese tank strength, exclusive of baby tanks and armored machine gun cars, was ten regiments, each consisting of 160 tanks, with an equal number in reserve.

FE 224 In addition the MA at Chungking on 27 August forwarded a Russian estimate that the actual strength of the Japanese Army was 48 divisions and 20 independent brigades (approximately 58 divisions), with 300,000 men in training, possibly ready in three months. Uncalled reserves were believed to number 210,000. Eleven divisions could be organized from reserves already trained and 16 from those then in training. These figures include corps, army, and service troops. Artillery was believe to be insufficient. The total potential strength was estimated by the Russians to be 76 divisions.

[*21*]

FE 222 On 21 August Tokyo reported that drastic shipping control meas-
FE 223 ures were about to be instituted by the Japanese Cabinet. Tokyo also reported five main forces, composed of ten armies (54 divisions), located overseas.

FE 226 On 1 September the Tokyo MA reported on the organization and high quality of the Japanese military signal communications system, and commented that Japanese radio equipment was "comparable to our own in every respect."

FE 229 On 11 September Tokyo made a full report on the National mobilization which had begun 3 June. In his opinion "in round numbers about 700,000 were called up during this mobilization." This number did not include the home defense "National Army," which was called up for five days' training. "The number of men mobilized was far too great for mere replacement purposes in existing divisions now in Japan or on the Continent . . . While estimates of other foreign observers place the total number of men mobilized as high as 1,250,000, it is believed that these estimates . . . [are too high]." About 90 per cent of the total of 18,000 horses also mobilized at this time were known to have gone south rather than direct to Manchoukuo or Korea.

FE 230 Japan set up a National Defense General Headquarters (reported by Tokyo on 16 September) in a move to improve arrangements for the defense of Japan Proper.

FE 231 Invocation of the last drastic measures of the 1938 National Mobilization Law (revised) and a tense political atmosphere indicated, according to Tokyo, that the day for a final decision on "immutable" policies was drawing near. Internally the nation was mobilizing for total war.

FE 239 On 14 October Hongkong reported the presence of 22 transports on the Pearl River.

FE 240 The China MA cabled on 17 October: "Increased Nazi activity in Japan plus the cabinet crisis and attacks on U. S. by spokesmen and press considered strong evidence of drastic action in the near future."

FE 242 Commenting on heavy troop movements into French Indo-China, Tokyo concluded on 20 October: "If the rumored increase goes above the number originally agreed upon there cannot remain much doubt as to the intention behind it."

[*22*]

FE 243 Tokyo reported on 20 October that General Tojo, on becoming Premier, retained his status as an officer on the active list, an unusual

procedure, and concluded that the third Konoe cabinet fell because of inability to meet army criticism of its policy toward French Indo-China, the conversations in Washington, and its policy vis-a-vis a weakened Russia.

FE 245 London cabled on 21 October: "Japanese troops in Indo-China will be strengthened as follows: 36,000 there now; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans." Chung-
FE 246 king on 23 October reported the official French Indo-Chinese view to be that the Japanese would attack Thailand about 15 November.

FE 247 A general southward movement of Japanese shipping in the Western Pacific was reported on 27 October from Singapore, together with intelligence that two aircraft carriers and 60 flying boats, fighters and bombers were operating in the Mandated Islands.

FE 249 Under pretext of surveying a new commercial air route the Japanese made a number of flights between Palau (Pelew) and Timor, violating at the same time certain provisions of the agreement granting them the privilege of flying over Dutch territory. Unusual passenger lists, the absence of commercial justification, the type of equipment, and the movement of guard vessels were reported on by the MO at Bandoeng on 30 October.

FE 248 On 29 October the MA in Chungking radioed that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was then 57,000 troops, and that it was steadily increasing in numbers. He anticipated a possible drive through
FE 250 Yunnan toward the Burma Road. Thailand was reported ready to capitulate in the hope that the country would be saved from the ravages of war.

FE 262 The Japanese Consul General at Batavia was reported to have recommended that on the outbreak of war all Japanese should report promptly to the Netherlands Indies authorities for internment, thus
FE 253 avoiding violence. The Singapore BMritish, however, were reported by the MO to believe that no attack could be expected before April because of the prevailing northeast monsoon over Malaya.

FE 254 The MA in London forwarded on 9 November a British opinion that Japan no longer felt that it must make every effort to avoid war with the United States and that Japan would find it too difficult to attack Malaya or the Burma Road and hence might be expected to attack Netherlands Indies .

[23]

FE 256 On 16 November Tokyo estimated production of aircraft at 200 planes per month for the Army. All factories in the aircraft industry had gone on a 3-shift 24-hour day in mid-June. The MA estimated that the current monthly maximum for production was 420 military planes, including trainers.

FE 258 The London MA on 21 November cabled a summary of British Intelligence as of 18 November, in which it was stated that failure of agreement in the Washington talks would require a major Japanese decision whether to risk probable war; that Japan would probably not attack Siberia at that time; that unless agreement was reached in Washington, the war in China would continue; that Japan probably did not intend to attack the Burma Road at that time; and that the occupation of Thailand, the best possibility for the moment, would pave the way for subsequent attack upon Malaya, yet minimize the risk of a general war.

FE 264 The Singapore MO advised the War Department on 2 December that the alert in Malaya had been advanced from the third to the second degree on the previous day. Japanese reconnaissance activ-
FE 260 ities over Malaya were reported.

FE 268 The MA in Melbourne radioed that on 6 December the Netherlands Far East Command, upon learning of Japanese naval moves on Menado and/or Ambon out of Palau, had ordered the execution of Plan A-2.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: Commanding General, Alaska Defense Force.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Philippine Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G-2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Headquarters, Puerto Rican Dept.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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